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ABSTRACT 
 
KWANGTAEK HAN: Spectral Substances of Democracy: Agency, Affect, and Power in 
American Romance 
(Under the direction of Eliza Richards) 
 
 
Focusing on texts by Charles Brockden Brown, Edgar Allan Poe, Nathaniel 
Hawthorne, and Herman Melville, my dissertation traces the historical conditions that 
shaped their heterodox political ontologies and the challenge these ontologies posed to 
what their contemporaries considered the essential fulcrums of American democracy: 
autonomous agency, solidifying affect, and consensual power. These canonical authors 
capture the paradox that such principles are liable to impersonal, disruptive, and 
autocratic operations that preclude the actualization of American democracy. This 
liability, they reveal, is hardly perceived as threatening to American democracy since it is 
a necessary condition for sustaining a fantastical belief in American democracy as a 
consensual society of self-governing individuals sympathizing with others for the public 
good. The romancers dramatize the unrecognized, antidemocratic workings of agency, 
affect, and power in their works, written during the critical periods of nation-building 
(Brown), Jacksonian Democracy (Poe), the rise of abolitionist and feminist movements 
(Hawthorne), and the Secession crisis leading to the Civil War (Melville). Their 
romances divulge the profound paradox that personal autonomy, affective solidarity, and 
popular sovereignty are spectral substances—conceptually present yet empirically 
absent—that uphold the politico-ontological ground of American identity. These 
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oxymoronic foundations of American existence, I argue, not only account for the 
enduring social desire and energy of American democracy, but also answer for its 
eventual impossibility. 
In the introduction, I define the three key concepts of my project—democracy, 
ontology, and substance in antebellum contexts. Chapter I investigates how Brown in 
Wieland demystifies the two competing ideologies of American democracy: the 
Republican-Democratic call for individual self-government and the Federalist request for 
national unity. Chapter II explores Poe’s critique of the dominant democratic logic of 
political and cultural identification and the vain pursuit of singular individuality. Chapter 
III examines Hawthorne’s inquiry into morbid, immoral sympathies in The Scarlet Letter, 
which reject the notion of sympathy for democratic social reforms. Chapter IV considers 
Melville’s insight into the paradox of popular sovereignty in Moby-Dick by focusing on 
the quarter-deck scene, in which Ahab garners the crew’s voluntary, unanimous consent 
to transform the commercial whaler Pequod into an instrument of his personal vengeance. 
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Introduction 
The Romance of Democracy 
 
For the last thirty years, literary critics have identified the antebellum romance as 
an effective mode of critique for the failings of American democracy. The source of those 
failures, according to this vibrant critical tradition, resides in the Gordian knot of race, 
class, and gender inequality. Charles Brockden Brown, Edgar Allan Poe, Nathaniel 
Hawthorne, and Herman Melville continue to be singled out as genuine critics of these 
three interlocking historical failures of democracy during the antebellum period.1 
                                                          
1 For the most recent studies on the question of race/class/gender in Brown’s romance, see Hana Layson, 
“Rape and Revolution: Feminism, Antijacobinism, and the Politics of Injured Innocence in Brockden 
Brown’s Ormond,” Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 2, no. 1 (2004): 160-191, 
Fredrika J. Teute, “A “Republic of Intellect”: Conversation and Criticism among the Sexes in 1790s New 
York,” Julia Stern, “The State of “Women” in Ormond; or, Patricide in the New Nation,” and Sean X 
Goudie, “On the Origin of American Specie(s): The West Indies, Classification, and the Emergence of 
Supremacist Consciousness in Arthur Mervyn,” in Revising Charles Brockden Brown: Culture, Politics, 
and Sexuality in the Early Republic, eds. Philip Barnard, Mark L. Kamrath, and Stephen Shapiro 
(Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 2004), 149-181, 182-215, 60-87, Paul Lewis, “Attaining 
Masculinity: Charles Brockden Brown and Woman Warriors of the 1790s,” Early American Literature 40, 
no. 1 (2005): 37-55, Maria DeGuzman, “The Shadow of the Black Legend,” in Spain’s Long Shadow: The 
Black Legend, Off-Whiteness, and Anglo-American Empire (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2005), 1-68, Laura Doyle, “Transatlantic Seductions: Defoe, Rowson, Brown, and Wilson,” in Freedom’s 
Empire: Race and the Rise of the Novel in Atlantic Modernity, 1640-1940 (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2008), 145-182, Bryan Waterman, “‘The Sexual Difference’: Gender, Politeness, and Conversation 
in Late-Eighteenth-Century New York City and in Charles Brockden Brown’s Alcuin (1798),” The Literary 
Utopias of Cultural Communities, 1790-1910, eds. Marguérite Corporaal and Evert Jan van Leeuwen 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), 23-46, Erica Burleigh, “Incommensurate Equivalences: Genre, Representation, 
and Equity in Clara Howard and Jane Talbot,” Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 9, no. 
3 (2011): 748-780. For the most recent studies focusing on the question of race/class/gender in relation to 
the failings of American democracy in the romances of Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville, see Joan Dayan, 
“Romance and Race,” in The Columbia History of the American Novel, ed. Emory Elliott (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991), 89-109, Timothy B. Powell, Ruthless Democracy: A Multicultural 
Interpretation of the American Renaissance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), Arthur Riss, 
Race, Slavery, and Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century American Literature (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), Amy Schrager Lang, The Syntax of Class: Writing Inequality in Nineteenth-
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Offering an alternative to this dominant critical tendency, my dissertation examines the 
works of these four canonical authors in order to identify their shared critiques of the 
fundamental but overlooked ontological causes of democracy’s failure in America. Their 
arcane romances, I contend, capture the profound paradox of American democracy: the 
ways that Americans think and feel about personal autonomy, social harmony, and 
political authority preclude the actualization of the democratic doctrines that give rise to 
these thoughts and feelings. The values of autonomous selfhood, humane social order, 
and consensual power are inscribed in the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. 
Constitution; and yet the very desire for these inviolable values, when activated through 
the ideologies, institutions, and practices designed in support of democracy, works in an 
impersonal, disruptive, and autocratic fashion that prevents the instantiation of 
democratic principles. Brown, Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville reveal that the presence of 
this dilemma on an ontological level is central to the unfulfilled promises of American 
democracy and exists prior to the historical quandaries of race, class, and gender 
inequalities. 
In so doing, these authors find their contemporaries oblivious to the 
antidemocratic workings of agency, affect, and power. This collective ignorance is, they 
notice, necessary for sustaining the communal vision of American democracy in which 
autonomous individuals work for the public good through their shared sympathies and 
establish a political authority based on popular consent. Upholding this seamless vision is 
not simply a political strategy, but also, on a more fundamental level, an ontological 
necessity. From its outset, the American Republic was predicated on the notion of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Century America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), Ivy G. Wilson, Specters of Democracy: 
Blackness and the Aesthetics of Politics in the Antebellum U.S. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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political autonomy and independence from the British Empire, and this logic, as 
expressed in the Declaration of Independence, posited that every American citizen was 
liberal and equal, imbued with the “voice of justice and of consanguinity” for “the public 
good,” and managing the government through “the consent of the governed.” Considered 
“self-evident,” these ontological propositions, as historian Edmund S. Morgan has 
pointed out, “are not debatable, and to challenge these would rend the fabric of our 
society”2 since they are the fundamental ideological foundations of American existence. 
Indeed, the declared doctrines of American democracy were enshrined as the essential 
components of the American existence, and the unprecedented social democratizations 
after the abolition of the monarchy and aristocracy in the early national and the 
antebellum periods3 reinforced the equation of the principles of American democracy 
with the foundations of American existence. This equation, central to the formation of a 
sense of the exceptional meaning and importance of the American life, prevented 
antebellum Americans from recognizing and criticizing the problematic workings of their 
agency, affect, and power. The political ontologies of Brown, Poe, Hawthorne, and 
Melville capture the paradoxical necessity of this ignorance, which served to maintain a 
fantastical belief in America as a consensual government of self-governing individuals 
sympathizing with others for the public good. 
                                                          
2 Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America 
(New York: Norton, 1988), 14. Like a number of scholars of American history and culture, Morgan regards 
the principles of universal liberty and equality as well as the rule by the consent as “the fictions we accept 
today as self-evident,” which “Thomas Jefferson enshrined in the Declaration of Independence” [Ibid]. In 
this dissertation, I am more concerned with the practical dimension of such historical fictions—how a set of 
social practices coupled with the ideologies of American democracy during the early national and the 
antebellum periods served to delusively substantiate the American convictions in the abstract values and 
doctrines of liberty, equality, and sovereignty through the tangible instances of such social democratization. 
 
3 The Declaration of Independence abolished the monarchy and the Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. 
Constitution abolished aristocracy by proclaiming that “[n]o Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United 
States.” 
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The present project aims to recover the long-ignored politico-ontological critique 
of American democracy in the romances of Brown, Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville. It also 
challenges the existing critical propensity to reduce the failures of American democracy 
to issues of race, class, and gender. A number of scholars have identified how these 
authors critically partake of their contemporaries’ discourses of race, class, and gender. 
But none has noted their shared insight into and critique of the fundamental ontological 
paradox underlying the political fashioning of what are considered the essential American 
identity and existence, which, prior to the specific historical issues of race, class, and 
gender inequality, accounts for the enduring failures of American democracy. In this 
introduction, I first turn back to the last quarter of the eighteenth century, when the 
profound ontological paradox of American democracy arose within the process of 
founding a new democratic nation and constituting a corresponding people. 
 
The Ontology of American Democracy 
From its inception, the American Republic amalgamated a strain of philosophy, a 
fabric of polity, and a mode of life germane to the democratic maxim of “We the People,” 
a resounding opening phrase of the Constitution which established the citizens of the U.S. 
at the heart of their new democratic government. This threefold combination was first 
manifested in the Declaration of Independence, as it made a public announcement of a 
new American people designated “We.” One of their “self-evident” natural rights was, 
among others, a government, “instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed.” Later, the preamble of the U.S. Constitution brought to the fore 
the phrase “We the People” in order to insist that they “ordain and establish” their 
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Constitution in order to, among other important principles, “promote the general welfare.” 
The two documents together endowed the referent of the elusive “We the People” with a 
significant sense of its empirical existence. In his autobiography, Thomas Jefferson, who 
had authored the Declaration of Independence, underscored that “[t]he question was not 
whether, by a declaration of independence, we should make ourselves what we are not; 
but whether we should declare a fact which already exists.”4 Jefferson was confident that 
there was ontic substance to the philosophized and politicized concept of “We the People.” 
As a matter of fact, the notion was no pure illusion to his contemporaries. It found its 
proper, if not perfect, referent in a succession of the common American people’s active 
political coalitions, declarations, and reactions, as well as the ardent cultural 
demonstrations of their democratic ideals and interests during the Revolutionary War and 
subsequent years.5 Such dynamic phenomena of social democratization in a new political 
order and a new cultural sphere allowed antebellum Americans to feel certain that a 
viable democratic society established by “We the People” was emerging. As Thomas 
                                                          
4 Thomas Jefferson, The Autobiography of Thomas Jefferson, 1743-1790, ed. Paul Leicester Ford 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 24. For Jefferson’s philosophical and practical 
ideas of the Declaration of Independence, see Garry Wills, Inventing America: Jefferson’s Declaration of 
Independence (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002). 
 
5 In fact, large numbers of common men actively engaged in their commonplace pursuit during the 
founding era through various forms of political and cultural practices. Regarding the expressions of popular 
convictions and mobilizations of the people before and after the “Declaration of Independence,” see 
Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), Pauline 
Maier, American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence (New York: Vintage Books, 1997). 
For the substantial influence of the democratic force of the populace upon the formation of the Constitution, 
see Woody Holton, Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2007), Jason Frank, Constituent Moments: Enacting the People in Postrevolutionary America (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2010), Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the 
American Working Class 1788-1850 (1984; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 63-76. For the most 
recent study on the democratic literary culture during the founding era, see Trish Loughran, The Republic 
in Print: Print Culture in the Age of U.S. Nation Building, 1770-1870 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2009). 33-104. 
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Paine firmly believed, “We have it in our power to begin the world over again … The 
birthday of a new world is at hand”6 [emphasis added]. 
However, the proclaimed model of a democratic government—a government of 
the people (“instituted among Men”), by the people (“powers from the consent of the 
governed”), and for the people (“the general welfare”)—did nothing but articulate the 
democratic principle of the American Republic: the sovereignty of a government should 
be vested in the people. As Carl Schmidt has pointed out, “[t]he connection of actual 
power with the legally highest power is the fundamental problem of the concept of 
sovereignty.”7 For the framers facing this conundrum, to decouple actual power from 
legal power was the only solution. As the new nascent Republic enclosed a multitude of 
heterogeneous people and their conflicting desires and practices in geopolitical 
boundaries and social limits,8 the consequent social complexities and contradictions were 
ascribed to the side effects of democracy that would transform all the encompassed 
people into the political demos. Thus, the democratic government run by the multitude 
solely for their common interests remained an idea that was neither fully accepted nor 
implemented. Indeed, the framers divorced the theory of the sovereign populace from the 
                                                          
6 Thomas Paine, Rights of Man, Common Sense, and Other Political Writings, ed. Mark Philp (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 53. 
 
7 Carl Schmidt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 18. 
 
8 Aware of the inherent and increasing heterogeneities of the American people, James Madison stressed that 
“[t]hose who contend for a simple Democracy, or a pure republic, actuated by the sense of the majority, and 
operating within narrow limits, assume or suppose a case which is altogether fictitious. They found their 
reasoning on the idea … that they all have precisely the same interests, and the same feelings in every 
respect. … We know however that no Society ever did or can consist of so homogeneous a mass of 
Citizens” (Quoted in Joseph K. Ellis, American Creation: Triumphs and Tragedies at the Founding of the 
Republic [New York: Vintage Books, 2007], 112-113). Robert A. Dahl has also pointed out that the nascent 
Republic was “not a static system” in the sense that history had indeed forged no relevant models of 
democratic government on similar scale, much less the scale US democracy would attain in the years to 
come (How Democratic Is the American Constitution? [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002], 10). 
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reality of popular sovereignty in order to prevent the possibility of mob-driven 
democracy. According to Joseph K. Ellis, “none of the founders, to include Jefferson, 
regarded democracy as a goal of the American Revolution. Throughout the founding era, 
the term “democracy” remained an epithet, used to tar an opponent with the charge of 
demagogy or popular pandering.”9 Sean Wilentz has also affirmed that “[i]mportant 
elements of democracy existed in the infant American republic of the 1780s, but the 
republic was not democratic. Nor, in the minds of those who governed it, was it supposed 
to be.”10 For instance, James Madison, who stressed that “the censorial power is in the 
people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people,” stubbornly 
denounced and rejected the institutionalization of rule by the popular majority for fear of 
democracy with mob rule.11 Even William Findley, an ardent Anti-Federalist, 
underscored in his speech that “sovereignty is in the states and not in the people in its 
exercise.”12 
Nonetheless, “[w]hen Americans referred to the sovereignty of the people,” as 
Gordon W. Wood has pointed out, “they meant that the final, supreme, and indivisible 
lawmaking authority of the society remained with the people themselves, not with their 
representatives or with any of their agents.”13 Therefore, the philosophical and political 
                                                          
9 Joseph K. Ellis, American Creation: Triumphs and Tragedies at the Founding of the Republic [New York: 
Vintage Books, 2007], 241-242. Ellis presumes that Thomas Paine did not employ the term “democracy” in 
Common Sense (1776) because of its negative connotation (Ibid., 43). 
 
10 Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln (New York: Norton, 2005), xvii. 
 
11 Quoted in Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy, 71. For Madison’s famous discussion of the 
problems of the popular government operated by the people, see The Federalist, No. 10. 
 
12 Quoted in Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788 (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2010), 110. 
 
13 Gordon S. Wood, The Idea of America: Reflections on the Birth of the United States (New York: Penguin, 
2011), 184. 
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configurations of the very essential doctrine of democratic power based on popular 
sovereignty found no proper counterpart in political reality. Since the substantiation of 
the doctrine of popular sovereignty was central to sustaining a seamless and holistic sense 
of American identity grounded on the democratic vision of “We the People,” the 
American people had to and did contrive alternatives that filled in the blanks; individual 
liberalism was their solution. As a matter of fact, the American Republic was a historical 
construct built not so much on popular democracy as an individual liberalism and would 
remain so until the Jacksonian era; the political space the new nation unfurled was for 
individuals who, now free from social hierarchy and monarchical power, became 
unbridled members—not necessarily political equals—of society. The grounding visions 
and ideas of the framers and the new political system they enacted were intended less for 
the equal demos than for liberal individuals, partly due to their primary aim to secure 
individual freedoms from British tyranny and partly due to their deep concerns about the 
dangers of popular power, then considered the equivalent of mob rule. This condition 
brought about an unbridgeable divide between the feared political demos and the 
privileged liberal individuals. The two were now strictly separated in exerting the rubric 
of “We the People,” which placed the referent of “We the People” in a fundamental 
ontological dilemma, caught between individual liberalism and popular democracy. Since 
democracy was not considered the effective and desirable solution for implementing the 
principle of popular sovereignty, individual liberalism was the only way to deal with the 
dilemma. 
The American notion of selfhood during the Revolutionary Era was the product of 
individual liberalism before it was aligned with the newly formulated notion of 
 9 
 
democratic citizens. The new dilemma lay in the impossibility of equating democratic 
citizens circumscribed by the electoral rules and governmental policies with liberal 
individuals as distinct agents of personal autonomy. For liberalism and democracy were 
two fundamentally distinct, even conflicting ideologies, putting individual freedom at 
odds with public equality.14 To conceive of a society of liberal and democratic members 
without canceling their liberal or democratic grounds required a reconfiguration of the 
American self proper to the American democracy. This requirement was met by bringing 
the tenets of democracy to the realm of proper individualism. According to Christopher 
Castiglia, early American citizens were encouraged to relocate their democratic impulses, 
aspirations, and strivings to their interiors, what he calls “inner life,” which served to 
displace the conflictual political and cultural publics with the turbulent feelings and 
conflicted desires. This internalization of democratic dilemmas, Castiglia argues, caused 
antebellum Americans to misconceive “the incessant labor of vigilant self-scrutiny and 
self-management as effective democratic action.”15 However, he does not probe into the 
                                                          
14 According to Chantal Mouffe, who draws on Claude Lefort’s concept of modern democracy as “the 
dissolution of the markers of certainty,” such a radically indeterminate modern democracy stems from “a 
contingent historical articulation” between “the liberal tradition constituted by the rule of law, the defense 
of human rights and the respect of individual liberty” and “the democratic tradition whose main ideas are 
those of equality, identity between governing and governed and popular sovereignty” (The Democratic 
Paradox [London: Verso, 2000], 2-3). For the conceptual difference between liberalism and democracy, 
see John McGowan, American Liberalism: An Interpretation for Our Time (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina, 2007), 12-13; by McGowan’s account, “[i]n general, liberalism is the attempt to maximize 
individual freedom within a legal order that distributes power. Democracy, on the other hand, refers to the 
location of sovereignty in the people and to mechanisms of decision-making at various sites, most notably 
within the government, but also potentially in the workplace and other locales” (ibid., 13). 
 
15 Christopher Castiglia, Interior States: Institutional Consciousness and the Inner Life of Democracy in the 
Antebellum United States (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 2. Castiglia develops a persuasive 
argument for the cultural process of internalization of politics by means of exploring popular antebellum 
fictions including the works of Hawthorne and Melville. I concur with such an observation, but I am more 
concerned with the politico-ontological way in which such internalization works to make impossible the 
instantiation of democratic visions and beliefs; whereas Castiglia believes in the relocated presence of 
democracy, I contend that American democracy is always an improbability misconceived as a probability. 
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ideological origin of this misconception—what led to the misrecognition of private 
thoughts and feelings as a vessel for the practice of democracy.  
At the heart of the implementation of democracy in the individual interior was the 
internalization of the property of the body politic. During the Constitutional Convention 
to address and resolve issues of how to govern the United States of America, its 
participants generally agreed that “the permanent temper of the people was adverse to the 
very semblance of monarchy.”16 Their underlying consensus was that the character—at 
once individual and collective—of an American exactly corresponded to the attribute of 
their polity. In the same vein, during the debates between Federalists and Anti-Federalists, 
Noah Webster, a staunch proponent of the federalist cause, wrote against the federalist 
plan for building a strong national army by stressing that “the principles and habits of the 
Americans are directly opposed to standing armies.”17 Though other Federalists had 
realistic concerns about the security of America without national troops,18 Webster 
disproved the point by underscoring what an American individual’s “principles and 
habits” could not accept and arguing that their refusal would undermine American 
national identity. For Webster, the way “We the People” existed—“the principles and 
habits of the Americans” in his words—was constitutive of and congruous with the 
essence of their political system. Another case that revealed the American tendency to 
equate the nature of their polity with that of their character was the petition from the 
Pennsylvania Abolition Society, which urged the Congress to abolish slavery because 
                                                          
16 Quoted in Robert Middlekauft, The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 651. 
 
17 Quoted in Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press, 1990), 354. 
 
18 For the Federalist argument for the necessity of national troops, see Federalist Papers, No. 23. 
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slavery was not compatible with the value of the American Revolution and Republic, 
which was, for the petitioners, enough reason for the Congress to “devise means for 
removing this inconsistency from the Character of the American People.”19 
All these instances evidence that the locus of national politics was believed to 
reside in the interiors of citizens who were thought to be the equivalent of a 
homogeneous whole of individuals with the same political dispositions. However, this 
reconfiguration of the American people was fraught with the political dilemmas of 
selfhood and nationhood. Though American selfhood became the proving-ground where 
posited individuals of the same political tempers, principles, and habits could resolve 
external issues on common ontological grounds, such prepositions of ontologically 
homogenous selfhood and its assumed ability to deal with the actual political issues 
pertinent to the question of nationhood were impracticable.  
Contemporary spectators of the birth and development of the U.S. noticed this 
ontological reconfiguration without noting its practical problems. Having seen the U.S. 
finally establish itself as “a state” after the Ratification of the Constitution in March 
1789,20 Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Judgment (1790) referred to the historic event 
as “the complete transformation of a large people into a state, which took place recently.” 
Kant was especially interested in the American case in order to present it as historical 
evidence to verify his formulation that the ideal body politic is analogous to a living 
                                                          
19 Quoted in Joseph J. Ellis, Founding Fathers: The Revolutionary Generation (New York: Vintage Books, 
2000), 83. 
 
20 Kant scholars have assumed that the reference indicates the French Revolution, which however was in its 
very early stage when Kant was writing Critique of Judgment (1790). It is more possible that Kant refers to 
the American Revolution and its subsequent years given the fact that the U.S. Constitution was adopted on 
September 17, 1787 by the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, ratified by 
conventions in eleven states, and went into effect on March 4, 1789. 
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organism. In the newborn American Republic, explained Kant, “no member should be a 
mere means, but should also be an end, and … he contributes to the possibility of the 
entire body, should have his position and function in turn defined by the idea of the 
whole.”21 What he observed in the nascent American Republic was a perfect ontological 
reciprocity between individual citizens and their polity, a necessary condition for 
America selfhood and nationhood. Kant scholars such as Pheng Cheah have viewed this 
organismic metaphor as “replac[ing] the hierarchical relationship between head and limbs 
with an egalitarian interdependence between citizens and the state similar to the relation 
of parts and whole in an organism.”22 What is central to the equal interconnectedness 
between citizens and their state is, in effect, that the “idea” or the “possibility” of the state 
is both formative of and formed by the corresponding ontological features of each citizen. 
In Kant’s view, the ideational potentiality of the state is always implicated in the agency 
of an individual, which characterizes the reciprocal relation between American self and 
society. 
Kant’s organismic metaphor can be traced back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
lesser-known notion of “common self,” strikingly analogous to the concept of “We the 
People.”  In The Social Contract (1762), Rousseau posited that what enables a “social 
pact” is the condition that “Each of us puts his person and his full power in common 
under the supreme direction of the general will and in a body we receive each member as 
an indivisible part of the whole” [italics in the original]. Such a self-generated, conscious 
“act of association,” he suggested, “produces a moral and collective body made up of as 
                                                          
21 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1987), 254. 
 
22 Pheng Cheah, Spectral Nationality: Passages of Freedom from Kant to Postcolonial Literatures of 
Liberation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 91. 
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many members as the assembly has voices, and which receives by this same act its unity, 
its common self, its life and its will” [italics in the original]. This scheme was postulated 
by the assumption that a society that “receive[s] each member as an indivisible part of 
the whole” is constructed by a liberal individual who willingly “puts his person and his 
full power in common under the supreme direction of the general will” [italics in the 
original]. Moreover, it was also premised but did not prove that such a democratic society 
is “a moral and collective body” of diverse individual “voices” as well as a collective 
“unity,” and thus its member is at once private and public, what Rousseau called a 
“common self.”23 His apparently oxymoronic notion of “common self,” as seen in the 
logic of his formulation of the term, was grounded on the threefold premise of individual 
autonomy and morality, social hospitality and solidarity, and the perfect reciprocity 
between the individual and the social. In his scheme, these essential conditions, all 
combined together, were supposed to serve the purpose of the “general will,” a dynamic 
of social association presumably built into every human agency. However, as Allan 
Bloom has pointed out, the general will is “only the expression of a desire that something 
be done” in a particular social condition and thus “[t]he [social] force to do it is also 
necessary.”24 For Bloom, the external force should be the government in a modern 
society; however, the government, as “the intermediary between sovereign and individual 
citizen,” is “totally derivative,” not the general will per se. 
                                                          
23 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch 
(Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 50-51. 
 
24 Allan Bloom, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau 1712-1778,” in History of Political Philosophy, eds. Leo Strauss 
and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 570. 
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Central to Kant’s and Rousseau’s ontological equation of individuality and polity 
is a premise of the ideal democratic social body as an end, not merely a means.25 For 
Kant, the nature of a body politic is synonymous with the political disposition of its each 
member. In the same light, Rousseau establishes the theoretical model of a citizen, an 
active participant in politics, working with other equally involved others to decide what is 
best for the good of their community, such as proper laws. Theoretically, this model of 
citizenry renders possible the essential formula of modern democracy—the ruled are in 
effect the rulers, which is an end rather than a means. For Rousseau, as David Held has 
pointed out, “the idea of self-rule is posited as an end in itself.”26 Also for antebellum 
Americans, this logical formula was crucial to dealing with the structural rupture between 
their liberal individuality and democratic citizenship; if the problems of the political 
sphere can be relocated to and reconfigured in the domain of the individual psyche, then 
the individual cognitive and affective faculties, which had been philosophically posited to 
be rational and moral,27 can help undo the intricate knot of political, social, and cultural 
issues reducible to interpersonal questions and problems. Hence the conceptual—not 
                                                          
25 Both Rousseau and Kant do not favor the idea of popular democracy as a proper form of government. 
However, their shared presuppositions of an ideal politic body are indicative of a democratic government, a 
government established by the fundamental principles of democracy such as universal liberty, equality, and 
popular sovereignty. 
 
26 David Held, Models of Democracy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 45. Held maintains 
that “Rousseau set himself firmly against the post-Machiavellian distinctions between state and civil 
society, government and ‘the people’” (Ibid., 45-46). 
 
27 Gilles Deleuze has claimed that the preconditions of Western philosophy are the questionable yet never 
questioned presuppositions of “a natural capacity for thought endowed with a talent for truth or an affinity 
with the true, under the double aspect of a good will on the part of the thinker and an upright nature on the 
part of thought.” Due to these assumptions pervading the philosophical formulation of mental faculties and 
their functions, Deleuze argues, ontological and epistemological agencies are always posited to be 
intrinsically rational and moral (Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton [New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995], 131). 
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necessarily practical—reconciliation that is possible between liberal individuals and 
democratic citizens. 
In a chapter entitled “PRINCIPAL CAUSES WHICH TEND TO MAINTAIN 
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC IN THE UNITED STATES” in the first volume of 
Democracy in America (1835), Alexis de Tocqueville maintained that “the manners and 
customs of the people” in the U.S. are more important than natural conditions and laws. 
In the chapter Tocqueville particularly singles out “manners,” by which he means not 
only courtesy and etiquette but also “what might be termed the habits of the heart,” as 
well as “the various notions and opinions current among men” and “the mass of those 
ideas which constitute their character of mind.”28 Three decades after the birth of the 
American Republic, whose essential founding principle was the ontological reformulation 
of the individual mind as the locus of dealing with the social, Tocqueville noted that 
“heart,” “notions and opinions,” “ideas,” and “mind” were crucial components to 
“maintain” the democratic nation. Thus, in his study of democracy in the U.S. he had 
“sought” “the image of democracy itself, with its inclination, its character, its prejudices, 
and its passions,” as well as “the influence which the quality of conditions and the rule of 
democracy exercise on the civil society, the habits, the ideas, and the manners of the 
Americans.”29 Tocqueville was especially concerned with the ways Americans thought 
and felt in their lives, because American democracy was attributed to the ontological 
conditions and features of American life. For him, democracy in America was a 
composite of the various ways in which Americans thought and behaved on a daily basis. 
From this standpoint, he concluded that “although a democracy is more liable to error 
                                                          
28 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Isaac Kramnick (New York: Norton, 2007), 354. 
 
29 Ibid., 19. 
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than a monarch or a body of nobles, the chances of its regaining the right path, when once 
it has acknowledged its mistake, are greater also; because it is rarely embarrassed by 
internal interests, which conflict with those of the majority, and resist the authority of 
reason.” Like Rousseau and Kant, Tocqueville thought of a significant homology 
between personhood and nationhood, and thus understood a democracy in view of a 
rational and moral individual being who can adjust to survive in given conditions. In this 
regard, a democracy is the equivalent of a living existence and therefore its practical 
problems can be fixed as those in life; as Tocqueville asserted, “a democracy can only 
obtain truth as the result of experience.”30 
However, to experience is one thing and to exist is another. More important, how 
to exist predetermines how to experience. What Tocqueville ignored was that the way in 
which antebellum Americans existed preceded and preconditioned the way they lived, 
recognized, and coped with their problems in life. The significance of American 
existence was, as I have argued above, predicated on the fundamental ontological 
reconfiguration of American selfhood as the equivalent of American nationhood. The 
crucial correspondence between the essential nature of personhood and that of polity 
would have been impossible without the premise of the entity of each notion; in order to 
believe in the identical reciprocity between a democratic self and a democratic society, 
one should first believe in the substance of each notion as a historical entity. Americans 
during the early nation-building period were firmly convinced that their democratic self 
and society were actual historical entities, a collective belief confirmed by the fact that 
they had actually set out to build the American Republic as a consensual society of 
autonomous individuals sympathizing with others for the public good through political 
                                                          
30 Ibid., 188. 
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and cultural practices designed for such a democratic society. Therefore, the significance 
of American existence was grounded on the belief in the substances of its essential 
components. These were, as they were inscribed in the Declaration of Independence, 
autonomous agency, solidifying affect for the public good, and democratic power built on 
popular consent.  
 
The Substances of American Democracy 
“We the People” was not an expression of American experience; rather, it was 
the expression, or ontological prescription, of American existence. How to exist, not how 
to experience, was the key question at stake and as such the elusive phrase “We the 
People” served as the ontological upholstery. The models of autonomous agency, 
solidifying affect, and consensual power, regardless of their practical problems, were 
central to defining the significance of American existence. Regardless of their empirical 
dilemmas, the three models were the essential prerequisites for American existence. 
However, these preconditions were not historical entities as they were believed to be; 
rather, they were conceptual fulcrums for sustaining the significance of American 
existence. However, they were not merely misleading mirages, given their substantial 
credibility and ideological functionality, which effectively contributed to constituting a 
new nation and a new people. Moreover, they were fundamental reasons for the failures 
of American democracy; prior to the political, socioeconomic, and cultural problems 
relevant to race, class, gender inequalities lay the fundamental ontological question of the 
American people.31 
                                                          
31 The recent studies of how antebellum authors critically reflect the failings of American democracy in 
their works have tended to confine their insight into the specific issues of racial discrimination, class 
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The key to the ambiguous—conceptual yet substantial—workings of the models 
of autonomous agency, solidifying affect, and consensual power lies in their function as 
the substances of American existence. In fact, this notion of substance was derived from 
the Enlightenment formulation of subject and society. René Descartes, for instance, 
understood the term “substance” as “every thing in which whatever we perceive 
immediately resides, as in a subject, or to every thing by means of which whatever we 
perceive exists.” According to Descartes, “[b]y ‘whatever we perceive’ is meant any 
property, quality or attribute of which we have a real idea. The only idea we have of a 
substance itself, in the strict sense, is that it is the thing in which whatever we perceive 
(or whatever has objective being in one of our ideas) exists, either formally or eminently.” 
In this view, not only an actual entity but an idea perceived as an entity is a substance; if 
one can perceive a certain “property, quality or attribute” of “a real idea” as substantially 
existent, it is nothing but a substance. However, Descartes, who asserted that “we know 
by the natural light that a real attribute cannot belong to nothing,” hardly distinguished 
between perceiving and believing in recognizing a substance.32 This problem occurred in 
his famous formula, “I am thinking, therefore I exist,” in which he posited that “I knew I 
was a substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think, and which does not 
                                                                                                                                                                             
struggle, and gender conflict. In particular, scholarly inquiries into the varying paradoxical significance of 
“We the People” throughout the antebellum period have mainly focused on how antebellum authors 
engaged with the political (re)fashioning of the identity of an American people in relation to their 
contemporary issues of race, class, and gender. This contextual and local attention can provide an answer to 
the question as to how American democracy has failed the promise of “We the People” and how American 
authors have functioned as keen critics of such failures. However, it ignores a more central question 
regarding the continual failures of American democracy which are not necessarily reduced to the questions 
of race, class, and gender. For the recent studies on how antebellum authors struggled with the elusive 
notion of “We the People,” see Priscilla Wald, Constituting Americans: Cultural Anxiety and Narrative 
Form (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), Kimberly K. Smith, The Dominion of Voice: Riot, 
Reason, and Romance in Antebellum Politics (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999). 
 
32 René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. vol. II, trans. John Cottingham, Robert 
Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (1984; Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 114. 
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require any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist.”33 The problem of 
this logical reasoning lies in the possibility that Descartes confirms the certainty of his 
existence by thinking that “I am thinking, therefore I exist.” As Jacques Lacan has 
incisively noted, cogito ergo sum “is not simply the formulation in which the link 
between the transparency of the transcendental subject and his existential affirmation is 
constituted” due to the possibility that “[p]erhaps I am … assuredly, insofar as I think 
so.”34 In this case, what is perceived as the thinking substance is an effect of thinking, 
more precisely an effect of a certain belief; it is not substance per se independent of the 
thinking subject’s desire or external conditions. 
In the similar vein, John Locke proposed that “substance” is an entity that should 
exist to uphold other relevant concepts. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
(1689), Locke insisted that “substance” is the entity without which what “stand[s] under” 
it cannot exist.35 This formulation exactly applied to his political proposition in Two 
Treatises of Government (1689) that “a State of perfect Freedom” and “of Equality,” 
which is given “by Nature,” is “so evident in itself” in the sense that “[t]he State of 
Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: And Reason, which is 
that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and 
independent”36 [italics in the original]. Here, Locke posited the substances of “a Law of 
Nature” and “Reason” as “that Law” in that they sustain the self-evident existence of a 
                                                          
33 René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. vol. I, trans. John Cottingham, Robert 
Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (1985; Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 127. 
 
34 Jacques Lacan, Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 2006), 532. 
 
35 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1975), 296-297. 
 
36 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 269. 
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nation of perfect freedom and equality. In this logical reasoning, however, the functional 
substance can be misconstrued as the original substance; indeed, Locke himself seems to 
be ambiguous about the difference between the two. Also questionable is the meaning of 
“so evident in itself,” strongly indicative of the self-evident nature of substance without 
explaining why and how it is self-evident. Moreover, Locke does not question the 
substances of “Nature” and “Reason,” which he apparently believed to be the given 
substances in themselves. 
It was David Hume who first posed a question regarding the inherent mode of 
belief—in particular its affective attribute which accounts for the self-affirming certainty 
of the act of believing—in the underlying logic of thinking of substance. Though he 
shared Locke’s empiricist premise that it is only from experience that an understanding of 
the external world can be derived, Hume suggested in An Enquiry concerning Human 
Understanding (1748) that it is in fact “belief” that renders our experience substantially 
comprehensible, accessible, and useful to us. According to him, belief as the 
epistemological substance is in essence affective: “belief is something felt by the mind, 
which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It 
gives them more weight and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; 
enforces them in the mind; and renders them the governing principle of our actions.” 
Hume located the centrality of affect and imagination to our comprehension and 
conviction; in this view, the substance we believe in is the effect of our feeling and 
imagining. Therefore, Hume argued, “belief consists not in the peculiar nature or order of 
ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and in their feeling to the mind,” suggesting 
that belief is not necessarily subjective agency; on the contrary, it “depends not on the 
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will, nor can be commanded at pleasure” but “a customary conjunction of the object with 
something present to the memory or senses.” For Hume, “the sentiment of belief” comes 
from the customary “principles of connexion or association” such as “resemblance,” 
“contiguity,” and “causation.” Hume’s point is that the substance of human epistemic 
agency lies in the working of feelings structured by the connective and associative laws 
of social custom.37 In short, Hume’s model of an empirical subjectivity, which Gilles 
Deleuze calls a “psychological subjectivity,”38 proposes “the sentiment of belief” as the 
actual substance of belief which foregrounds understanding and knowledge. This 
affective belief, Hume argues, is in essence associated with “fancy,” which operates to 
make its holder convinced of what he or she believes as the fancy brings about actual 
somatic satisfaction: “every thing, which is agreeable to the senses, is also in some 
measure agreeable to the fancy, and conveys to the thought an image of that satisfaction, 
which it gives by its real application to the bodily organs”39 
In the first chapter of volume II of Democracy in America (1840), Tocqueville 
referred to several “principal characters of … the philosophical method of the Americans.” 
One of them is “to aim at the substance through the form.”40 He did not expound upon the 
phrase in the chapter, only implying that the forms of democratic life in America actually 
                                                          
37 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding And Other Writings, ed. Stephen Buckle 
(Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 47-53. 
 
38 Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrines of the Faculties, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and 
Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 12-13. For Deleuze’s discussion 
of Hume’s formulation of subjectivity, see Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on 
Hume’s Theory of Human Nature, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1991). 
 
39 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 232. 
 
40 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 378. 
 
 22 
 
engendered the actual substance of American democracy. For him, Americans believed 
that the forms, if actualized to the fullest, can be the substances; they were thus all 
Cartesians and Lockeans.41 To the contrary, Brown, Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville were 
close to Hume in rejecting to conceive of the given—self-evident—substance through its 
corresponding forms. For these authors, the paradox of American democracy lies in the 
very belief Tocqueville identifies as the American “philosophical method,” a belief that 
substances can be perceived and verified through the Cartesian and Lockean method. If 
the forms serve to validate certain substances, these forms should be already substances, 
and if the forms are substances, what they serve to prove to be substances should be 
substances. Central to this logic is an inverted causality of belief—the act of believing in 
the substance of forms (or means) retroactively validates the substance of what the forms 
are supposed to uphold (or ends). At the heart of the American “philosophical mind” was 
this logic, operating as the fundamental ideology underlying the antebellum beliefs in 
American democracy. 
According to Slavoy Žižek, who rejects the popular phase “the end of ideology” 
and argues for the persistent centrality of ideology to any analysis of political, social, and 
cultural questions, the inverted logic of belief is what Louis Althusser unknowingly 
brings to the theory of ideology. He first reconsiders Althusser’s famous example of 
ideology that “interpellates individuals into subjects”: the example of a police officer 
shouting out “Hey, you there!” in public. On hearing this exclamation, an individual turns 
around instantly and “by this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, 
                                                          
41 For the influence of Locke on early American literary and political culture, see Gillian Brown, The 
Consent of the Governed: The Lockean Legacy in Early American Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2001). 
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he becomes a subject.”42 In Althusser’s analysis, the very act of acknowledging that it 
should be he who is addressed enables the individual to recognize his subjectivity. Here, 
Althusser’s point is the double formation of the subjectivity—although the individual is 
recognized as a social subject by the law, he is also subjugated to the law.43 Thus, he sees 
ideology functioning not as an illusion but as an imaginary yet generative mediator 
between systems and institutions of power and individuals, thereby complicating the 
relationship between domination and subordination by introducing the ideological 
interpellation process in which individuals recognize themselves as subjects through 
ideology. This formula illustrates how subjects are complicit in and subject to their own 
domination, but fails to explain why they come to believe in the substance of the 
ideological injunction.44 
What especially concerns Žižek in the Althusserian formula of ideology is the 
veiled logic of the paradoxical subjectivization. For him, it “designates the retroactive 
illusion of “always-already” … when the subject recognizes himself in an ideological call, 
                                                          
42 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes towards an Investigation” in Lenin 
and Philosophy, and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1991), 174. 
 
43 For Althusser, the interpellating ideology allows for hegemonic power to reproduce itself by obscuring 
traditional forms of repression and incorporating individuals into the power structure. He thus emphasizes 
the ubiquity of ideology and interpellation by noting how subjects are consistently constituted by 
Ideological State Apparatuses such as the family, educational institutions, and media such as literature, 
radio and television. Thus, ideology is “a structure essential to the historical life of societies,” in which “the 
real relation is inevitably invested in the imaginary relation, a relation that expresses a will (conservative, 
conformist, reformist, or revolutionary), a hope or a nostalgia, rather than describing a reality.” For 
example, “the bourgeoisie lives in the ideology of freedom the relation between it and its conditions of 
existence: that is, its real relation (the law of a liberal capitalist economy) but invested in an imaginary 
relation (all men are free, including the free laborers)” [italics in the original] (For Marx, trans. Ben 
Brewster [London: Verso, 2005], 232, 234). 
 
44 Drawing on Hegel, Althusser, and Foucault, Judith Butler has similarly maintained  that the notion of 
“[s]ubjection” signifies the process of becoming subordination by power as well as the process of becoming 
a subject. Yet she also fails to consider why individual subjects in subjection would like to choose to be 
subject to power collectively (Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power [Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1997], 2). 
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he automatically overlooks the fact that this very formal act of recognition creates the 
content one recognizes oneself in.”45 He elaborates on the way in which the act of 
perception retroactively renders the perceived object a substantial content by unveiling 
the mechanism of affective belief inherent in the process of ideological recognition. 
According to him, “[m]embers of a community who partake in a given “way of life” 
believe in their Thing, where this belief has a reflexive structure proper to the 
intersubjective space,” for example: “I believe in the (national) Thing” equals “I believe 
that others (members of my community) believe in the Thing” [italics in the original]. 
This view provides a clear account of why the interpellated individual quickly responds 
to the police officer’s call; on hearing it, he or she believes that others would also turn 
around instantly in the same situation. Hence Žižek concludes that “[t]his paradoxical 
existence of an entity which “is” only insofar as subjects believe (in the other’s belief) in 
its existence is the mode of being proper to ideological causes: the “normal” order of 
causality is here inverted, since it is the Cause itself which is produced by its effects (the 
ideological practices it animates).”46  
Žižek owes his reformulation of Althusserian ideology to Jacques Lacan’s 
psychoanalytic notion of fantasy. For Lacan, fantasy is the “very essential structure”47 of 
the human psyche—“essential” in that it works unconsciously as the condition of human 
                                                          
45 Slavoy Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2004), 73. 
 
46 Ibid., 201-202. The example of The Holy Spirit Žižek gives makes his point clear: “The Holy Spirit is the 
community of believers in which Christ lives after his death: to believe in Him equals believing in belief 
itself, i.e., believing that I’m not alone, that I’m a member of the community of believers. I do not need any 
external proof or conformation of the truth of my belief: by the mere act of my belief in others’ belief, the 
Holy Spirit is here. In other words, the whole meaning of the Thing turns on the fact that “it means 
something” to people” (Ibid.). For Žižek’s detailed discussion of the logic of belief, see Slavoy Žižek, On 
Belief (London: Routledge, 2001), 79-89.  
 
47 Jacques Lacan, Anxiety, trans. C. Gallagher, unpublished, 1. 
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agency. The “unconscious fantasy,” as he calls it, is “an image set to work in the 
signifying structure,” which is “the means by which the subject maintains himself at the 
level of his vanishing desire, vanishing inasmuch as the very satisfaction of demand 
deprives him of his object,” or what he calls the “original possibility.”48 Lacan 
understands desire as a psychological force that cannot be fully satisfied or fulfilled, 
unlike needs or demands; it always evades the subject, triggering the subject’s pursuit of 
it. Žižek is indebted to Lacan’s proposition that fantasy clarifies and confirms the 
substance of what seems to be originally possible in the world of the subject, thereby 
constituting a sense of proper subjectivity and seamless reality; by illustrating the original 
possibility, fantasy 1) conceals the essential inconsistency, gap, or lack—i.e., 
impossibility—of the subject and the world, and thus sutures our ontological 
incompletion, “provid[ing] us with firm foundations” of our existence,49 2) creates a 
hologram of the originally possible as a perceivable and pursuable entity, thereby 
“protect[ing]” what is impossible in reality, or “the real” in Lacan’s terminology; this 
function of fantasy is “ the support of desire; it is not the object that is the support of 
desire.”50 Whether concealment or creation, fantasy transposes the effect of our 
recognition of the lack or the whole into its cause so as to provide us with a plausible 
scenario of consistency, identity, unity, and plenitude of our subjectivity and society. It is 
due to the inverted logic of fantasy, as Lacan asserts, that “the empty spaces are as 
                                                          
48 Lacan, Écrits, 532. Lacan goes on to explain that “[t]his is why any temptation to reduce fantasy to 
imagination … is a permanent misconception” (ibid.). 
 
49 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan 
Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1998), 31. 
 
50 Lacan, Écrits, 185. For Žižek’s thorough analysis of Lacan’s formulation of fantasy and its significance, 
see Slavoy Žižek, “The Seven Veils of Fantasy,” in Key Concepts of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, ed. Dany 
Nobus (London: Rebus, 1998). 
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signifying as the full ones”51 and thus “the impossible is not … a negative form, [nor] 
necessarily the contrary of the possible.”52 As Lacan encapsulates the paradox, ““the 
effects are successful only in the absence of cause”53 [italics in the original].  
What these fantastical effects proffers in reality is, as Žižek stresses, more than “a 
hallucinatory realization of desire” in that “fantasy is the realization of desire, however, 
not ‘realization’ in the sense of fulfilling it, but rather ‘realization’ in the sense of 
bringing it forth, of providing its coordinates.” In this sense, “it is not the case that the 
subject knows in advance what he wants and then, when he cannot get it in reality, 
proceeds to obtain a hallucinatory satisfaction in fantasy. Rather, the subject originally 
doesn’t know what he wants, and it is the role of fantasy to tell him that, to ‘teach’ him to 
desire.”54 It is due to this essential ignorance that “fantasy guarantees the consistency of a 
socio ideological edifice.”55  
My readings of the romances of Brown, Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville identify 
these authors’ Lacanian insights into the logic of fantasy built in agency, affect, and 
power linking it to the questions of antebellum political economy and culture. The 
authors note that what is central to the failed American democracy is what renders the 
very notion of American democracy possible in “the human heart” (in Hawthorne’s 
expression) of Americans. For instance, for antebellum Americans, their democracy was 
                                                          
51 Lacan, Écrits, 327. 
 
52 Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 167. 
 
53 Ibid., 128. 
 
54 Slavoy Žižek, Interrogating the Real (London: Continuum, 2008). 279-280. 
 
55 Slavoy Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom! Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out (1992; New York: Routledge, 
2008), 103. 
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in fact the creation of their collective belief in the existence of a construct built on the 
popular consent, where self-governing individuals in emotional solidarity with others 
work for public good. These interlocking forms of democracy were believed to be 
substances in order to conceive of an American democracy—which these forms uphold 
conceptually—as a historical entity. This vision of American democracy, to borrow 
Tocqueville’s words, the substance aimed at through the form. In order that the substance 
is an entity, the form should be believed to be an entity, too. This belief, which creates 
and validates the substance of American democracy, is not merely an illusion. Rather, it 
is both formative of and formed by historical entities that evidence an unmatched level of 
social democratization in the U.S. such as free and equal opportunities given by the 
absence of aristocracy, the extended universal male suffrage and the resultant national 
elections, participatory rallies, and conventions, an incomparable freedom of the press, 
and a blossoming literary public sphere.  
Autonomous and singular agency, socially harmonious and solidifying affect, and 
democratically consensual power exist only as long as they are believed to be substances 
of American life. What the four romancers expose further in the specific historical 
context of antebellum American is the intricate relation between literature and reality. 
The real substances of democracy always lie in the contingent articulation of the affective 
belief in form of imagination—as Hume explains—in democracy and the actual 
phenomena of political, socioeconomic, and cultural democratizations: what American 
people actually perceive, feel, and pursue are the substances of democracy. More 
importantly, for these authors the actual workings of the substances of democracy were 
doubly misleading, for the very ontological conditions of American democracy on 
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individual and collective levels are in effect liable to be operative in an antidemocratic—
impersonal, disruptive, and tyrannical—way. The main characters created by the four 
romancers believe in the power of their autonomous agency, the effect of socially linked 
feelings serving the purpose of public good, and the legitimacy of popular sovereignty 
built on the consent of the governed, and such belief is constitutive of the significance of 
their existence. Contrary to their belief, however, their agency, affect, and power actually 
function in a way that rejects their socially determined mandates and roles which are 
believed to serve the cause of democracy. Rather than being self-governing and in 
harmony and consensus with others, their agency, affect, and power are working in a 
desubjectivizing, disintegrating, and despotic way. 
Moreover, this important paradox remains a blind spot in praises or criticisms of 
American democracy because the shared idea and promised possibility of American 
democracy are necessary conditions that fantastically constitute and substantially sustain 
each American individual’s sense of his or her existence. That is to say, the fantasies of 
democratic agency, affect, and power serve as ontic substances, without which existence 
is completely futile and unbearable; indeed, it is not possible for antebellum Americans to 
conceive of themselves as incapable to of thinking or doing anything on his own, failing 
to feel for and with others in a given community, and living under a political authority 
that is established regardless of his consent. Such a condition was not only unreal but also 
unbearable in ideologized political, socioeconomic, and cultural registers. In other words, 
the other side of the same logic of the fantasies of American democracy is that living is 
believing; living as an American is tantamount to believing in the substance of being an 
American, which is also equal to the substance of American democracy. Thus, there must 
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be no doubt or suspicion of the three substances; without the three interlocking 
substances, life does not exist in America. 
Brown, Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville capture the necessary ignorance of their 
characters, characters whose lives are grounded upon the fundamental fantasies of agency, 
affect, and power as conceived in democratic terms. Unbeknownst to them, they suffer 
the self-destructive and antisocial effects of the undemocratic workings of their agency, 
affect, and power. Though they suffer from the paradox of what fantastically 
substantiates their lives, they do not see into its essentially empty, delusive substance due 
to its fantastical yet substantial working. Paradoxically, it is the very structural void that 
sustains their sense of existence and reality. Owing to this oxymoronic function, I call the 
models of agency, affect, and power the spectral substances of American democracy. 
They are spectral in that they are at once conceptually present and existentially absent 
and they keep haunting, as ghosts, exposing the dilemma of American democracy without 
revealing its paradoxical nature. The deeper secret of such enduring haunting as well as 
the necessary ignorance of it lies in the underlying logic of fantasy that maintains the 
spectral substances. The following chapters explore how Brown, Poe, Hawthorne, and 
Melville capture the spectral substances of American democracy by focusing on their 
texts and as well as probing the historical, critical, and theoretical writings related to their 
themes and styles.  
 
Chapter Outline  
In the first chapter, I examine Charles Brockden Brown’s Wieland, or, The 
Transformation: An American Tale (1789) to shed new light on the author’s political 
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insights into the essential paradox of America in the historical process of nation building. 
Political readings of Wieland, inspired by its suggestive subtitle, have tended to focus on 
Brown’s relationship to the two dominant political ideologies competing to design the 
fundamental fabric of the American Republic: Federalism, which pursued a secured and 
solidified unity; and Democratic-Republicanism, which valorized the doctrine of self-
government on individual and public levels. In these historical readings, Brown distances 
himself from the Federalists or the Democratic-Republicans by using one to critique the 
other; for example, if a critic understands Brown to be blaming the Federalist vision of 
national unity for its homogenizing force, then of course Brown believes in the value of 
uninterrupted self-government, and if Brown is understood to be attacking the 
Democratic-Republican conviction of inviolable personal autonomy, then he necessarily 
agrees to the necessity of social order and security. These dichotomous interpretations 
overlook Brown’s awareness of the absent substance of self-government and national 
unity. I suggest instead that Brown rejects both ideologies to disclose their common 
problem—their underlying logic of fantasy in particular. For Brown, I argue, both the 
Democratic-Republican adherence to the model of self-sufficient and self-governing 
personhood as well as the Federalist obsession with national unity are grounded in a 
fantastical logic that transposes an absent entity into a present one simply by asserting a 
given belief in it. 
Like Lacan’s account of fantasy as the essential structure of our sense of being 
and reality, Brown’s Wieland elucidates the centrality of fantasy to the formation of the 
American idea of self-government and national unity. The two notions, in his view, are 
perceived and pursued as realities because they are believed to be realities; this belief is 
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not simply an illusion, but a necessary condition for sustaining the notion of subject and 
society as conceived of in a democracy. According to the prevalent philosophical and 
political ideas of democratic society in America, an individual should be capable of self-
government (a tenet of Democratic-Republicanism) and their society should be 
constitutive of national unity (a principle of Federalism). Note that the word “should,” 
which does not necessarily guarantee “can,” is logically inverted to “can” due to the 
inversion’s centrality to building a new republic of imperative doctrines for promising 
universal liberty and equality. In Wieland, Brown dramatizes the possibly fatal 
consequence of this logic by depicting a character who believes in the existence of his 
own God—a necessary condition for the significance of his life—and then kills his 
family and dismantles his community just because he believes that God actually orders 
him to do so. The way in which Wieland believes in the substantial existence and 
mandate of his God is based on the inverted logic of causality; his actions make the 
object of belief—the God he believes in—exist to him. Conversely, the confirmed 
existence of God justifies what Wieland thinks about the supreme authority. This 
thinking, Brown suggests, is inherent in both Federalism and Democratic-Republicanism, 
which accounts for not only his sharp awareness of the logic of fantasy underlying the 
early American political ideologies but his dark vision of the inherent impossibility of 
American democracy. 
This pessimism underlies the other three authors I study. In the second chapter, I 
view Edgar Allan Poe’s two tales, “William Wilson” (1839) and “The Man of the Crowd” 
(1840), as a pair that critically reflects on the paradox of individualism during the 
Jacksonian Era. The first part of this chapter investigates how the political, economic, and 
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cultural democratizations during the 1820s and 1830s deteriorated after the Great Panic 
of 1837. Before the Panic, pervading social democratizations brought about the 
expansions and developments of political participation, free capitalism, and literary 
democracy. During this period, the principle and practice of liberal individualism in 
political, economic, and cultural spheres were promoted and prospered. However, the 
unprecedentedly destructive national economic depression drastically deformed 
expressions of individualism in literary culture and the literary market. Rather than an 
increasingly diverse and heterogeneous literary public sphere, the post-Panic sphere 
became skewed toward the dominant logic of capitalist production. The enormous 
popularity of penny literary newspapers and magazines, which published work with 
derivative styles and themes for a wide range of general readers, facilitated the 
transformed the course of literary democracy. Now, to reproduce a popular literary model 
successfully was the key to commercial and critical success. In politics as well, 
interpersonal identification was crucial to success as politicians; both Jacksonians and 
anti-Jacksonians tried to imitate the model of Andrew Jackson to replicate his political 
success and popularity. The shrewd imitation of an existing celebrated model became 
more necessary and effective in appealing to the general populace than establishing a 
unique political identity. Poe’s sharp critique of this paradox of democratic individualism 
is reflected in “How to Write a Blackwood Article” and “A Predicament” (1838) and 
“The Man That Was Used Up, A Tale of the Late Bugaboo and Kickapoo Campaign” 
(1839). In these stories, peculiar individuality or extraordinary singularity, idolized and 
sought, turns out to be nonexistent.  
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After the Panic, Poe expressed his growing concerns with the increasingly 
dominant logic of political and cultural homogenization and impersonalization in his tales. 
The second part of the chapter II discusses the harsher criticism of the logic of 
democratic individualism expressed in “William Wilson” (1839) and “The Man of the 
Crowd” (1840). Wilson, mortified by his namesake/doppelgänger’s “most absolute 
identity” with him, seeks his own singular identity in vain, and the narrator of “The Man 
of the Crowd,” also chasing after an nameless old roamer’s “absolute idiosyncrasy,” 
finally realizes that such a peculiarity is “in vain to follow.” These two stories reveal 
Poe’s sustained inquiry into the paradox that the awareness of the lack of genuine 
individuality triggers one’s urgent yet deluded striving to secure his own or a stranger’s 
autonomy and singularity; what his characters chase after is, as they find eventually, 
nothing. The two stories collectively chastise the contemporary intellectual—mainly 
Tocquevillian and Emersonian—urge to retrieve the proper individual sphere marred by 
the democratic logic of political and cultural homogenization and impersonalization 
facilitated by permeating social democratizations. Poe indicts this public injunction as a 
double delusion: first it posits the discursive conception of a self-possessed and 
distinctive individual as a historical entity, and then it proclaims the loss of such proper 
individualism, which is thus considered the urgently sought-after object. Poe precisely 
captures this doubly misleading delusion as central to the democratic individualism of the 
Jacksonian Era.  
In the third chapter, I explore how Nathaniel Hawthorne studies the mechanisms 
of a plurality of sympathies in The Scarlet Letter (1850), sympathies that complicate the 
simple antebellum notion of sympathy. Hawthorne’s contemporaries tended to regard 
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sympathy as an essential, socially harmonizing feeling, through which one can gain a 
deeper understanding of the suffering of others in social troubles and ills. This 
sympathetic understanding and bond were generally considered the necessary conditions 
for social reform and thorough democratization, especially in abolitionist and women’s 
rights movements. Composed at a time replete with political and cultural discourses 
relying on the reforming and democratizing power of sympathy, The Scarlet Letter 
demonstrates that the way sympathy operates in interpersonal relationships is not 
necessarily democratic; rather, sympathy is, in effect, an affective structure that allows 
interpersonal knowledge and action. Moreover, there are modes of sympathy that work in 
amoral, immoral, or morbid ways. These “strange” sympathies, Hawthorne shows, do not 
work in a subjective and harmonious way; rather, they desubjectivize their holder. 
Hawthorne’s point is that sympathies, or any other social feelings required for a proper 
democracy, are fundamentally misconceived, though they are supposed to be the 
foundation for democratic relationships and sociality. Thus, he denounces the serious 
misconceptions of sympathy, which mislead the public into fantasizing about the 
substantial power of sympathy to lay the groundwork for establishing a liberal and 
democratic society. He also acknowledges the inevitable necessity of believing in this 
impossibility, because it enables his contemporary Americans to have the wholesome 
sense of sound American democracy. 
In the final chapter, I read Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick; or, The Whale (1851) 
in the historical context of the 1848 presidential elections in the U.S. and France and their 
aftermath. That year, Zachary Taylor, who had no name in politics, won the American 
presidential election, and Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, also a political neophyte, became 
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the first elected President in France. What enabled their rise to power was not only their 
popular celebrity—one was the nephew of Napoleon I and the other was a Mexican War 
hero—but also universal suffrage and the presidential election by popular vote, both 
based on the principle of popular sovereignty. By 1848, France and the U.S. were the 
only two countries to institutionalize popular sovereignty on the national level. Napoleon 
and Taylor were the system’s beneficiaries, however, they both failed to fulfill their 
promise of better democracy; Napoleon became Emperor Napoleon I through coups, and 
Taylor was helpless about the Secession crisis that led to the Civil War. Published in 
1851, Moby-Dick attends to the paradox of popular sovereignty, especially in the 
celebrated quarter-deck scene. I focus on the strikingly democratic and consensual way in 
which Captain Ahab persuades his crew into the communal pursuit of Moby Dick at the 
cost of their economic profit and in breach of the original contract with the owners of the 
Pequod. Unlike existing readings that critically view him as a totalitarian dictator, I argue 
that Melville depicts Ahab in this scene as a democratic leader who first asks for the 
consent of others and follows the result of their collective decision. This democratic 
procedure, however, serves the purpose of Ahab’s private intention and despotic design. 
This paradox, I argue, is central to the paradox of consensual democracy, an enduring 
aporia of modern democracy. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter I 
 
Selfhood, Nationhood, and the Logic of Fantasy 
in Charles Brockden Brown’s Wieland 
 
In Nathaniel Hawthorne’s often neglected tale, “The Hall of Fantasy” (1843), the 
narrator, who is identified with the author himself, wanders in the titular edifice located 
in the “mystic region, which lies above, below, or beyond the actual.” At a spot in the 
building, he stops and sees “[i]n niches and on pedestals … the statues or busts of men, 
who, in every age, have been rulers and demi-gods in the realms of imagination, and its 
kindred regions,” a constellation of literary masters such as “Aesop,” “Dante,” “Ariosto,” 
“Rabelais,” “Cervantes,” “Shakespeare,” “Spenser,” “Milton,” “Bunyan,” “Fielding,” 
“Richardson,” and “Scott.” Beside them, “[i]n an obscure and shadowy niche,” he finds 
“the bust of our country man, the author of Arthur Mervyn,” Charles Brockden Brown.56 
Hawthorne’s allusion to Brown as the only American author qualified for this glorious 
pantheon of stellar authors inaugurates an enduring genealogy of American dark 
romancers including these two, as well as Poe and Melville.57 Designating Brown as the 
                                                          
56 Nathaniel Hawthorne, Mosses From an Old Manse, vol. 10 of The Centenary Edition of the Works of 
Nathaniel Hawthorne, ed. William Charvat et al. (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1974), 173-
174. 
 
57 It is Melville who first employs the word “dark” to characterize the arcane and profound theme of 
Hawthorne’s fiction in “Hawthorne and His Mosses” (1850), a review of Hawthorne’s two volumes of 
Twice Told Tales (1837, 1842). In the essay Melville ascribes “the great depth and breadth of this American 
man” to “the great power of blackness” and “the blackness of darkness beyond” in him, lauding him as the 
proud American author to “prize,” “cherish,” and “glorify” (“Hawthorne and His Mosses: By a Virginian 
Spending July in Vermont,” in The Piazza Tales, vol 9 of The Writing of Herman Melville, eds. Harrison 
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precursor of Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville, critics have noted and valorized the ironic, 
significant chiaroscuro between the progressive Enlightenment ideals Brown openly 
endorses in his political writings and the “intensification of shadow,” as Harry Levin puts 
it,”58 that he creates in his fictional writings. Over the past decades, this critical attention 
to Brown’s status as the forefather of the American Gothic imagination and the romance 
genre has gradually shifted to uncovering the breadth of his active contribution and 
achievement as a prolific historian, essayist, journalist, and editor eagerly engaging with 
the pressing concerns and issues in the young American Republic’s emerging national 
politics and literary culture. Hence the prevalent reassessment of Brown as a key figure 
for comprehending the political, socioeconomic, and cultural contours of the nascent 
Republic.59 
One recent critical tendency in reappraising the political Brown through focusing 
on his protean literary career is an increasing attention to his implicit yet keen political 
stance during the 1790s, especially expressed in his first romance, Wieland or, The 
Transformation: An American Tale (1798).60 Political readings of the text have had a 
tendency to bifurcate into two mutually exclusive interpretations of Brown’s cautious tale 
of contemporary politics. One identifies Brown as a Federalist proponent of a stable, 
viable social order free from the turmoil and seductive politics of demagogues. Critics 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle [Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press 
and The Newberry Library, 1987], 243, 247). 
 
58 Harry Levin, The Power of Blackness: Hawthorne, Poe, Melville (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 
1980), 21. 
 
59 For an overview of recent Brown criticism that marks this critical shift, see Mark Kamrath, “Charles 
Brockden Brown and Contemporary Theory: A Review of Recent Critical Trends in Brown Scholarship,” 
Profils Americans 11 (1999): 213-45. 
 
60 Brown had already composed Alcuin and Sky-Walk and published minor literary pieces before the 
publication of Wieland. Yet the latter was the first of his major romances to be published in its entirety. 
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such as Jane P. Tompkins have presented this reading by viewing the eponymous 
character’s tragedy caused by his solipsistic religious zealotry and the stranger Carwin’s 
deceptive and destructive influence as “a plea for the restoration of civic authority in a 
post-Revolutionary age.”61 In the same light, Christopher Looby and others have 
regarded Wieland as “offer[ing] a direct refutation of the Republican faith in men’s 
capacity to govern themselves without the supports and constraints of an established 
social order.”62 Opposing this critical strand, other critics have tended to align Brown 
with contemporary Democratic-Republicans pursuing personal autonomy and democratic 
diversities, rather than an established social system and forced unity that circumscribe 
individual freedom and local liberty. From this perspective, Eric A. Wolfe and others 
have identified Wieland’s tragic story centering on his fanatic religiosity and self-
destructive zealotry as “a tragedy caused by the relentless search for unity of identity, and 
more particularly, a tragedy played out in the quest for a unified voice.”63 Though these 
two readings seem to conflict, they are in fact premised upon the common assumption 
that Brown is seriously concerned that the political idea and identity he rejects—whether 
Democratic-Republican or Federalist—is the real menace to the progress of American 
democracy. 
                                                          
61 Jane P. Tompkins, Sensational Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction, 1890-1860 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1985), 61. 
 
62 Christopher Looby, Voicing America: Language, Literary Form, and the Origins of the United States 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 202. 
 
63 Eric A. Wolfe, “Ventriloquizing Nation: Voice, Identity, and Radical Democracy in Charles Brockden 
Brown's Wieland,” American Literature: A Journal of Literary History, Criticism, and Bibliography 78, no. 
3 (2006): 452. There is also an eclectic reading that tries to combine the two opposite readings of the 
political Brown. For example, Robert S. Levine maintains that Wieland expresses both “Brown’s 
‘Federalist’ concerns about the threat posed by expedient seducers” and an “ironic critique of the 
foundationalism implicit … in the idea of America as a reified national entity.” Overall, however, Levin’s 
reading is lopsided toward acknowledging more Brown’s political affiliation with Federalists (Conspiracy 
and Romance: Studies in Brockden Brown, Cooper, Hawthorne, and Melville [Cambridge, Eng.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989], 30). 
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My reading of Wieland confronts and confounds the existing political readings of 
the text. Directing attention to Brown’s radical critique of the unquestioned ideological 
premise that delusively substantiates both the Democratic-Republican and Federalist 
causes, I unmask his deep concerns about the logic of early American political fantasy 
that makes such delusive substantiation possible. For Brown, I contend, both the 
Democratic-Republican call for self-government of individual agency and the Federalist 
request for national identity and unity are fundamentally misplaced and misleading in that 
what each party argues for does not exist; in Brown’s view, the perceived substance of 
the Federalist and Democratic-Republican belief is nothing but the fantastically 
substantial belief itself. To discuss how Brown makes such a radical point in Wieland, I 
first turn to the volatile decade of the 1790s which established an unbridgeable gulf 
between Democratic-Republicans and Federalists. During this decade, President George 
Washington’s shocking public announcement of his retirement in September 1796 and 
the subsequent heated presidential election held in December 1796 made evident the 
increasing ideological antagonism between the two conflicting parties, while the 
scandalous XYZ Affair in July 1797 and the controversial passing of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts in July 1798 deepened these inter-party hostilities. Moreover, the decade 
witnessed escalating diplomatic tensions and political crises between the U.S. and France, 
which caused conflicts between Democratic-Republicans and Federalists. After 
considering this historical context, I reconsider the political significance of ventriloquism 
in Wieland. Critics have explored the political and cultural meanings of the hazardous 
effects of ventriloquism in Wieland as an allegory of the contemporary political debates 
over agency, identity, and authority. I claim that, ultimately, their readings mistakenly 
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portray Brown as a firm believer in the substance of contemporary political ideology. The 
political Brown I restore poses a question regarding the very tendency to have faith in 
spectral substances of political ideologies. 
 
“The Transformation: An American Tale” 
On September 19, 1796, George Washington published his valedictory in the 
American Daily Advertiser after 45 years of dedicated military and political service in 
building the new republic. The departing president emphatically called upon his fellow 
Americans in the celebrated “Farewell Address” to continue understanding their strong 
bonds of union as “sacred ties.” Ironically, however, his sudden decision to leave office 
would set the stage for the first presidential election, a contentious election that divided 
leading statesmen and their followers into two opposing political factions—Democratic-
Republicans led by Thomas Jefferson and Federalists aligned with Alexander Hamilton 
and John Adams. Both sides organized campaigns for the coming presidential election on 
the local, state, and national levels, largely disregarding Washington’s public warning of 
the dangers of political partisanship. During the unprecedentedly heated and vicious race 
between Adams and Jefferson, the Democratic-Republicans blamed Federalist elitism and 
their call for national political economic policies (e.g., a powerful and regulative central 
government, a national bank, heavy government subsidies, and tariffs, etc.) that they 
portrayed as a serious menace to American ideals of individual freedom and local liberty. 
Meanwhile, the Federalists denounced the Democratic-Republicans, likening them to 
French Jacobins who would radically attempt to bring down the central government and 
prevent the progress of the American Republic. 
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The result of the election was that Adams narrowly defeated Jefferson in the 
electoral college with a vote of 71-68. Yet according to the U.S. Constitution, the runner-
up was to be elected Adams’s vice president, a rule which would undermine the stability 
of the national body politic. Another crisis in the Adams administration was precipitated 
by Adams himself. Many Federalists, more loyal to Hamilton, considering Adams too 
moderate to fulfill the Federalist vision of America; therefore, they were lukewarm or 
hostile to Adams’s weak leadership. Accordingly Adams’s presidency faced political 
challenges from the outset, both from his own party and from the opposition whose 
leader was his own vice president; Adams was at the helm of the young Republic amid 
increasing political divisions and party rivalries. During his presidency, as a consequence, 
he disagreed with the Federalists as much as he did with the Democratic-Republicans.64 
One significant example of this was his stubborn decision to end the Quasi-War with 
France and push for peace even though the Federalists favored making peace with Britain 
and continuing to be hostile to France.65 At the cost of his own party support, popularity, 
and consequently reelection, Adams obstinately turned his fact against the Federalist 
choice and resolved the conflict with France.  
The XYZ Affair, a political and diplomatic scandal and a fatal blow to Adams’ 
presidency, happened during this negotiation. In 1797, Adams sent three American 
envoys to Paris to secure a peace treaty with the French government. However, the 
American envoys received insulting demands from the French: the public apology of the 
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65 Hamilton favored this option for the purpose of promoting closer ties with Britain for the U.S.’s 
commercial interests. On the contrary, Adams always sought peace as he frankly wrote in his letter to his 
wife: “[r]econciliation if practicable and Peace if attainable, you very well know would be as agreeable to 
my Inclinations and as advantageous to my Interest, as to any Man’s” (John Adams to Abigail Adams, 18 
February 1776, Letters of John Adams, Addressed to His Wife Vol I, ed. Charles Francis Adams [Boston: 
Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1841], 85). 
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American government, granting a loan, and also paying a bribe of $250,000 to the French 
government. When this news reached America, many citizens were furious and, 
regardless of party affiliation, they demanded war. Despite the insult, Adams kept trying 
to reach an agreement with France, which resulted in a deluge of public denunciations 
and attacks directed at him, especially from Democratic-Republicans. To quash the 
Federalist opposition, Adams signed the notorious Alien and Sedition Acts into law in 
June and July of 1798. The laws were supposed to control the hostile activities of French-
sympathizing foreigners in the U.S. during a time of impending war, but they actually put 
a gag upon members of the press voicing opposition to the Adams administration. Indeed, 
after the passing of the Acts anti-Federalist newspaper publishers and journalists were 
arrested, tried, and convicted. Seeing this, Adams’ vice President Jefferson lamented, “I 
know not which mortifies me most, that I should fear to write what I think, or my country 
bear such a state of things.”66  
It was during this period of domestic political crisis that menaced the 
foundational values and principles of American democracy that Brown published his four 
major romances: Wieland (1798), Ormond, or, The Secret Witness (1799), Arthur Mervyn, 
or, Memoirs of the Year 1793 (Volume 1 in 1799 and Volume II in 1800), and Edgar 
Huntly, or, Memoirs of a Sleep-Walker (1799). During this brief explosion of imaginative 
power, Brown advanced a new form of the American romance, a form characterized by 
enigmatic figures, their unresolved dilemmas, and a narrative voice willing to speak the 
unidentified truth of the young American Republic. As the portico to the “obscure and 
shadowy”—as Hawthorne calls it—sanctum of dark romances, Wieland explores the 
                                                          
66 Thomas Jefferson to John Tylor, 26 November 1798, vol 4 of The Writings of Thomas Jefferson: Being 
His Autobiography, Correspondence, Reports, Messages, Addresses, and Other Writings, Official and 
Private, ed. H. A. Washington (New York: Derby & Jackson, 1854), 259. 
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centrality of complex dimensions and functions of the human psyche to the unidentified 
sources of early American political problems. Since its first appearance, the highly 
suggestive subtitle of Wieland–“The Transformation: An American Tale”—has tempted a 
number of readers and critics to try to unveil its ambiguous political, social, and cultural 
meanings, positioned as the novel is within the historical context of the nation building 
period.  
One of the most striking and significant transformations the early American 
Republic underwent was the increasing diversification of the American population. For 
Brown and his contemporaries, late 18th-century America was indeed reeling from the 
fundamental, guiding principle of national unity that directed the Revolutionary War. 
After the Revolutionary years, Americans began to face and fear inherent and increasing 
political, social, and cultural (especially religious) differences in their own populace. 
Wieland captures the deepening tension and anxiety about such internal heterogeneities 
that practically threatened to shake he necessary ideology of national unity. To reflect this 
social concerns, one of the romance’s main characters, Francis Carwin, is an alien; he is 
an Englishman who has abandoned his birth country’s faith, culture, and identity, 
essentially to become a Spaniard. He has learned the Spanish language, identified with its 
cultural norms, and even converted to Roman Catholicism. Brown’s contemporaries 
would have considered Carwin’s varied, heterogeneous national and cultural identities a 
tangible threat to the formation of American unity. In particular, his ventriloquism—an 
ability to make and manipulate a voice that cannot be easily identified as his own— 
indicates the serious issue of identity and identification he brings to the early American 
Republic suffering from the crisis of national unity during the 1790s. Jay Fliegelman and 
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Eric A Wolfe, among other critics, have viewed the disruptive power and influence of 
Carwin’s ventriloquism upon Wieland as an indication of the specific political incidents 
that flamed the emerging national chauvinism made manifest in the XYZ Affair and the 
Alien and Sedition Acts to deal with the crisis of American unity.67 According to these 
critics, Brown’s exploration of the effect of ventriloquism takes on a political 
significance as Brown depicts the ventriloquist Carwin thwarting and disrupting 
Wieland’s fantasy of the identity of bodily agent and vocal agency. Their readings 
suggest that Wieland not only channels Brown’s anxiety about the violent logic of the 
American body politic but also underscores his strong belief in the possibility of a more 
genuine democracy, one that would embrace unauthorized voices of people with diverse 
identities. However, these readings ignore Brown’s suggestion that divorcing voice from 
body is impossible, as is the divorce of identity from authority, and choice from will. The 
irresistible and overwhelming influence of Carwin’s ventriloquism upon the Wieland 
circle suggests that only Wieland is unable to decouple himself from the fantasized 
identification between selfhood and authority. In what follows, my close reading of 
                                                          
67 The main plot of Wieland, which hinges upon the delusional and destructive effect of a strange visitor’s 
ventriloquism resulting in his host’s familicide, has invited a number of critics to a discussion of the 
intricate philosophical questions of agency, authority, will, and identity/identification in relation to 
contemporary European and American political thoughts. Leigh Eric Schmidt’s Hearing Things: Religion, 
Illusion, and the American Enlightenment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000) provides a 
thorough historical and cultural study for the discussion of the thematic importance of ventriloquism in 
Wieland by elucidating the centrality of ventriloquism to demystifying the logic of religious revelation. For 
the philosophical and political readings of Wieland in terms of the issue of ventriloquism, see Jay 
Fliegelman’s introduction to the Penguin Classic edition of Wieland; and Memoirs of Carwin the Biloquist 
(New York: Penguin, 1991), vvxii-xxxivv, Emory Elliott’s introduction to the Oxford World’s Classics 
edition of Wieland and Memoirs of Carwin the Biloquist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), vii-xxx, 
Caleb Crain’s introduction to the Modern Library Classics edition of Wieland or, the Transformation: An 
American Tale and Other Stories (New York: Random House, 2002), xi-xxiv, Nigel Leask, “Irish 
Republicans and Gothic Eleutherarchs: Pacific Utopias in the Writings of Theobald Wolfe Tone and 
Charles Brockden Brown,” in British Radical Culture of the 1790s, ed. Robert M. Maniquis (San Marino: 
Huntington Library, 2002), 109, David S. Hogsette, “Textual Surveillance, Social Codes, and Sublime 
Voices: The Tyranny of Narrative in Caleb Williams and Wieland,” Romanticism on the Net: An Electronic 
Journal Devoted to Romantic Studies 38-39 (2005): 1-24, and Barbara Judson, “A Sound of Voices: The 
Ventriloquial Uncanny in Wieland and Prometheus Unbound,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 44, no. 1 (2010): 
21-37. 
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Wieland expounds how Brown represents Wieland’s dilemma as associated with an 
ontological problem that cannot be easily fixed, as well as this unresolved problem’s 
political implications. 
 
“Wast thou the agent?” 
Though notoriously complicated and confusing, the major events of Wieland’s 
plot originate from and revolve around Wieland’s religious fanaticism and monomaniacal 
zealotry. The story is narrated by Wieland’s sister Clara Wieland upon someone’s request 
of the details of her American experience. Clara undertakes her autobiographical story 
with some hesitancy, in part because the incidents she has gone through are so repulsive 
and led to her emotional and nervous breakdown, and in part because she is not quite 
confident that others will believe her experience. Yet she begins to tell her story to the 
unidentified recipient, starting with a brief history of her family and the bizarre death of 
her father Theodore. Theodore Wieland, a mercantile apprentice in London, was early 
converted to a strict form of Protestant Christianity. One day he decided to come to 
America to convert the savages. However, his failure to persist in his calling bred a deep 
guilt and an ungovernable anxiety in him, as well as a feeling that he had disappointed his 
God. When Clara was six, he died, apparently by spontaneous combustion, in the very 
location of his religious ritual and worship, an appalling event that would remain in the 
minds of Clara and her elder brother Theodore.68 
What is particularly noteworthy in Clara’s recollection of her father is her precise 
delineation of the origin and structure of his religious belief. She details how he 
                                                          
68 Charles Brockden Brown, Wieland and Memoirs of Carwin the Biloquist, ed. Jay Fliegelman (New York: 
Penguin, 1991). Further references will be to this edition and will be cited parenthetically in the text. 
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transforms into “a fanatic and a dreamer” with “invincible candor and invariable integrity” 
(13): 
A Bible was easily procured, and he ardently entered on the study of it. His 
understanding had received a particular direction. All his reveries were fashioned 
in the same mould. His progress towards the formation of his creed was rapid. 
Every fact and sentiment in this book was viewed through a medium which the 
writings of the Camisard apostle had suggested. His constructions of the text were 
hasty, and formed on a narrow scale. Everything was viewed in a disconnected 
position. One action and one percept were not employed to illustrate and restrict 
the meaning of another. Hence arose a thousand scruples to which he had hitherto 
been a stranger. He was alternately agitated by fear and by ecstasy. He imagined 
himself beset by the snares of a spiritual foe, and that his security lay in ceaseless 
watchfulness and prayer. (9-10) 
 
In this depiction, Clara underscores the quite problematic ground of her father’s religious 
belief, which is formed and fortified in an impetuous (“rapid,” “hasty”), parochial (“a 
particular direction,” “on a narrow scale”), illusory (“reveries”), self-contradictory (“by 
fear and by ecstasy”), as well as a passive, submissive, and subjugated (“beset by the 
snare of a spiritual foe”) fashion. All these negative attributes of his creed are central to 
the solid groundwork for his belief, which then characterize his existence: “[t]he empire 
of religious duty extended itself to his looks, gestures, and phrases” (10). In a sense, 
Clara implies that his belief is devoid of substance. Ironically, what constitutes it is its 
form and procedure, not its true content. The problematic aspects of his religious 
apprenticeship indicate that it is his act of belief that forms and fortifies the validity of 
what he believes. 
 Another notable episode that demonstrates this inherent problem with his piety is 
the way in which he decides to come to America. When seeking a new habitation, “there 
was another of the most imperious and irresistible necessity,” the logic and operation of 
which is described in Clara’s account: 
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He imbibed an opinion that it was his duty to disseminate the truths of the gospel 
among the unbelieving nations. He was terrified at first by the perils and 
hardships to which the life of a missionary is exposed. This cowardice made him 
diligent in the invention of objections and excuses; but he found it impossible 
wholly to shake off the belief that such was the injunction of his duty. This belief, 
after every new conflict with his passions, acquired new strength; and, at length, 
he formed a resolution of complying with what he deemed the will of heaven. 
(10-11)  
 
Here, Brown significantly suggests that the religious belief of Clara’s father is in truth 
contingent on an inverted logic of causality—the cause is retroactively created by the 
effect. In his case, the cause of his religious belief is recognized as the substantial 
“injunction of his duty” by suffering the terrifying effect of such belief; that is, it is the 
very act of his belief and its effect that impel him to have faith in the substantial cause of 
his belief. Note that despite his own existential fear and anxiety about his decision to 
immigrate to America—the apprehensions are what his true self really feels and 
understands—it is his “belief” that forces him to conform to what he believes to be “the 
will of heaven.” His decision led by the underlying logic of his belief requires no internal 
confidence or external confirmation of how true his belief is; what is necessary is only 
the act of firm belief itself. By believing in the substance of what he believes, Brown 
suggests, he undoubtedly confirms the validity of the substance of his own religious 
belief.  
 When Clara’s father moves to Philadelphia, he purchases a farm and begins 
cultivating it, still believing that the Indians require his proselytizing. However, his 
religious faith slackens as he becomes caught up in hard work in the New World. 
Eventually, he returns to his theological studies and takes up the missionary mantle once 
more, but in vain due to practical difficulties and hardships in reality. It is harsh reality 
itself—not his belief—that thwarts his religious design to convert the savage tribes in 
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America. Discouraged and despondent, he engrosses himself in building a veritable 
temple on a cliff for solitary meditation. Building the temple signifies his desperate 
endeavor to keep the form of his belief because the belief is what substantiates and 
sustains his sense of being and reality. Without it, he does not exist ontologically. In this 
sense, he already lives a dead life devoid of substance, without the knowledge of the 
paradox. Thus, his sudden death, though its cause is inexplicably mysterious and 
unbelievable, is not surprising at all. Rather, the putative cause of his death, the 
spontaneous combustion whose source or cause cannot be identified or explained, implies 
his life devoid of the proper substance of his belief. In sum, his causeless life is the 
equivalent of his causeless death. 
 After describing the death of her father, Clara’s narration shifts to the story of a 
circle comprised of herself, her brother Theodore Wieland, his wife, Catharine Pleyel 
Wieland, their four children, and Wieland’s brother-in-law, Henry Pleyel, who live in a 
relatively isolated rural community outside Philadelphia. Their insular intimacy and 
happiness in a close-knit circle of families and relatives/friends begin to falter as they 
hear a series of unidentified and disembodied voices, some of which are later revealed to 
be the work of Francis Carwin, a strange visitor to the Wieland circle. Carwin has the 
peculiar ability to throw his voice and thus seems to be responsible for the mysterious 
voices, though he stubbornly denies it. Whether through Carwin’s vocal manipulations or 
not, Wieland, who has inherited his father’s heightened religiosity, becomes strongly 
convinced that he really hears the voice of God, especially an order that demands the 
sacrifice of his family to prove his faith. In the end, to fulfill the order of his God 
Wieland kills his wife and their children. He also tried to kill Clara, but she is saved by 
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Carwin’s ventriloquized command from God to stop Wieland. In his last moments, 
Wieland doubts his divine sanction for the first time, but only when he has nothing left to 
do but terminated his falsely guided life. 
Arguably, no event in Wieland is more traumatic and catastrophic for the 
Wielands and Pleyel than the tragedy caused by Wieland’s religious solipsism and 
fanaticism, which he seems to have inherited from his father. As a matter of fact, in 
Clara’s reminiscence, though “[t]here was an obvious resemblance between him and my 
father, in their conceptions of the importance of certain topics, and in the light in which 
the vicissitudes of human life were accustomed to be viewed … the mind of the son was 
enriched by science, and embellished with literature” (26). Therefore, “[h]uman life, in 
his opinion, was made up of changeable elements, and the principles of duty were not 
easily unfolded” (25). Unlike his religiously obsessed father, Wieland is open to the 
world of variability and objectivity through his deep interests in literature and science; 
thus, he understands human life in terms of its changeability and relativity as well as 
objectivity and rationality. However, the significant dissimilarity between the father and 
the son eventually becomes a salient similarity as the son also becomes a religious fanatic 
who focuses on nothing but his own religion due to his belief in the substance of the 
mysterious voice. Wieland’s drastic transformation is in fact enacted and derailed by the 
logic of inverted causality; like his father, he convinces himself of the substance of the 
religious cause he believes in by means of suffering the effect of the act of his religious 
belief. 
What compels his transformation is the mysterious, unidentified voice. One 
evening, Wieland, Catharine, Pleyel, and Clara are in the temple Theodore Wieland built 
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on a hill for his religious rituals. The women practice needlepoint while the men argue a 
particular point of Cicero. Then a storm comes and they retire to the house. When 
Wieland returns to the temple for a letter he himself left in it, he hears his wife’s voice at 
the bottom of the hill, which is impossible because he thinks she must be at home at that 
time. Later Clara and Wieland have a chance to talk about the extraordinary event, when 
he expresses his opinion of it for the first time: “There is no determinate way in which the 
subject can be viewed. Here is an effect, but the cause is utterly inscrutable. To suppose a 
deception will not do. Such is possible, but there are twenty other suppositions more 
probable” (40-41). Given this comment, Wieland’s later transformation to a religious 
fanatic is especially shocking. At that moment, he seems to clearly understand what is 
central to the problem of his religious belief—“Here is an effect, but the cause is utterly 
inscrutable.” He is aware of the fact that central to the actual problem with any 
determinism is the presence of an “effect” whose “cause is utterly inscrutable.” As he 
acknowledges, the paradox is not an epistemological question of “deception”; rather, it is 
a deeper ontological question regarding why one is compelled to explore the 
“probable”—not simply “possible”—“suppositions.” This exploration is triggered by 
believing in the “probable” “suppositions.” That is, the act of believing what is supposed 
to be the probable, whether “inscrutable” or not, is enough for believing the substance of 
the cause—though the latter remains still “inscrutable.” This is, in truth, the logical 
“effect” of believing. Wieland’s awareness of this logical problem is, however, to be 
overshadowed by the domineering logic of his religious belief—the very logic of inverted 
causality. 
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The mysterious voices, which haunt the mind of Wieland, also influence Clara, 
and she precisely records the actual working of the inverted logic of causality in her own 
mind, making her a self-aware case study to help the reader understand better the case of 
Wieland. When she hears the unidentified voices, she says that “[t]he words uttered by 
the person without, affected me as somewhat singular, but what chiefly rendered them 
remarkable, was the tone that accompanied them. It was wholly new.” Here, she ascribes 
the irresistibly attractive power of the voice to the new and remarkable singularity of the 
tone. The tone is an affectively expressive mode of voice, which is not necessarily 
pertinent to the content the voice conveys. In other words, the tone is nothing but an 
affective effect and therefore cannot be the actual substance of what voice intends to 
deliver. However, the problem is that the tonal effect, due to its affectively expressive 
and infectious tonality, sounds like a new and singular entity, which attracts individuals 
who hears it. This attraction of the voice works like gravitational force because of its 
inherent affectivity: “a heart of stone could not fail of being moved by it” because “[i]t 
imparted to me an emotion altogether involuntary and incontrollable” (59). In Wieland, 
Brown underscores that this overwhelmingly powerful—“involuntary and 
incontrollable”—affective influence of the effect is so substantial that no one can resist 
its operation. 
Pleyel also falls prey to the power of the effect misconstrued as the cause. 
Misunderstanding the strange voices as evidence of Clara’s affair with Carwin, he leaves 
her. Verifying the substance of an incident does not matter to him anymore. Pleyel’s 
problem in his misunderstanding of Clara indicates the inherent problem of the 
Enlightenment model of epistemological subjectivity. Under the influence of the 
 52 
 
Enlightenment, antebellum Americans tended to believe that one’s senses are the 
conduits to receiving and accumulating knowledge; an individual should trust their senses 
rather than place their faith in religion. In Wieland, however, the senses are as faulty and 
misleading as misplaced and misleading religious faith. As a matter of fact, Pleyel is the 
most emphatic advocate of the truth of sensory perception. Without questioning, he 
accepts all the voices he hears. Wieland is also convinced that he hears the voice of God 
command him to murder his family. In the absence of Pleyel, as Clara later depicts, the 
“power” whose “might” is “irresistible” “disarmed” Wieland “of all his purposes” and 
forced him to kill his wife and children (261). In his confession, he later admits that 
“[w]ith regard to myself, I had acted with a phrenzy that surpassed belief” (241). This 
confession is seriously erroneous, however. For it is his belief in the truth of the voice 
that makes him commit familicide, not a simply excessive “phrenzy.” The deep irony 
Brown reveals here is the agent’s ignorance of the real problem of the mechanism of his 
belief. In fact, this lasting ignorance is what makes possible the persistence of belief; only 
without any doubt or knowledge of its problematic logic can the belief keep operating on 
human agency. When called upon to testify in his own defense during his trial, in front of 
“judges, advocates, and auditors,” he begins his testimony by posing a question regarding 
his identity: 
It is strange; I am known to my judges and my auditors. Who is there 
present a stranger to the character of Wieland? Who knows him not as a 
husband—as a father—as a friend? Yet here am I arraigned as criminal. I 
am charged with diabolical malice; I am accused of the murder of my wife 
and my children! … You know whom it is that you thus charge. The 
habits of his life are known to you; his treatment of his wife and his 
offspring is known to you; the soundness of his integrity, and the 
unchangeableness of his principles, are familiar to your apprehension; yet 
you persist in this charge! (186-187)  
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Wieland never denies the obvious fact that he has killed his family. Nor does he deny the 
“integrity” of his perceived identity or character. As he explains in his courtroom 
statement, “God is the object of my supreme passion. I have cherished, in his presence, a 
single and upright heart. I have thirsted for the knowledge of his will. I have burnt with 
ardour to approve my faith and my obedience.” In the continuing confession, he also 
contends that “[m]y purposes have been pure; my wishes indefatigable.” His sense of 
purity attests to his ignorance of the essential problem central to the mechanism of his 
belief. The belief, as he acknowledges, can be “fully gratified” only by the act of killing 
his family (187). That he sees this murder as “divine command,” or the inevitable act of 
sacrifice which would “set myself forever beyond the reach of selfishness” (195), or a 
“duty” (the word he emphatically repeats three times [194, 195, 196]) reaffirms that he 
never doubts the substance of his belief.  
For Wieland, the tragedy he brings about and answers for is nothing but a 
necessary consequence of “searching for the revelation of that will [of God].” As a matter 
of fact, as he acknowledges, now he realizes that “I have not been wholly uninformed; 
but my knowledge has always stopped short of certainty.” What fills in the lacuna in his 
knowledge is his certain belief based on his unnoticed misrecognition and misjudgment. 
Therefore, he underscores that “If I erred, it was not my judgment that deceived me, but 
my sense” (256). This self-justification leads to his sense of purity, not only for his 
“purposes” but for his being itself. “I am still pure. Still will I look for my reward in thy 
[God’s] justice!” says him (256). This self-imposed conviction suggests that the logic of 
inverted causality allows him to be convinced of a seamless ontological plenitude by 
covering up what is absent in his actual selfhood and social life. “Wast thou the agent?” 
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(250) is the question Wieland asks Carwin in order to verify if he was the real perpetrator 
of the mysterious voices. However, the question regarding the real agent no longer 
matters to Wieland as he is now haunted by the inverted logic of causality without the 
knowledge of its operation and influence. This fatal ignorance, which prevents him from 
understanding the problematic mechanism of his agency, enables him to keep 
maintaining a holistic idea of his God. 
 
The Logic of American Fantasy 
As I have discussed in the introduction, David Hume’s concept of “belief” as a 
contingent—i.e., non-subjective—mode of affective imagination complicated John 
Locke’s and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s notions of rational agency and liberal 
individualism central to the conceptualization of modern democracy. As Locke and 
Rousseau were heralded as the philosophical mentors of the American revolutionary 
mind—while Hume’s skepticism found no place in it, the underlying logic of Locke’s 
and Rousseau’s abstract formulation of liberal individuals and their democratic society 
was predominantly operative in the American thought. Also functioning were the 
problems of their logic. For example, when Jefferson presents and advocates the notion 
of the self-governing agency, he follows the conceptual model of Locke and Rousseau. 
The notion of self-government pervades Jefferson’s design of the American Republic as 
an “Empire for Liberty.” America, he believes, is to be “such an empire for liberty as the 
world has never surveyed since the creation; and I am persuaded no constitution was ever 
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before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire and self-government.”69 His notion 
of self-government suggests the government of and by the self-governing and self-
sustaining individuals; that is, the political form of government reciprocally corresponds 
to the agentive form of its citizen. In this view, the self-government gains its rightful 
authority from the agent as an autonomous subject, proving that at the heart of American 
democracy is proper liberal individualism. His visionary rendering of the fulcrum of a 
young American Republic highlights the self-evident and proper liberal individualism at 
its core. However, as Brown reveals in Wieland, the fantasized notions of autonomy and 
unity are doubly delusional; both are devoid of their proper substances, which however 
unknowingly activates the inverted logic of causality as a necessary means of sustaining a 
fantasized vision of the desired political reality of American democracy.  
Therefore, it is noticeably suggestive that Wieland is, according to Brown’s own 
prefatory “Advertisement,” set in “between the conclusion of the French and the 
beginning of the revolution war” (4), an indication of the text’s pertinence to the outset of 
the history of American democracy. In fact, Brown’s focused attention to the self-
imposed and self-endorsed logic of inversed causality, which retroactively creates a grand 
cause and then blindly pursues and (simultaneously) validates any substantial process to 
fulfill it, is indicative of the same logic’s implicit service for constructing the American 
republic. It is strikingly notable that the logic of Jefferson’s vision of “Empire for Liberty” 
is analogous to that of Wieland’s religious fanaticism. They both believe in the substance 
of what they believe, which exists as long as it is believed to exist. In the same way that 
Wieland’s act of belief retroactively creates and validates the substance of the pseudo-
                                                          
69 Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 27 April 1809, vol 5 of The Writings of Thomas Jefferson: Being 
His Autobiography, Correspondence, Reports, Messages, Addresses, and Other Writings, Official and 
Private, ed. H. A. Washington (New York: Derby & Jackson, 1859), 444. 
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Christianity he believes in, Jefferson’s belief in American democracy transmutes the 
object of fantasy into a perceivable and thus pursuable object. The paradox is that 
Jefferson adamantly argues for “building a wall of separation between church and State” 
in order that the “expression of the supreme will of the nation” should be “in behalf of the 
rights of conscience,” not religious “faith” or “worship.”70 For Brown, what is central to 
Wieland’s abnormal religious enthusiasm is also central to the emerging American idea 
of and passion for a new democratic republic because they both are contingent on the 
logic of inverted causality inherent in the non-subjective mode of affective and 
imaginative belief. 
By suggesting this analogy in Wieland, Brown disproves the politicized notion of 
personal autonomy as well as any political fantasy of national unity. He thus displaces 
both the Democratic-Republican and Federalist belief in the substance of their respective 
political ideology and thus reveals his disbelief in the possibility of a true democracy. 
What Brown specifically criticizes is not so much the Federalist and Democratic-
Republican fantasies themselves as the essential logic of fantasy central to the 
ideologized American democracy. For him, both Federalism and Democratic-
Republicanism are in effect empirically impossible; self-government of agency is not 
possible given the democratic social realities that implicate individual citizens in a set of 
complicated social relations and connections, and a unified identity or a national unity is 
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also an obvious impossibility due to the heterogeneous fabric of American reality as well 
as the established two-party system in American politics.71  
Hence there is something more subversive in Brown’s acerbic critique of the 
underlying logic of American democracy. That is, his true intent for Wieland is not to 
simply highlight his double rejection of the respective political ideology of Democratic-
Republicans and Federalists. Rather, he aims to direct attention to the fundamental 
national myths and practical social practices that serve to delusively substantiate the 
irresistible and overwhelming fantasies of self-government and national unity. For Brown, 
it is the American political ideologies that function to foster and fortify the haunting idea 
of American democracy, and the paradox is the shared sense and pursuit of the substance 
of American democracy. 
“America has opened new views to the naturalist and politician, but has seldom 
furnished themes to the moral painter,” writes Brown in the preface of Edgar Huntly. A 
new theme of moral philosophy America can provide for a moralist is, Brown suggests, 
the unique dynamic of agency and causality in the American mind; “[t]hat new springs of 
action and new motives to curiosity should operate; that the field of investigation opened 
to us by our own country should differ essentially from those which exist in Europe, may 
be readily conceived.” What are “peculiar to ourselves” are, Brown identifies in the 
preface, “[t]he sources of amusement to the fancy and instruction to the heart.” The 
centrality of “fancy” and “heart”—rather than rationality and reason—to the operation of 
                                                          
71 Leading Federalists such as James Madison endorses the significance of political objection established by 
the Constitution. Madison argues that the “political truth” “on which the objection is founded” has great 
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of tyranny” (quoted in David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist [Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984], 126). 
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the American agency and the American sense of the logic of causality (especially “new 
springs of action and new motives to curiosity”) indicates the significance of the working 
of an American affective imagination and its underlying logic of inverted causality in the 
way Americans believe and confirm the political meaning and importance of their 
existence. 
For Brown, romance is the most effective mode of criticism of American social 
and political reality. In his essay, “The Difference Between History and Romance,”72 
published in April 1800, Brown explains how the romance can guide readers to deeper 
awareness of their social questions and problems. Brown claims that historians and 
romancers, like early modern scientists such as Isaac Newton, should be social scientists 
who employ literary narratives and devices to delve into the existing social system and 
order so as to educate their contemporary readers about the essential, structural problems 
of their society. In this regard, he rejects the common notion that history and romance are 
different from each other in that the former is factual and the latter is fictional. Rather, he 
proposes, history documents the significant process and result of actual historical actions 
in order to confirm facts about real events and identify their lessons, while romance 
explores the possible conditions and motives that bring about such historical actions in 
order to pose a deeper question as to why and how the events occur. Therefore, for him, 
romance is concerned with the veiled causes and consequences of individual behaviors 
and social actions through the medium of imaginative conjecture and literary 
representation, which he believes will illuminate the way in which social systems and 
forces operate. Brown thus suggests romance as a mode of deep realism to probe into the 
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(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2009), 196-198. 
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essential ideological fabric and function of fantasized reality. In his view, Wieland, his 
first romance, is intended to disclose the uniquely American psychical dynamic that is 
constitutive of what is spectrally inherent in the logic of causality political ideology and 
reality. 
Brown’s dark vision of American democracy would lead him to foreswear writing 
fiction. By April 1800, Brown would find reasons “for dropping the doleful tone and 
assuming a cheerful one” and would thereafter abandon the Gothic theme and style that 
marked his best literary writing. In the end, not only did he change into a critic and 
magazine editor, but he disavowed radical politics he had advocated before. In October 
1803, he wrote in an editor’s note stating “I should enjoy a larger share of my own 
respect, at the present moment, if nothing had ever flowed from my pen, the production 
of which could be traced to me.” By writing this, he meant to restart his career as an 
editor. Indeed, he had carried on the editing of The Monthly Magazine, and American 
Review, while drafting and publishing Edgar Huntly and the second part of Arthur 
Mervyn. Although the final issue of the Monthly Magazine appeared in December 1800, 
the review section, which had proven to be the magazine’s most popular feature, 
continued; The American Review and Literature Journal (1801-1802) began appearing 
quarterly in New York.  
William Dunlap, Brown’s friend and first biographer who wrote The Life of 
Charles Brockden Brown (1815), identified a significant change that occurred in Brown’s 
life between the latter years of the eighteenth century and the early ones of the nineteenth 
century. According to Dunlap, “[f]rom the regions of poetry and romance; from visionary 
schemes of Utopian systems of government and manners, Mr. Brown … became a sober 
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recorder of things as they are.”73 Dunlap welcomed the transformation as Brown started 
to devoe himself to serious writing on the real issues of American politics and life. 
However, the nature of the change has been interpreted differently over the years. 
William Charvat, for example, has claimed that after 1801 Brown “spent the rest of his 
life storekeeping and doing hack work for Philadelphia publishers.”74 In the similar view, 
Frank Luther Mott has suggested that “[f]ailure in his most ambitious literary attempts, 
the unfaith of his promising friends, the responsibilities of marriage, the lectures of his 
conventional brother, and – finally – physical illnesses, tamed his high spirit and made 
him a hack.”75 But just as a prophet who has already conveyed the prophecy would not 
tell it repeatedly, Brown, who had already pointed to the central ontological dilemma of 
American democracy did not need to compose more romances to express the same 
concern. Ironically, the tragic ending of his literary career as a romancer was the 
inevitable consequence of his correct insight. 
Brown’s deep concern about the paradoxical yet necessary logic of American 
democracy proved prophetic for Edgar Allan Poe in only a few decades. During the 
1830s and 1840s, Poe had to confront the political and cultural monsters borne out of the 
very logic. The next chapter considers how the development and deflection of American 
democracy in Poe’s time had generated the two monsters at the heart of the democratic 
values and practices his contemporaries desired and pursued and how the author 
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struggled with them in his romances that capture the intrinsic contradiction of American 
political and literary democracy. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter II 
 
Edgar Allan Poe and the Paradoxes of Democratic Individualism 
“ … in most of the operations of the mind, each American appeals to  
the individual exercise of his own understanding alone …” 
-Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835) 
 
Edgar Allan Poe has long been politically labeled as an anti-Democratic Whig 
due to his help with a Philadelphia presidential campaign for Whig candidate William 
Henry Harrison, as well as his strong aversion to the Jacksonian “Era of the Common 
Man” as expressed in his “Some Words with a Mummy” (1845) and “Mellonta Tauta” 
(1849).76 In these satires, Poe explicitly indicts the Jacksonian paean to the American 
embodiment of “the great beauty and importance of Democracy,” particularly the 
institution of “suffrage ad libitum” or “universal suffrage” [italics in the original]. For 
Poe, the extension of the right to vote to a wider range of common (white) men would 
inevitably degrade into “the most odious and unsupportable despotism” whose “usurping 
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tyrant” is “Mob.”77 Hence the long-held image of Poe denigrating the Jacksonian 
mobocracy as synonymous with egalitarian chaos and political turmoil.  
On the other hand, critics have in recent decades tended to reconsider Poe’s 
daunting vision of Jacksonian democracy in terms of its profound menace to 
individualism by noting the representation of such a crisis in “William Wilson” and “The 
Man of the Crowd.” This new critical orientation focuses on Wilson’s solipsistic selfhood 
negated by the intrusion of his identical double and a solitary narrator’s botched pursuit 
of an idiosyncratic peregrinator among the unindividuated crowds, viewing them both as 
referential to the foreclosure of individual autonomy and singularity as well as self-
isolation. Such a twofold crisis of individualism indicates that democracy at once 
homogenizes and insulates individuals in a mob of the disconnected. From this 
perspective, Poe is aligned squarely with Alexis de Tocqueville and Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, contemporary champions of the inviolable dignity and value of self in the face 
of democratic equalization and seclusion; that is, for these critics Poe’s denunciation of 
mob impulse and rule should be regarded in the same light with Tocqueville’s angst over 
a homogeneous mass of detached individuals and Emerson’s loathing of the herd 
mentality—all three warn against the democratic liquidation of proper individuality, 
which must be preserved.78 
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This recent critical leveling not only ignores Poe’s ingrained skepticism of self-
sustaining agency, a consistent theme in his arcane works; it also eclipses his incisive 
critique of the contemporary intellectual urge —mainly Tocquevillian and Emersonian—
to retrieve the individual marred by permeating social democratizations. Poe chastises 
this public injunction as a double delusion, for this delusion first posits the discursive 
conception of a self-possessed and distinctive individual as a historical substance and 
then it proclaims the abstraction unredeemable as the urgently sought-after object. Poe 
precisely captures this doubly-mistaken delusion in “William Wilson” and “The Man of 
the Crowd.” Note that Wilson, contemptuous of the utter democratization of his name of 
“a noble descent” into “the common property of the mob,” is mortified by his 
namesake/doppelgänger’s “most absolute identity” with him, a case of extreme 
interpersonal identification which depersonalizes his agency by rendering him a mere 
part of the “twofold repetition” (431, 434).79 Also notable is that the narrator of “The 
Man of the Crowd,” immersed in watching a kaleidoscopic view of the unindividuated 
demos (“throng,” “population,” and “masses”) on the street, is strongly drawn to and 
desperately chases after an nameless old roamer’s “absolute idiosyncrasy,” only to realize 
that such a peculiarity is “in vain to follow” (507, 511, 515). What binds the two tales 
together thematically is Poe’s sustained inquiry into the way in which the bare reality of 
the desubjectivized individual and the depersonalized masses triggers the narrator’s 
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urgent yet deluded striving to secure his own or a stranger’s autonomy and singularity; 
what the narrator perceives and pursues is, as he finds in the end, nothing but an 
nonentity that has deluded their dogged chase after it. So Poe is not a Whig, not a 
champion of individualism, but a demystifier of the false logic of democratic 
individualism. 
By dramatizing the impossible condition of autonomous and singular agency in 
“William Wilson” and “The Man of the Crowd,” Poe directs the reader’s attention to the 
paradox underlying contemporary politics and culture in which the very agentive 
impossibility actually functions as the key condition for both presidential victory and 
literary success. This oxymoronic phenomenon originated from the new social fabrics 
molded by social democratizations and their drastic fluctuations during the Jacksonian 
era. The first half of Poe’s literary career, from 1829 to 1841, overlapped with Andrew 
Jackson’s two consecutive terms and Jackson’s loyal successor Martin Van Buren’s one 
term and this era saw the flowering of unprecedented political, economic, and cultural 
democratizations, as well as their deflected ramifications. Many new voters created by 
the extension of the franchise fell prey to massive political mobilizations which 
intensified the unbridgeable factional confrontation between Jacksonians and anti-
Jacksonians;80 the widely promoted and pursued laissez faire doctrine of the Jackson and 
Van Buren administration gave rise to the frenzied and competitive land boom and 
speculative fever leading to the Great Panic of 1837; and due to the recession, the 
publishing market veered toward conforming to the dominant popular tastes. Those 
shifting contours of American social democratization had transformed the structures of 
                                                          
80 Between the presidential elections of 1824 and 1844, the vote for President jumped about 750 percent, 
while the population did not quite double during the same period. This disproportionate increase resulted 
from the increased ballots of a number of citizens formerly disenfranchised by lack of property or poverty. 
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national politics and literary culture into the impersonal mechanisms of the presidential 
race and the printing market in which imitating what the populace favored, even if it 
required the sacrifice of personal identity and singularity, became a decisive determinant 
of presidential victory and authorial success; for instance, William Henry Harrison won 
his rematch with Martin Van Buren in the 1840 presidential election by camouflaging his 
aristocratic background and identifying himself with Jackson’s popular image of a 
homespun war hero of humble origin. In the literary market, imitation and reproduction 
of popular genres and styles helped to guarantee an author’s commercial and critical 
success. Published in the final years of the Jacksonian Era, “William Wilson” (1839) and 
“The Man of the Crowd” (1840) register Poe’s critical reflection on how the logic of 
impersonal identification emerged and prevailed in the political and cultural spheres, 
making the fantasized model of autonomous and singular agency in the new social 
milieus of American democracy impossible. 
What follows is a historical, literary, and theoretical study of how Poe developed 
and aestheticized his critical review of the paradox of individuality in the politics and 
culture of antebellum democracy. While I suggest “William Wilson” and “The Man of 
the Crowd” are the two best cases and focus on their textual and contextual significance, I 
also insist that Poe’s life and work during the years before the two works’ appearance be 
discussed as well, for during these years Poe began to represent the emergence and 
prevalence of the logic of impersonal identification. The first part of this chapter 
investigates how the widespread political, economic, and cultural democratizations 
during the Jacksonian era engendered the dominant logic of impersonal identification in 
antebellum politics and culture, and how Poe had literalized his growing concerns with 
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this logic in tales prior to “William Wilson” and “The Man of the Crowd.” The second 
part provides a close reading of the textual and contextual significance of “William 
Wilson” and “The Man of the Crowd” in terms of Poe’s critical analysis of the 
impossible condition of individual autonomy and singularity in thorough democratization 
and his allusion to this agentive impossibility as the necessary condition for political and 
literary success in Jacksonian America. 
 
Poe and the Deflections of Jacksonian Democracy 
In the period when “William Wilson” and “The Man of the Crowd” were 
published, Poe was composing many of his most lasting literary and critical works. These 
prolific years, however, came after his literary hiatus from February 1837 to May 1839. 
During this period, as his biographer Kenneth Silverman puts it, Poe “virtually disappears 
from biographical view.” What Silverman terms Poe’s “blank period” began after his 
break with the Southern Literary Messenger and his move from Richmond to New York 
City with his wife and mother-in-law in order to seek a literary position more worthy of 
him. But the decision brought him fifteen unemployed, poverty-driven months in Gotham, 
as the unprecedented colossal collapse of business and banking began in early May 1837. 
New York City was the epicenter of the catastrophic economic depression, causing the 
entire nation to pass through the depths of financial paralysis and ruin over the following 
years. 
Poe became one of the many victims of the depression. Upon the outbreak of the 
Panic, Harper and Brothers in New York postponed the publication of The Narrative of 
Arthur Gordon Pym Of Nantucket (originally scheduled to appear in May). During the 
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long delay of the debut of his first attempt at a novel designed mainly for commercial 
success, a pseudo-realistic travelogue designed mainly for commercial success, Poe had 
nothing to do but perform some sporadic hack writing to make a living for his family 
“literally suffering for want of food” and barely surviving “on bread and molasses for 
weeks together,”81 as one acquaintance described their dire poverty. Seeking an end to 
their miserable life in New York, the Poe family relocated to Philadelphia in early 1838 
to seek other opportunities. A few months later, Poe, still unemployed, wrote to James 
Kirke Paulding, imploring the prominent New York literary figure and Secretary of the 
Navy to get him any job “beyond mere literature” such as “the most unimportant 
Clerkship … anything, by sea or land” (italics in the original). The same letter also 
reveals Poe’s deep disenchantment with his literary career: “the miserable life of literary 
drudgery to which I now, with a breaking heart, submit, and for which neither my temper 
nor my abilities have fitted me.”82 
Poe’s long ordeal finally ended, when he began to work for Burton’s 
Gentleman’s Magazine as its editor in June 1838. When the news was announced in the 
magazine’s June issue, the editor of the Saturday Courier openly expressed his envy, 
saying “Mr. Poe was very favourably known as editor of the Southern Literary 
Messenger in its early days: and he has produced several works, which prove him a man 
of letters and industry. His accession is very valuable.”83 Charles Alexander, influential 
publisher and journal owner in Philadelphia, also said that “[h]e is a gentleman of 
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superior ability and character, and we are glad to see that his name is associated with Mr 
Burton in the future direction of the Gentleman’s Magazine.”84 Poe proved them right. 
Working for Burton’s, he took pains to select submissions and edit works for the 
magazine to increase its subscribers. He also published some of his finest tales such as 
“The Fall of the House of Usher,” “William Wilson,” and “The Man of the Crowd” in the 
magazine, heralding his rise as one of the most celebrated, if not financially successful, 
authors in the country. 
Poe’s “blank period” spent in New York and Philadelphia from February 1837 to 
May 1839 has received little scholarly attention because of his biographical lacuna and 
literary silence during the years; a very few records are extant to document his sufferings 
during the two years in which he only produced two new tales (“Von Jung, the Mystific” 
and “Siope: A Fable,” later known as “Shadow”). Critics have also paid little attention to 
the specific social contexts of Poe’s first two years as the editor of Burton’s, 
concentrating instead on Poe’s literary trajectory in the 1840s. Yet, the “blank period” 
left an indelible mark on Poe’s life and literary career and it requires more thorough 
scholarly attention since it helps to trace how he had struggled with the political, 
economic, and cultural transformations of Jacksonian democracy before and after the 
Panic.  
After his 1831 visit to the U.S., Alexis de Tocqueville published two volumes of 
Democracy in America to inform French readers how America “has attained the 
consequences of the democratic revolution”85 unlike European countries. One significant 
effect of the young public’s political democratization is, Tocqueville states, that “[a]t the 
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present day the principle of the sovereignty of the people has acquired, in the United 
States, all the practical development which the imagination can conceive” and 
furthermore, in the unprecedented system of thorough political democratization “the 
nation participates in the making of its laws by the choice of its legislators, and in the 
execution of them by the choice of the agents of the executive government.”86 What 
strikes Tocqueville in particular is the extended suffrage for white men, which was 
granted in most states by eliminating property requirements for voting and eligibility for 
office by the mid 1820s.87 During Jackson’s terms, most states completely eliminated 
property or tax-paying qualifications for voting. This pivotal reform drew an increasing 
number of common voters into national politics. Parties began to make efforts to appeal 
to the mass of voters by selling their leading candidates as the best choice for public good 
and prosperity. 
The two presidential elections in 1828 and 1832 showcased the emergence of the 
new popular dynamics of political democratization, a dynamic unique to American 
politics. The two elections won by Andrew Jackson also marked the appearance of 
national political conventions and campaigns, as well as public verbal brawls and harsh 
mudslinging between candidates and supporters. Now the “public will” and “public 
opinion” mattered; common people were now the driving force of national politics. 
Tocqueville describes these new scenes on election day: “[a]s the election draws near, the 
activity of intrigue and the agitation of the populace increase; the citizens are divided into 
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several camps, each of which assumes the name of its favorite candidate; the whole name 
glows with feverish excitement.”88 
Abreast of this pervasive political democratization was its economic counterpart, 
also observed and recorded by Tocqueville. To Tocqueville’s eyes, America was the 
young republic incarnating the Lockean possessive individualism and the Smithian 
principle of laissez-faire: “The American republics of the present day are like companies 
of adventurers, formed to explore in common the waste lands of the New World, and 
busied in a flourishing trade. The passion which agitates the Americans most deeply, are 
not their political, but their commercial passions.”89 In fact, the Jacksonian federal 
government exhibited a strong will to develop a capitalistic economy based on the 
doctrine of noninterference or economic liberal individualism; under Jacksonian 
economic philosophy and policy, the federal government refrained from granting special 
privileges and allowed free competition in the marketplace. As a result, unrestrained 
enterprise capitalism led by a multitude of aspiring entrepreneurs gradually replaced the 
former agricultural economy and contributed exponentially to the growing national 
wealth during the Jacksonian era. In addition, revolutionary innovations in transportation 
and communication facilitated a vibrant economy of finance, transportation, and 
information,90 helping liberal economic democracy to penetrate deep into all corners of 
the nation. During this era of progress, Emerson proudly accorded high praise to the 
“awesome hunger for land, material security, and personal success” as a “benign force 
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that summoned the creative force of the people.”91 For Emerson, the new epoch was 
especially remarkable for the “immense creation of property and so by the increase of the 
political importance of individuals everywhere, or the steady progress of the democratic 
element.”92 In the same vein, he extolled in his 1836 essay “Nature” the “new importance 
given to the single person” as “a sign of the times.”93 
For Poe, the United States of America was particularly the republic of cultural 
democratization characterized by the spread of “literary democracy”94 and he himself was 
one of its beneficiaries. As the political and economic democratizations propagated by 
the spirit of individualism allowed eligible individuals to participate in the operation of 
diverse social systems,95 American literary democracy also enabled the liberal and equal 
participation of amateur writers in seeking seek popular recognition. The public networks 
of the literary marketplace helped an aspiring neophyte like Poe to enter the world of 
letters and claim his or her share of literary democracy by winning public popularity. By 
the early 1830s, Tocqueville observed that “[t]he number of periodical and occasional 
publications which appear in the United States actually surpasses belief.”96 He suggested 
that the prosperity of the American literary market stemmed from “[t]he facility with 
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which journals can be established [that] induces a multitude of individuals to take a part 
in them.”97 In fact, literary democratization became more facilitated and widespread due 
to technological advances and improvements in papermaking, typesetting, and printing 
machinery along with the extended transportation systems of the railroad and steamboat. 
According to Frank Mott, the period from 1825 to 1850 was “A Golden Age of 
Periodicals.”98 
Poe owed his quick rise from a nonentity to a celebrity in the publishing world—
from a nameless dilettante to a popular litterateur and finally to a leading editor and 
proprietor of his own literary magazine—to the very democratic openness of the literary 
public sphere. The development of Poe’s professional literary career exactly overlapped 
with the burgeoning period of Jacksonian literary democracy. Poe published his first 
three books in Boston, Baltimore, and New York, and his early poems, short stories, and 
reviews in literary periodicals and newspapers issued in these three cities as well as in 
Philadelphia and Richmond. All these major cities were then the nation’s leading 
publishing venues, containing leading literary figures and entrepreneurs, heavily 
capitalized commercial publishing firms, and a large reading population. To reach a 
wider readership, Poe actively introduced his work to influential critics and editors who 
played a crucial role in the effective promotion of a promising new author to general 
readers and other publishers. In addition, he quickly established a reputation as a rising 
author by entering literary competitions that offered significant prize money, which 
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helped him to become a favored contributor to several major literary periodicals. All 
these endeavors eventually led him to gain an editorial position at the Southern Literary 
Messenger in 1835, only three years after having launched his professional literary career. 
When Poe left Richmond, he expected to get another quick and easy chance at literary 
business in New York, then the dynamic center of American literary democracy. The 
Jacksonian zeitgeist of political and cultural democratizations was best expressed by John 
Keese, the toastmaster who exclaimed in a celebratory dinner held for the booksellers of 
New York City in April 1837 that “we cannot but exult that we have lived to see the day 
when American liberty and American literature walk hand in hand.”99 Poe was also 
present at the dinner to propose a toast to “The Monthlies of Gotham—Their 
distinguished Editors, and their vigorous Collaborateurs.”100 It was only a few weeks 
before the outbreak of the Panic.  
The auspicious progress of Jacksonian democracy was drastically derailed by the 
outbreak of the Great Panic. In early 1840, the estimated economic losses after the Panic 
were estimated to be six billion dollars.101 The Panic “engulfed all classes and all phases 
of economic life within its toils; and for seven long years the people of this land struggled 
to free themselves from its oppression.”102 The intellectual response to the worst 
depression of the national economy was to urge despondent Americans to reclaim their 
lost self-confidence. On August 31, 1837, Emerson delivered a public address later 
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entitled “The American Scholar,” which was an attempt to hold out hope during a period 
of unprecedented economic hardship. Emerson began his address with the promise that 
the start of a new academic year would offer hopeful prospects in order to evoke a 
renewed sense of a fresh start in his audience. Thinking anew, he then insisted, can be 
achieved only by means of “self-trust,” a self-conscious attainment of inner confidence 
and resolve. Emerson’s emphasis on self-possessed individuality would reappear with a 
much stronger tone in his 1838 lecture, “Divinity School Address,” which Oliver 
Wendell Holmes praised for redefining “the [individual] soul as the supreme judge in 
spiritual matters.”103 
Another spiritual leader who reaffirmed the significance of self-mastery was 
William Ellery Channing. In his “Self-Culture,” an introduction to a series of public 
lectures delivered in 1838, Channing argued that “we are able to discern not only what 
we already are, but what we may become, to see in ourselves germs and promises of a 
growth to which no bounds can be set. … This is indeed a noble prerogative of our nature. 
Possessing this, it matters little what or where we are now; for we can conquer a better lot, 
and even be happier for starting from the lowest point.” He went on to stress that what he 
termed “the self-forming power” which “makes self-culture possible” now “slumbers in 
most men unsuspected, unused!”104 Both Emerson and Channing put symbolic and 
practical emphasis on the spiritual potential of self-centered individuality as the creative 
power to overcome the troubled world. Yet Poe, now an impoverished author who found 
himself enmeshed in economic hardship, was confronted with the changed reality of a 
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literary world, in which the autonomy of self-sufficient agency would be impossible to 
desire and pursue. 
In the wake of the Panic, the unprecedented national depression transmuted the 
existing democratic literary culture and market into a highly competitive industry serving 
the now commercialized tastes of common readers. As a consequence, “Poe’s career,” as 
Jonathan Elmer has pointed out, “is marked by alternate solicitations and repudiations of 
mass popularity, both a desire for merger with the general taste and an equally intense 
compulsion to distinguish himself from it”105 According to Terrence Whalen, the second 
half of Poe’s literary career after the Panic was, in fact, profoundly affected by his 
predicament during this period of socioeconomic turmoil and the reshaped terrain of the 
literary market under the influence of the troubled political economy.106 However, even 
before the outbreak of the Panic, the ever-shifting cultural market was slipping out of 
Poe’s editorial grasp and control. One instance was his failure to publish Tales of the 
Folio Club. Though a popular writer and editor, he could not find a publisher for the book, 
his most ambitious work for the reading public. Harper and Brothers declined the book, 
explaining to Poe that many of the works were “too learned and mysterical” and had been 
already published in several literary magazines. The publisher claimed that American 
readers now preferred works “in which a single and connected story occupies the whole 
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volume.”107 This advice made Poe enlarge the draft of The Narrative of Arthur Gordon 
Pym, Of Nantucket (1838) to a longer narrative replete with fresh, exotic adventures, one 
of the most saleable genres at the time. Though he had already published its two 
installments in the Southern Literary Messenger early in 1837, he revised them and 
continued expanding the book after arriving in New York in order to make it more 
popular and profitable, and he carefully composed the subtitle to whet the reading 
public’s appetite for a thrilling travel narrative.108  
In May 1837, Harper and Brothers finally announced that Poe’s new book was 
almost ready for publication. But the abrupt outbreak of the Panic delayed the publication 
more than a year, until July 1838. In the meantime, the publisher suggested that Poe 
compose poems and short tales for popular penny newspapers to maintain his popular 
attention and popularity, a concerned reaction to the inundation of cheap dailies and 
weeklies providing a variety of sensational literary materials including factual news and 
fictional stories. These literary newspapers had already existed before the Panic, but 
increased exponentially after the Panic.109 The first popular penny newspaper was The 
Sun, which appeared in New York in 1833. It was not sold by subscription but on the 
street, and it was small to entice readers to buy and read it with ease. In order to attract 
the general reading public, it cost only a penny. New Yorkers took to the new form of 
literary entertainment and within several months The Sun was selling 4,000 copies a day 
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and two years later its circulation surged to 22,000 copies with the advent of the steam 
press. Also popular was the New York Herald, founded in 1835 by James Gordon Bennett, 
who proudly declared that it was the first newspaper designed “for the great masses of 
people.” He sent reporters out to uncover the news of common people in the hotels, 
theaters, courts, slums, and docks. Popular daily papers, historian David M. Henkin 
points out, “reinforced emerging modes of anonymous, market-oriented, urban sociality 
in New York” especially by “becom[ing] a regular feature of the verbal cityscape, 
rendering new forms of social knowledge visible in the public spaces of the city to a 
broad and impersonal readership.”110 Proud of the great success of his newspaper, 
Bennett spoke in 1836 that “[w]hat is to prevent a daily newspaper from being made the 
greatest organ of social life? Books have had their day—the theatres have had their day—
the temple of religion has had its day. A newspaper can be made to take the lead of all of 
these in the great movements of human thought, and of human civilization. A newspaper 
can send more souls to heaven, and save more from hell, than all the churches and 
chapels in New York—besides making money at the same time.”111 
New York would soon become notorious for its highly competitive literary 
newspapers: in the 1830s and 1840s, more than 300,000 New Yorkers enjoyed reading 
about fifty dailies and weeklies.112 Due to their growing popularity, the penny 
publications had to be more attuned to the particular sensibilities of common readers in 
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order to augment the readership of the street. Indeed, they competed by offering more 
distinctive stories, that is, by specializing in a particular topic so as to attract a specified 
group of readers, topics such as literature, humor and gossip, local news, commercial 
information, politics, the interests of the laboring classes, theaters and plays, or 
religion.113 They also stole popular  articles and essays from literary monthly magazines 
so frequently that in 1845 an editor of the Broadway Journal would openly complain that 
“[i]t has long been the custom among the newspapers—the weeklies especially—to copy 
magazine articles in full, and circulate them all over the country—sometimes in advance 
of the magazines themselves.”114  
As the mass appeal of the literary newspapers threatened existing literary 
magazines, the latter tried to secure their precarious position by transforming into 
“special class” magazines. According to Mott, from 1830 onward literary magazines 
increasingly targeted special classes of readers, such as politically inclined or religious 
readers, women, and children.115 As a consequence, calculating readerly tastes and 
preferences became the crucial issue for publishers and editors. Indeed, as they started to 
classify books, magazines, and newspapers by their appeal to distinct market niches, they 
had to deploy particular rubrics and marketing strategies for particular classes of readers. 
Consequently, effective marketing strategies were no longer derived solely from the 
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author’s fame and popularity or the text’s theme and topic.116 Consequently, professional 
authors , if they were not successful and famous, were forced to precisely discriminate 
among readers of different social statuses and backgrounds to calculate the most 
profitable genre and form of their work in order to appeal to their specific readership. Poe 
had to compete with a number of these authors in the competitive literary market. By 
1842 the deflected democratization of literary business, Poe lamented, made it a fact that 
“the higher order of poetry is, and always will be, in this country, unsaleable.”117 His 
lamentation was already inscribed in his two outrageous parodies of the literary market’s 
logic of impersonal identification: “How to Write a Blackwood Article” and “A 
Predicament.”  
 
Poe’s Literary Responses to Post-Panic America  
Originally paired as “The Psyche Zenobia” and “The Scythe of Time,” Poe 
published the two pieces later known as “How to Write a Blackwood Article” and “A 
Predicament” together in the November 1838 issue of the American Museum. These 
stories are the most striking literary examples of Poe’s critical view of the contemporary 
magazine warfare facilitated by the thriving printing and literary markets for the reading 
public in antebellum America. Both tales overtly deride the blind pursuit of the 
characteristic styles of popular articles from Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, and in 
these tales Poe inveighs strongly against an American propensity for complying with 
typical themes and styles in an effort to manufacture profitable literary commodities on 
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the market. In this condition, talented authors are stripped of their own literary originality, 
degraded to mere assemblers who are compelled to fabricate the most formulaic 
composite of the most popular genres and styles in order to attract more readers for 
commercial success.  
However, on a deeper level the two stories serve as more than a satirical jab at 
the standardized mode of popular writing. In the first story, the narrator Zenobia 
expresses a meticulous sensitivity about her public identity as a singularly recognized 
individual. She begins her narrative by proudly stating, “I presume everybody has heard 
of me. My name is the Signora Psyche Zenobia.” Then, she affirms that her name is “a 
fact” in a conscious effort to defend her unusual name and its significance from her 
“enemies” who calls her “Suky Snobbs,” which is “a vulgar corruption of Psyche.” She 
emphasizes that “Psyche, which is good Greek, and means “the soul” (that’s me, I’m all 
soul) and sometimes “a butterfly,” which latter meaning undoubtedly alludes to my 
appearance in my new crimson satin dress, with the sky-blue Arabian mantelet, and the 
trimmings of green agraffas, and the seven flounces of orange-colored auriculas” (336). 
Here Poe italicizes the names of attire and ornament to indicate that the singular identity 
that she so self-assuredly claims, which she stresses is her “all soul,” is nothing but the 
effect of an ensemble of manufactured, popularized fashion commodities. That is, her 
seemingly peculiar and special personality is constructed through her impersonal 
identification with the popular elements of fashion.  
Filling the void of original subjectivity by identifying human agency with 
impersonal items is central to the question of representing a true self in literary writing. In 
her interview with William Blackwood, Zenobia is advised to “get yourself into such a 
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scrape as no one ever got into before” (340), that is, a uniquely sensational experience 
that will bring out the agent’s own authorial identity; in other words, Blackwood suggests 
that an author’s peculiar subject is constitutive of her subjectivity.118 He also strongly 
recommends that she consider and determine “the tone, or manner, of your narration” 
(341) and perform “the filling up” of the story with “a host of little scraps of either 
learning or bel-esprit-ism” (343). Blackwood therefore instructs Zenobia to learn how to 
construct a most compelling assemblage of existing literary styles and information—a 
multi-layered composite of aesthetic identifications—in order to highlight her own 
experience; however, Poe suggests, the experience’s originality, if any, will be offset by 
the assemblage’s banality, eventually producing a work deprived of its author’s own 
identity.  
The sequel, “A Predicament,” shows the tragic corollary of this utter 
impersonalization. It is offered as an example of a Blackwood article composed by 
Zenobia according to the very principles given by Blackwood. In “seeking for desperate 
adventures – adventures adequate to the intensity of my feelings, and adapted to the vast 
character of the article I intended to write” (347), Zenobia walks through the city of 
Edina with her two faithful companions, her poodle Diana and her servant Pompey, and 
ascends to the peak of a Gothic cathedral with a tall steeple. At the top, she finds a hole 
through though which she can command a city view and thrusts her head through the 
opening in the dial-plate. Losing track of time while watching the city view, Zenobia is 
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suddenly surprised to feel the exceedingly sharp minute hand touching her neck, pressing 
harder and harder into her skin and gradually decapitating her. Dying excruciatingly, she 
finally exclaims, “what now remains for the unhappy Signora Psyche Zenobia” is 
“nothing!” (italics in the original), a bitter awakening to the paradox of constructing 
personal identity through impersonal identification. Thus, Poe’s stories that concern the 
homogenizing logic of the literary market capture the essential void of proper subjectivity; 
for Poe, paradoxically, the democratic literary market only exacerbates the delusion of 
democratic individualism.  
The same critique also runs through Poe’s political satires, published during the 
same period, that directly assail the declining Jacksonian power. As a matter of fact, 
Poe’s criticism of Andrew Jackson had already been expressed in his 1836 tale, “Four 
Beasts in One/The Homo-Cameleopard.” The story lampoons a Jackson-like ancient ruler 
whose apparent predilection for democratic republicanism is betrayed by his imperial 
ambitions to identify himself with Zeus, a quite explicit allusion to Jackson’s “kingly 
commoner” persona, or, as Whigs called him, “Andrew Jackson I.” In contrast to this 
story, which centers on Poe’s problem with Jackson’s deceptive identity, two political 
satires Poe published in 1839 direct attention to the essential nothingness of agency and 
the dynamics of impersonal identification that construct the agent’s identity. 1839 was a 
politically charged year, a year of preparation for the next year’s presidential election. 
Whigs were desperately trying to terminate the 12 year long Jacksonian reign. Drawing 
attention to the continuing economic depression was the Whig’s most likely chance to 
beat the incumbent President Van Buren, and to do this, the Whigs publicized popular 
complaints and antipathy toward Van Buren. Poe’s “The Man That Was Used Up, A Tale 
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of the Late Bugaboo and Kickapoo Campaign” represents Poe’s contribution to the Whig 
effort to end the Jacksonian reign.  
In August 1839, Poe published the story in Burton’s. To his contemporary 
readers, the piece was a straight-forward allusion to Van Buren who was then derided as 
“a used up man” (“Van, Van’s a Used Up Man”) due to his futile economic policies after 
the Great Panic. However, critics have noted deeper thematic complexities in the story. 
Mabbott, for instance, construes this story as “consider[ing] the problem of identity,” in 
other words, as an ontological question regarding “[h]ow much of a man still makes a 
man?”119 This philosophical issue is raised by the shocking ending scene in which the 
idolized General John A.B.C. Smith, a highly celebrated American war hero whose 
singular physical charm and impressive power of speech120 attract the public, including 
the narrator, turns out to be an assemblage of artificial prosthetic devices and parts. At the 
end of the story, the narrator accidentally finds the shocking fact that the general is only 
completely reconstructed after his black valet literally assembles his essential physical 
parts piece by piece, screwing his second leg and arm on to his body and adding his 
shoulders, a chest, a wig, a glass eye, and false teeth. Poe’s point is clear. The essence of 
the celebrated general is nothing but a nothing. The fabrication of apparent agency from 
manufactured impersonal commodities in this story repeats Poe’s criticism of Zenobia in 
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the pair of Blackwood stories. The same acerbic criticism is now directed toward a 
prominent and respected public idol. Poe dramatizes that what the narrator first perceives 
and pursues as “something, as it were, remarkable – yes, remarkable, … about the entire 
individuality of the personage in question” (378), turns out to be naught, or simply “the 
object” (388).  
What links the Blackwood pair to the political satire thematically is Poe’s 
deepening concern with the impossibility of individual singularity in the newly 
democratic political and cultural milieus. The stories of Zenobia and General Smith 
satirize the myth of individual autonomy and singularity in the public sphere. A public 
celebrity who is believed to own and claim a peculiar personhood is in effect just the 
effect of amassed and assembled popular parts and items that are impersonally 
manufactured for and consumed by the public. In all three stories, the model of individual 
autonomy and peculiar singularity is fundamentally denied and the ardent pursuit of it is 
doomed to fail. Zenobia’s vacant identity and General Smith’s material identity showcase 
the essential absence of peculiar individuality in the absolute state of social 
democratization, suggesting that Emerson and Channing’s postulation of individual 
subjectivity is a double delusion; what they try to reclaim from democracy is what is 
already absent and thus unredeemable. Poe’s ever critical view of the impersonal 
identification central to his contemporary political and cultural democracies would gain a 
even more profound politico-philosophical depth as he directed his attention to the 
contradictory nature of democratic individuality in “William Wilson” and “The Man of 
the Crowd.”  
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The Paradox of “Absolute Identity” in “William Wilson” 
“William Wilson” first appeared in the annual The Gift: A Christmas and New 
Year’s Present for 1840, which was published in mid-1839 and was later reprinted in the 
October 1839 issue of Burton’s. This doppelgänger story has been construed as a 
meditation upon the familiar narrative of the psychological and moral struggles between 
good and evil twins—oftentimes interpreted as a complicated allegory for a bipartite soul 
consisting of two internal selves that contradicts each other—and the ultimate triumph of 
the evil over the good.121 Indeed, the narrator himself shows his intent to frame his 
narrative as a moral confession by introducing himself as “an object for the scorn – for 
the horror – for the detestation of my race,” dwelling upon his own “unparalleled infamy” 
ascribable to his “later years of … unpardonable crime” and thus trying to narrate how 
“in an instant, all virtue dropped bodily as mantle.”  
In the first paragraphs of the story, beneath the hyperbolic self-criticism that 
effectively conveys a moral message to his audience, is the narrator’s subtle yet 
significant indication of a profound ontological question that has constantly haunted his 
fallen life. Wilson’s “later years” have been, he narrates, filled with not only 
“unpardonable crime” but also “unspeakable misery” (426). Both are attributed to the fact 
that he has been “in some measure, the slave of circumstances beyond human control.” In 
the following narrative, the irresistibly determinant “circumstances beyond human 
control” are alluded to as sharply at odds with his self-assured control of his own agency.  
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Wilson is, as he states, “the descendant of a race whose imaginative and easily 
excitable temperament has at all times rendered them remarkable; and, in my earliest 
infancy, I gave evidence of having fully inherited the family character.” This 
“remarkable”—the very adjective Poe repeatedly employs to accentuate the singular 
“individuality” of General A.B.C. Smith—personality of Wilson is inseparably associated 
with his being “self-willed, addicted to the wildest caprices, and a prey to the most 
ungovernable passions.” Hence the unbridled constitution of his own individualism: “my 
voice was a household law; and at an age when few children have abandoned their 
leading-strings, I was left to the guidance of my own will, and became, in all but name, 
the master of my own actions” (427). A self-centered individual, Wilson once believed 
that “[t]he teeming brain of childhood requires no external world of incident to occupy or 
amuse it,” and he is still convinced of his uncommon singularity: “Yet I must believe that 
my first mental development had in it much of the uncommon – even much of the outré” 
(430). Wilson’s boyhood autonomy and self-assurance would become more overtly 
pronounced later in his school years, as “the ardor, the enthusiasm, and the imperiousness 
of my disposition, soon rendered me a marked character among my schoolmates, and by 
slow, but natural gradations, gave me an ascendancy over all not greatly older than 
myself.”  
However, Wilson’s singular individuality and its unchecked power are soon 
confronted with “a single exception” that would not conform to his imposing personality. 
“This exception,” he explains, “was found in the person of a scholar, who, although no 
relation, bore the same Christian and surname as myself; a circumstance, in fact, little 
remarkable” due to the social democratization pervasive in Wilson’s time: “for 
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notwithstanding a noble descent, mine was one of those everyday appellations which 
seem, by prescriptive right, to have been, time out of mind, the common property of the 
mob.” For this reason, Wilson uses a pseudonym, explaining that “In this narrative I have 
therefore designated myself as William Wilson, —a fictitious title not very dissimilar to 
the real” (431). This democratic “circumstance,” for Wilson, accounts for the very 
“unspeakable misery” he mentions, and it renders him “the slave of circumstances 
beyond human control.” Wilson never veils his loathing of the democratic circumstance. 
At the outset of his narrative, Wilson asks the reader to “call myself, for the present, 
William Wilson” because of his unforgivable crime and ignominy. As he confesses 
several pages later, however, “I had always felt aversion to my uncourtly patronymic, and 
its very common, if not plebeian prænomen. The words were venom in my ears” since “a 
second Wilson,” as he calls his identical copy, is the object of loathing because he is “the 
cause of its twofold repetition, who would be constantly in my presence, and whose 
concerns, in the ordinary routine of the school business, must inevitably, on account of 
the detestable coincidence, be often confounded with my own” (434).  
Wilson’s open abhorrence toward the “uncourtly” and “very common” rather 
than the “plebeian” indicates that Poe understood modern democratization not as a 
sociality of Roman-like commoners sharing civic rights and virtues but as a sociality of 
the unrefined modern masses whose “very common” attributes are characterized by 
rudeness and coarseness, that is, lacking a proper sense of one’s own individual position 
in relation to others. The fundamentally unindividuated democratization is already devoid 
of the very locus of proper individuality itself. For Poe, that is, the essential condition of 
“very common” democratization, as Wilson’s name exemplifies, disallows the possibility 
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of a sense of individual self and its individualist approach to others. Individuality in 
thorough democratization exists only in the mode of naught or, in other words, the absent 
individual is the condition of possibility of thorough democratization. “[R]epition” and 
“coincidence” are, in this regard, constitutive of democratization, not its side-effects. 
Poe’s sense of the absent individuality is more clearly indicated in the latter part 
of Wilson’s narrative. He states that his “namesake alone … refuse[s] implicit belief in 
my assertions, and submission to my will – indeed, to interfere with my arbitrary 
dictation in any respect whatsoever.” What the namesake nullifies is “a supreme and 
unqualified despotism … the despotism of a master-mind in boyhood over the less 
energetic spirits of its companions” (431). Here, Poe suggests that Wilson’s 
individualism is grounded in his childish solipsism. Since the ground is insubstantial, his 
relation and response to the identical copy is groundless, as well. More significantly, 
Wilson confesses that he “secretly felt that I feared him, and could not help thinking the 
equality which he maintained so easily with myself, a proof of his true superiority … Yet 
this superiority – even this equality – was in truth acknowledged by no one but myself” 
(431-432). Wilson’s fear of his identical double is attributed to his understanding of the 
“equality” they share as evidence of the copy’s “true superiority” that “so easily” enables 
him to be identical to the original. Physically, his fear results from the confrontation of 
what is believed to be impossible to reproduce (i.e., the original) and the lack of a sense 
of self-superiority. Ironically, he loses confidence in his superiority as he literally faces 
himself; what he sees, Poe suggests, is what he actually fears to see.    
Furthermore, he goes on to confess his self-contradictory feelings that now 
undermine the very ground of his solipsistic individualism: “It may seem strange that in 
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spite of the continual anxiety occasioned me by the rivalry of Wilson, and his intolerable 
spirit of contradiction, I could not bring myself to hate him altogether” (432-433). More 
inexplicably, “[i]t is difficult, indeed, to define, or even to describe, my real feelings 
towards him. They formed a motley and heterogeneous admixture; – some petulant 
animosity, which was not yet hatred, some esteem, more respect, much fear, with a world 
of uneasy curiosity. To the moralist it will be unnecessary to say, in addition, that Wilson 
and myself were the most inseparable of companions” (433). The uncanny homology, if 
not friendship,122 Wilson notices in his troubling relation to his copy is self-negating. The 
first Wilson who overtly loathes “a similarity of mind, person, or condition” (434) 
becomes impossible to dissociate from his copy. Indeed, he becomes “the slave of 
circumstances beyond human control,” the circumstances of thorough democratization. 
His ambivalent feelings toward his double decisively reveal that there is no substantial 
agency with which the original can defend his “true superiority.” 
To highlight this point, Poe provides a striking case that evidences the void of 
Wilson’s originality. The event occurs when he is stealthily trying to play a trick on his 
double at night in order to make the copy feel the original’s “malice.” Wilson secretly 
sneaks into his double’s room to plot “ill-natured pieces of practical wit at his expense” 
and looks at his “countenance.” Then, he is completely appalled at what he finds: “I 
looked; — and a numbess, an iciness of feeling instantly pervaded my frame. My breast 
heaved, my knees tottered, my whole spirit became possessed with an objectless yet 
intolerable horror.” What terrifies him is “the lineaments of William Wilson” which 
paradoxically “were” and “were not” his at once. It is obvious, he exclaims, that he shares 
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(432). 
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“[t]he same name! the same contour of person! The same day of arrival at the academy! 
And then his dogged and meaningless imitation of my gait, my voice, my habits, and my 
manner!” and yet there is something that is not exactly the same in the double’s face. Not 
solving the mystery, he leaves the chamber and the halls, “never to enter them again” 
(437).    
Wilson’s horrified confrontation with another Wilson’s oxymoronic sameness 
with him suggests to the reader that his self-assured identity is not exactly identical to 
what he really is like. If the identical does not look exactly like the original, then logically 
the original is not what he should be like. Or the original cannot define what he is like, if 
he fails to recognize any difference in the copy. In either case, the original’s authenticity 
is in question. Significantly, after this shocking incident Wilson confesses that “I could 
now find room to doubt the evidence of my sense; and seldom called up the subject at all 
but with wonder at the extent of human credulity” (438). As the original Wilson begins to 
suspect his own sense and the judgment of his subjectivity, the copy exudes an 
“inscrutable tyranny” from which the original has to “at length flee, panic-stricken, as 
from a pestilence.” However, as Wilson laments, “to the very ends of the earth I fled in 
vain” (445). 
Towards the end of his narration, Wilson, once the dictator of his associates and 
himself, reveals an awareness of his “utter weakness and helplessness” (446), a bitter, 
frank confession of the groundless construct of his self-centered despotism. Paradoxically, 
it is the occurrence of “the most absolute identity” that drives him to face the veiled truth 
of his lack of individual autonomy and singularity. In this sense, the denouement of the 
story does not remain ambiguous; the death of the two Wilsons is an inevitable corollary 
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of the vain battle between the absent original and its vacant copy. The ultimate irony is 
that death has always haunted the original ever since he found the absence of his own 
singularity in his copy’s face. The spectral identification tells the bitter truth of the myth 
of individual identity. One year later, Poe revisits the paradoxical interplay between 
identity and identification that he explores in “William Wilson” in “The Man of the 
Crowd,” this time in terms of the ontological issue’s political context. 
 
The Paradox of “Absolute Idiosyncrasy” in “The Man of the Crowd” 
First published in the December 1840 issue of Graham’s Magazine, “The Man of 
the Crowd” is a short story with a very simple plot: an anonymous narrator unexpectedly 
discovers a peculiar-looking old man among the crowds he has been watching, becomes 
immediately electrified by the old man’s singular physiognomy, and desperately chases 
after him to verify his true identity, but to no avail. At the outset of the story, the 
unnamed narrator is seated next to the transparent window of a London coffeehouse as 
evening slowly settles in. Having returned to health after a long illness that he does not 
specifically identify, he is now relishing watching the scene of the bustling streets 
thronged with the passing crowds. With “a calm but inquisitive interest in everything,” 
the narrator obsessively enjoys “observing the promiscuous company in the room” and 
“peering though the smoky panes into the street.” The crowded street “is one of the 
principal thoroughfares of the city, and had been very much crowded during the whole 
day.” What especially catches his eyes is the momentarily varying size of the watched 
“throng” and the speedy movement of “two dense and continuous tides of population.” 
Having “never been in a similar situation,” he is now “filled” by “the tumultuous sea of 
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human heads.” And due to “a delicious novelty of emotion” that he feels, the narrator 
becomes “absorbed in contemplation of the scene without.” 
In what follows, the narrator becomes more eagerly engrossed in surveying the 
massive crowds, trying to provide a detailed analysis of them. He first takes “an abstract 
and generalizing turn” by “look[ing] at the passengers in masses, and th[inking] of them 
in their aggregate relations” and then he shifts his attention to “details, and regarded with 
minute interest the innumerable varieties of figure, dress, air, gait, visage, and expression 
of countenance” (507). Through looking, he learns about their “satisfied business-like 
demeanor,” and notes how the crowd is “restless in their movement,” with “flushed faces,” 
and “an absent and overdone smile upon the lips,” and being “overwhelmed with 
confusion” and  “feeling in solitude,” all ascribable to “the very denseness of the 
company around” (508).  
The crowds on the street, though the narrator focuses on their general features, 
collective relations, and multifarious details, are all viewed as the impersonal masses. 
Even though he later takes a more categorizing look at the crowds, he still understands 
each individual as an impersonal entity, using their generic physical and social identity 
markers to interpret their age, race, class, and occupation. First, he easily discerns 
“noblemen, merchants, attorneys, tradesmen, stock-jobbers—the Eupatrids and the 
common-places of society—men of leisure and men actively engaged in affairs of their 
own—conducting business upon their own responsibility.” Yet those people “did not 
greatly excite my attention.” What interests him is “[t]he tribe of clerks” who are “the 
junior clerks of flash houses” whose appearances are “an exact facsimile” of what had 
been in vogue. “[T]he best definition of the class” is wearing “the cast-off graces of the 
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gentry.” These commoners are characterized by their impersonal collective identity. The 
following description follows the same categorization: “The division of the upper clerks 
of staunch firms,” “the race of swell pick-pockets, with which all great cities are infested,” 
“[t]he gamblers,” “an order of men somewhat different in habits, but still birds of a 
kindred feather” (508-509).  The narrator repeatedly stresses that he can promptly discern 
their collective identity. Though he stares at what appear to be “the innumerable varieties 
of figure, dress, air, gait, visage, and expression of countenance” (507), he as a matter of 
fact sees the varieties of types, not specific individualities. What identifies an individual’s 
seeming identity is his or her social type, a certain generic marker for a given collective 
identity. 
The same method of voyeurism continues while the narrator finds “darker and 
deeper themes for speculation,” such as “Jew peddlers,” “sturdy professional street 
beggars,” “feeble ghastly invalids,” “modest young girls returning from long and late 
labor to a cheerless home,” “women of all kinds and of all ages,” “pie-men, porters, coal-
heavers, sweeps; organ grinders, monkey-exhibiters and ballad mongers, those who 
vended with those who sang; ragged artisans and exhausted laborers of every description.” 
They are all categorized by their apparent collective identity such as race, class, and 
vocation. Nonetheless, he believes that he is “occupied in scrutinizing the mob” to read 
their individual faces and their respective “histor[ies] of long years” (510-511). The 
narrator’s sense of individuality and individuation is, Poe shows, misplaced from the 
beginning; he misconstrues the diversity of “the general character of the crowd” (511) as 
the “innumerable varieties” of heterogeneous masses. What appears to be an individual 
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entity is in fact just a distinctive case expressive of the particular collective identity it 
belongs to socially.  
A number of critics have regarded the narrator’s taxonomic voyeurism as an 
attempt to take epistemological control of the new social spectacle of the urban masses, 
an effort to capture their abstract humanity by focusing particular attention on their 
identifiable characteristics. For instance, Jonathan Elmer points out that the narrator’s 
“typing was very attentive to details of class difference, but only in order to supersede 
such differences through a reassuring appeal to a common humanity; the typing thus 
served a desire for clarity and social transparency”123 Yet, what Poe suggests in the story 
is the self-dehumanizing force of a mob of impersonal individuals that encourages the 
observer to fantasize about their individual diversities. For example, consider the 
narrator’s sudden and strong attraction to the singularity of the old stranger, which 
implies the absence of the true individuality he seeks. It is this spectacle of impersonal 
individualities that unconsciously drives the narrator to desire to find and pursue a 
peculiar exception. While watching “the general character of the crowd,” to his surprise 
and joy, “suddenly there came into view a countenance (that of a decrepit old man, some 
sixty-five or seventy years of age), – a countenance which at once arrested and absorbed 
my whole attention, on account of the absolute idiosyncrasy of its expression.” The old 
man is the unique singularity he “had never seen before,” which excites the watcher 
immediately: “As I endeavored, during the brief minute of my original survey, to form 
some analysis of the meaning conveyed, there arose confusedly and paradoxically within 
my mind, the ideas of vast mental power, of caution, of penuriousness, of avarice, of 
                                                          
123 Elmer, Reading at the Social Limit, 170. In the similar regard, Mary Esteve reads “The Man of the 
Crowd” as a pioneering case of “urban aesthetics”; see Mary Esteve, The Aesthetics and Politics of the 
Crowd in American Literature (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 44-50. 
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coolness, of malice, of blood-thirstiness, of triumph, of merriment, of excessive terror, of 
intense – of supreme despair.” Only by watching the old man’s existence is the narrator 
“singularly aroused, startled, fascinated.” He cannot but believe that a “wild” “history” 
“is written within” his “bosom!” And “[t]hen came a craving desire to keep the man in 
view – to know more of him” (511).  
The significance of the old urban roamer and his unseizable and illegible 
singularity have titillated and evaded critical attention. Focusing on the old man’s 
membership in position within the anonymous crowds and his mysterious identity that 
eventually exhausts the narrator to the extent of becoming “wearied unto death” (515), 
Robert. H. Byer and many others have maintained that the old man’s lethal attraction and 
inexplicable escape reflect Poe’s “vision of the crowd’s sublime mystery.” According to 
this reading, both the old man and the crowds embody the threat to an individual self of 
being overwhelmed by the nameless masses, or they represent a case of excessive 
individual isolation from society and people as shown in the similarities shared by the 
narrator and the old man.124 What underlies this interpretation is the assumption that Poe 
depicts the crowds as evil and that both the narrator and the old man are asocial. However, 
a closer examination of the text reveals that the narrator’s deepening anxiety comes, not 
from the watched crowds, but from his pursuit of the old man. He actually feels secure 
and satisfied when he is just watching the crowds. It is his chase after the old man that 
makes him nervous and drained. 
                                                          
124 Robert H. Byer, “Mysteries of the City: A Reading of Poe’s “The Man of the Crowd,” in Ideology and 
Classic American Literature, eds. Sacvan Bercovitch and Myra Jhelen (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), 227. Byer maintains that the narrator is tormented by “[t]he “feverish” haunted 
movement of Poe’s crowd” and “[t]he crowd’s demonic and threatening physiognomy.” Karen Halttunen 
also claims that “[o]f all Poe’s tales, this one [“The Man of the Crowd”] appears most explicitly to 
represent “his generation’s shock at realizing that the urban stranger cannot be known” (Confidence Men 
and Painted Women: A Study of Middle-Class Culture in America, 1830-1870 [New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1982], 36). Also see Elmer, Reading at the Social Limit, 172. 
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As Walter Benjamin sharply points out, the narrator is a “flâneur” and “[t]o Poe 
the flâneur was, above all, someone who does not feel comfortable in his own company. 
This is why he seeks out the crowd; the reason he hides in it is probably close at hand. 
Poe purposely blurs the difference between the asocial person and the flâneur. The harder 
a man is to find, the more suspicious he becomes.”125 It is also noteworthy that, as proved 
by his particular categorization of randomly passing people, the narrator is able to easily 
discern and precisely analyze social divisions and dynamics. In this sense, Poe is not 
particularly negative about the crowds, nor is the narrator asocial. The old man is not an 
asocial demon, either, given the obvious fact that he passes by the city’s diverse people 
and places rather than seeking to escape from them. He is neither a passive recluse nor an 
active runaway from society; rather, he is a thorough explorer of society.  
Public alarms about the city in antebellum America were generally derived from 
deep concerns and anxieties about the rapid fluidity and indecipherable rootlessness of 
one’s true individual identity in a new mobile urban space full of a multitude of strangers. 
Yet, at least in Poe’s story, the narrator actually takes a full epistemological hold of the 
crowds until he meets with the exceptionally singular old man. As social modes and 
frames for understanding anonymous others are disabled by the appearance of “the 
absolute idiosyncrasy,” the narrator finally “grew wearied unto death.” Such death-like 
experiences, Poe underscores, happen when one follows what is absent but seems so 
tantalizingly tangible  
In the beginning of the story, the narrator’s tone suggests that he gets joy and 
stability from his categorizing and typifying observation of the crowds. His secure 
                                                          
125 Walter Benjamin, Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings Vol. 4 1938-1940, eds. Howard Eiland and 
Michael W. Jennings, trans. Edmund Jephcott and others (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 27. 
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figuration of the crowds is a social act because it is a way of understanding the 
individuals of a society as they are constituted and represented. Furthermore, the narrator 
embraces the unknown crowds and their social status and lives as readable and 
identifiable texts, recognizable and visible structures of the social reality. But the 
emergence of “the man of the crowd” disrupts this safe relation and world. His peculiar 
identity is not only illegible but also destructive to the significance of the crowds and the 
society. He loosens the narrator’s epistemological grasp of the crowd. This is why the 
interplay between seeing and identifying does not come to a final resolution in the story: 
seeing fails to capture what identifying does. 
Poe thus redirects the reader’s attention from the question of surfaces to the 
question of what lies beneath. Critics such as Elbert and Byer contend that the narrator 
comes to be identified with the man of the crowd, an identification that foregrounds the 
self-annihilation of his individuality. Their focus on the irony that the narrator comes to 
bear a striking resemblance to the man he is chasing is correct. However, they disregard 
the inherent impossibility of the identification between two men. Since the old man’s 
identity is, from the first, illegible and elusive, the chaser desires to be identified with 
what is always already a lost object. The moment when the frustrated pursuer exclaims 
that “It is in vain to follow him” discloses the truth of the deceptively misplaced 
identification. In fact, the conclusion echoes the story’s outset, as the narrator returns at 
the story’s end to the geographical starting point of his narrative. At first he remarks that 
“[t]here are some secrets which do not permit themselves to be told.” Those secrets, he 
claims, make men “die with despair of heart and convulsion of throat, on account of the 
hideousness of [their] mysteries which will not suffer themselves to be revealed” (506-
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507). The secret of the absence of individual peculiarity is a hideous secret in that it 
negates the existing individualism. In this light, the true fear of “The Man of the Crowd” 
inheres not in facing the identification but in realizing that it is a fantasy that serves to 
substantiate the popular illusion of the imaginary singular identity. That is, by centering 
the narrative on the delusive workings of impossible identification, Poe redirects the 
reader’s attention from the vain myth of reclaiming absent individualism to the 
substantial power of the deceptive desire for singular agency. The substantial power of 
the logic of impersonal identification, for Poe, underlay his contemporary national 
politics.   
The paradoxical relation between the narrator and the old man reveals a deeper 
political connotation if it is linked to Poe’s contemporary political contexts. Note that 
“The Man of the Crowd” was published in December, 1840, the same month in which the 
Whig candidate, William Henry Harrison, defeated the Democrat Martin Van Buren in 
the presidential election. In several important respects, “The Man of the Crowd” 
allegorizes Jacksonian legacies of political democratization. First of all, the description of 
the old man in the story alludes to Jackson. For example, upon his first glance at the old 
man, the narrator describes his appearance, guessing that he seemed “some sixty-five or 
seventy years of age.” It is no coincidence that Jackson began his second term at the age 
of sixty five. Jackson was also often times called “Old Hickory” or “Old Man.” After his 
two terms, he became literally “a decrepit old man” and died in 1845, five years after 
leaving the White House.  
Furthermore, the old man’s “absolute idiosyncrasy” is strongly redolent of 
Andrew Jackson’s persona. For Poe’s contemporary readers, Jackson was arguably the 
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unprecedented and simultaneous epitome of both a singular man and the man of the 
common men, just like Poe’s old man of the crowd. He was especially known for his 
strikingly idiosyncratic egotism and political obstinacy. Born in obscurity and poverty, 
Jackson rose to incarnate the American paragon of the self-made, heroic, and 
representative man, and he was the most popular and polarizing political leader in the 
history of antebellum America. His outstanding military leadership in the War of 1812 
between America and Britain earned him national fame as a military hero. He then 
became the charismatic leader of the Democratic Party, and during his two terms his 
doctrine of democracy for the common men democratized Americans’ political 
sensibilities and practices in drastic and irrevocable ways. Jackson held the presidency 
through his keen instinct, lightening-rod personality, formidable will, and effective public 
gestures that drew popular support. To subdue his political opponents, he personalized 
political disputes as his solitary struggle to fight for the cause of common men as 
opposed to the privileged, believing in and representing himself as the true, invincible 
democratic leader. Consequently, he garnered both popular admiration and political 
condemnation. 
Jackson’s unprecedentedly strong political character and popularity made his 
opponents seek and contrive more effective tactics to prevent his second term in the 1832 
election. The election featured the first appearance of the third party to join the 
presidential race, the Anti-Masonic Party, which introduced important political 
innovations to American politics, such as nominating conventions and the adoption of 
party platforms, two new institutions that catered to the voting public and changed the 
contours of political democratization. The new minor party first emerged as a public 
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movement to prevent Masonic figures from assuming public office, and yet in early 1828 
its strong anti-Masonic feeling formed and intensified through a series of mass meetings, 
quickly transformed into a strong anti-Jacksonian political faction that sought to prevent 
Jackson’s second presidency on the grounds that Jackson was actually a high-ranking 
Mason. In order to consolidate and promote their new party effectively, anti-Masons 
invented the national nominating convention, in which locally elected delegates would 
select state candidates to pledge their loyalty and mobilize the increased number of voters, 
and the party platform, in which they officially specified their principles and doctrine for 
the public. On September 26, 1831, the Anti-Masons held the first national political party 
convention to nominate their presidential candidate. The new procedural innovation 
proved more successful than expected; the public selection process gave the party 
publicity and its candidate legitimacy. Whigs and Democrats quickly recognized its 
effectiveness and rushed to hold similar national conventions to anoint their candidates; 
on December 12, 1831, the National Republican Convention nominated Henry Clay, and 
on May 21-22, 1832, the Democratic Party Convention nominated Jackson for 
reelection.126 
Central to the election of 1832 was the singular political personality of Jackson, 
who embodied the popular idea of advocating for the common man. His political 
character was inseparable from the most heated issue of his administration: the existence 
of the Bank of the United States. During his first term, Jackson made all possible effort to 
dismantle the Bank of the United States because it had too many foreign investors, it 
                                                          
126 In the 1832 election, Anti‐Masonic party candidates won 10 percent of all House races, and the party's 
Presidential candidate, William Wirt, carried Vermont and won almost 8 percent of the popular vote 
nationally. For the emergence of the Anti-Masonic Party and its political impact on the American politics, 
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favored the rich over the poor, and it restricted loans for western expansion and 
development plans. For these reasons, Jackson promptly vetoed the legislation passed by 
the Senate to renew the bank’s charter in 1831. When the House and Senate voted to 
reauthorize the bank in July 1832, Jackson announced a second veto stating “[i]t is to be 
regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of government to their selfish 
purposes…When the laws undertake, … to make the rich richer and the potent more 
powerful, the humble members of society, the farmers, mechanics and laborers, who have 
neither the time nor the means of securing like favors for themselves, have a right to 
complain of the injustice of their government.” Soon after this Congress overruled 
Jackson’s veto and both sides continued the confrontation. As the 1832 campaign 
approached, the question of the Bank’s survival became the pivotal debate between 
Jacksonians and Anti-Jacksonians. Whereas the National Republican platform assailed 
Jackson’s “character” and equated it with his policy, the Democratic Party shrewdly 
issued no platforms that might displease lukewarm Jacksonian voters.127 In a famous 
National Republican cartoon, he was portrayed as “King Andrew the First,” and the 1832 
election was the first substantial popular national election in American political history, 
one that decided whether Jackson was a popular tribune or a democratic despot, a 
referendum on Jackson himself.  
In the election, Americans favored Jackson’s singular character, regarding it as 
representative of their interest and voice. Jackson easily won his reelection, proving 
himself more popular than the National Bank. He later interpreted the overwhelming 
victory as “a decision of the people against the bank.” Early in his second term, Jackson 
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ordered the removal of the government’s deposits and funds from the National Bank in 
order to distribute them to local state banks. Shocked, the Senate, which was controlled 
by Whigs, passed a resolution demanding that Jackson open the cabinet’s documents 
related to the 1831 veto. When Jackson refused to release the documents, on March 8 in 
1834 Congress officially censured the President for the first time in American history. 
However, the politically symbolic censure failed to stop Jackson from demolishing the 
federal banking system. Though Jackson’s battle against the National Bank and the 
privileged seemed to be a fight for the common man, historians have agreed that the 
National Bank was not abolished because of public opinion.128 Rather, as one historian 
trenchantly sums it up, “[t]he killing of the BUS [Bank of the United States] was 
primarily the work of one man, and that man was Andrew Jackson.”129 Indeed Jackson 
took his fight against the Bank personally; the Bank “is trying to kill me,” he told Vice 
President Van Buren, “but I will kill it.” Ultimately, the decision was Jackson’s own and 
nothing but his personal popularity could have overridden the complaints of the 
privileged and the elite.  
However, the boundary between public perception and the correct understanding 
of Jackson’s political strife is still ambiguous. First of all, the public opinion Jackson 
relied upon was not necessarily formed by the voices of common people. For instance, 
Amos Kendall, who masterminded much of Jackson’s political strategy and composed 
many of his official papers, wrote editorials that he sent to friendly newspaper editors 
around the country. He then (re)quoted their friendly articles in his own journal to give 
                                                          
128 See, for example, Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 
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129 Robert Vincent Remi, Andrew Jackson and the Bank War: A Study in the Growth of Presidential Power 
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evidence of the people’s approval of Jackson’s policy. Moreover, Jackson’s decision was 
not necessarily the opinion of the Democratic Party; by 1836, twenty-eight Democratic 
congressmen who had voted to recharter the Bank had left their party.130 Tocqueville’s 
analysis of the ideological contest over the Bank and Jackson’s reelection victory 
precisely captures the essence of the groundless substance of Jackson’s singular authority, 
believed to represent the public good: 
when the president attacked the bank, the country was excited and parties 
were formed; the well-informed classes rallied round the bank, the 
common people round the president. But it must not be imagined that the 
people had formed a rational opinion upon a question which offers so 
many difficulties to the most experienced statesmen. The bank is a great 
establishment which enjoys an independent existence, and the people, 
accustomed to make and unmake whatsoever it pleases, is startled to meet 
with this obstacle to its authority. In the midst of the perpetual fluctuation 
of society, the community is irritated by so permanent an institution, and is 
led to attack it, in order to see whether it can be shaken and controlled, 
like all the other institutions of the country.131  
 
Here, Tocqueville poses the question of popular rule uniquely central to the American 
politics. To the French aristocrat concerned with the self-interest and demagoguery 
peculiar to American democracy, it was apparent that the political imagination was now 
at the mercy of a charismatic leader’s public image, so long as it was equated with the 
public cause. Connecting the significance of the 1832 election to the 1828 election, 
Tocqueville points out that Jackson’s supporters share the same political psychology and 
self-affirming delusions:  
“General Jackson, whom the Americans have trice elected to be the head 
of their government, is a man of a violent temper and mediocre talents; no 
one circumstance in the whole course of his career ever proved that he is 
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qualified to govern a free people; and indeed the majority of the 
enlightened classes of the Union has always been opposed to him. But he 
was raised to the presidency, and has been maintained in that lofty station, 
solely by the recollection of a victory which he gained, twenty years ago, 
under the walls of New Orleans; a victory which was, however, a very 
ordinary achievement, and which could only be remembered in a country 
where battles are rare. Now the people who is thus carried away by the 
illusions of glory, is unquestionably the most cold and calculating, the 
most unmilitary (if I may use the expression), and the most prosaic of all 
the peoples of the earth.”132  
 
This passage reveals Tocqueville’s acute analysis which especially concerns the political 
ambivalence of the masses as well as the self-deceiving dynamics of their political desire. 
This problem, he anticipates, would deepen if American politics centered on the political 
character of Jackson and the common support for his actions. Indeed, the consequence of 
Jackson’s two terms was, as Harry L. Watson has noted, that “the President’s actions 
stripped his original supporters down to fighting strength and gave them a strong sense of 
group identity … [and] the emerging Democratic Party shared an emotional loyalty to 
Jackson and his legacy and a fervent desire, in the President’s words, to give it 
“permanent ascendancy.””133 
It is notable that Poe represents a singular identity as not only mysteriously 
alluring but also potentially lethal. Poe already warns in “William Wilson” of the 
deceptive binary between the original and the identical through that story of fatal 
impersonal identification. In “The Man of the Crowd” the Jackson-like old man allures 
and exhausts his chaser. In both narratives, the narrating pursuers are completely 
entrapped by the uncanny power of the identical or the original. Likewise, Poe’s 
contemporaries were infatuated with what they believed to represent a common humanity 
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and what they believed to be singular leadership. This paradoxical double delusion is 
difficult to avoid since impersonal identification is not only conceptual but also 
sympathetic. Collective affects enables the communal belief justified by the very act of 
feeling together. The coming presidential election would take advantage of this secret 
mechanism of impersonal identification.        
Jacksonians viewed the 1836 election as a third election for their admired hero 
since the Democrat candidate was Van Buren, Jackson’s best advisor with unvarying 
loyalty and dedicated service, whom Jackson openly designated as his successor and 
others ratified unanimously. To defeat Jackson’s avatar, the Whigs took strategic action. 
Ignoring the precedence of the last election, they held no national convention to nominate 
their candidate. Instead, various states nominated three Whig candidates, William Henry 
Harrison of Ohio, Hugh Lawson White of Tennessee, and Daniel Webster of 
Massachusetts. The purpose of this decision was twofold; it was intended to heighten and 
take full advantage of regional hostilities to Jackson and his successor Van Buren, and it 
was expected that several competitors would split the vote sufficiently to send the 
election into the House of Representatives. As a matter of fact, this had happened in 
the1824 election when Jackson got more popular votes but the decision of the House of 
Representatives favored John Quincy Adams. But Jackson was still the old hero of most 
Americans. Van Buren won a clear-cut victory over all other Whig candidates. His 
victory signifies a now tolerable discrepancy between the original image and its double; 
regardless of the actual substance, Americans could embrace the identical double of the 
original image as the real entity. Poe’s “William Wilson” captures this new political 
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paradox and “The Man of the Crowd” indicts the absence of substance at the heart of the 
paradox. 
By 1840 the two opposing party system, national conventions, and mass rallies 
defined the more extensively democratic course of the coming presidential race. Both 
parties were organized down to the regional level, and the proportion of voters in the 
presidential election had tripled from 26 percent in 1824 to 78 percent in 1840. Yet, 
despite the codification and solidification of the party presidential campaigns, the 
campaigns became more of “personalities and not of issues.”134 Indeed, the Whigs 
recalled the valuable lesson they learned from the last election and accurately adjusted 
their strategies and tactics. In December 4, 1839 the Whigs nominated Harrison. For the 
campaign, Whigs popularized three carefully crafted, rousing campaign slogans: “Log 
Cabin and Hard Cider,” “Tippecanoe and Tyler, too,” and “Van! Van! Is a Used-Up 
Man!” They were calculated to make the public visualize Harrison as an Andrew 
Jackson-like Southern war hero and a simple commoner in contrast to Van Buren, whom 
the Whigs represented as a corrupt career politician indulging in a luxurious, aristocratic 
lifestyle while the nation’s economy failed.135 In fact, however, Van Buren was of 
humble origins, whereas Harrison was a propertied slaveholder from a renowned 
Virginian family. Along with campaign newspapers, Whigs also employed a variety of 
visual and mobile devices such as plentiful placards, large emblems, massive rallies, and 
catchy campaign songs and slogans. In addition, as the Democratic Party successfully did 
four years before, the Whig Party did not adopt a platform in order to prevent any 
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possible political conflicts within them. In this extensive democratization of national 
politics, it became almost impossible to establish a distinction between the original and 
the identical, as suggested in “William Wilson,” and more importantly, as Poe implies 
more allusively in “The Man of the Crowd,” what appears to be the original “will be in 
vain to follow.” 
The consequence was a Whig victory, a death sentence to twelve years of 
Jacksonian power. The politics of impersonal identification worked well with the 
American public. Jackson, who had been the epitome of impersonal identification, wrote 
scornfully of the Whigs misleading the people by “worshipping coon and sour cider … 
[attempting] to degrade the people to a level with the brute creation.”136 However, the 
Whigs only imitated what the Democrats had been doing, but in a more effective way. 
Thus, an editor of the Democratic Review lamented “they have at last learned from the art 
of victory! We have taught them to conquer us!”137  
 
“The horrid law of political economy” 
The three presidential elections in 1832, 1836, and 1840 had shown Americans 
the predominant logic of impersonal identification at the center of national politics. 
Though Jackson was idolized and detested as the incarnation of absolutely idiosyncratic 
political agency, his individuality cannot be easily defined as autonomous and singular. 
For the democratic individuality he embodied was in constant interplay between the 
individual and the public; his individuality was always coupled with the democratic will 
                                                          
136 Pessen, Jacksonian America, 169. 
 
137 Quoted in Robert Gray Gunderson, The Log-Cabin Campaign (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 
1957), 108. 
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which is not necessarily the expression of the real demos. The paradox of democratic 
individuality was more egregious in the case of William Henry Harrison as seen in his 
intentional disowning of his original selfhood and his identification with the image of his 
political adversary. In these cases of Jackson and Harrison, it is difficult to find the 
original locus of autonomous and singular agency. Central to what formed and 
transformed the political contours of 1830s was, as Poe suggests in his tales, the spectral 
substance of the logic of impersonal identification.     
In 1846, Poe wrote that “in this country, which has set the world an example of 
physical liberty, the inquisition of popular sentiment overrules in practice the freedom 
asserted in theory by the laws.” “William Wilson” and “The Man of the Crowd” had 
explored the way in which what he calls “the horrid law of political economy” became 
the unavoidable structure of American reality and how “the public sentiment overrules in 
practice the freedom” in irrevocable ways.138 The two tales, at their respective conclusion, 
make the same point: the fantasy of “absolute idiosyncrasy” is an ideological hologram of 
the reality built on the logic of “absolute identity.” For Poe, such “absolute” conditions 
best characterize the increasing social democratization and also the spreading sense of the 
threat from the new social milieus characterized by the homogenizing of individualities. 
With this in mind, Poe’s strong and explicit loathing of American transcendentalism 
should be reconsidered. He disdained Transcendentalists as “Frogpondians” and ridiculed 
their philosophy of individualism as “metaphor-run mad” which lapses into “obscurity 
                                                          
138 Edgar Allan Poe, “The Literati of New York,” Edgar Allan Poe: Essays and Reviews, ed. G. R. 
Thompson (New York: The Library of America, 1984), 1134. 
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for obscurity’s sake” or “mysticism for mysticism’s sake.”139 Poe once wrote in a letter to 
Thomas Holley Chivers that he disliked “only the pretenders and sophists among 
them.”140 For Poe, transcendental individualism is a doubly misconceived and misleading 
hoax since there is in truth no individual autonomy or singularity and thus it is impossible 
to reestablish or reclaim them.  
In the same vein, “William Wilson” and “The Man of the Crowd” can also be 
read as allegories of how “public opinion” deludes the individual into sympathizing for 
the original and the identical. The strenuous struggles of both narrators are substantial—
not simply unreal just because they are misled by fantasy—because these struggles are 
the actual ways in which one maintains one’s ideological vision of being and society. 
Poe’s daunting vision of American mobocracy warns against the very deceptive 
substantiation that is visible and palpable but not legible. Like “a certain German book,” 
described by the narrator of “The Man of the Crowd,” it “does not permit itself to be read” 
and thus commits a “deep crime” (515). For Poe, the deeper, more significant lesson is 
the transformation of the power of the delusive substantiation of the absent, abstract 
notion of the singular individuality into the tangible, tantalizing entity in democratic 
social milieus. Poe’s inquiry is thus directed at the working of the spectral substance of 
the uniquely American democratic individuality, its paradoxical fictionality and 
historicity. 
Whereas Poe was interested in political and cultural democracy in terms of the 
presidency, the national political economy, and the cultural market, Hawthorne was 
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concerned with political and cultural democracy in terms of the widespread and popular 
social reform movements of the 1840s. In the next chapter, I consider how Hawthorne’s 
romance, like Brown’s and Poe’s, discloses the underlying paradox of the fundamental 
principles of democracy; but in his romance Hawthorne studies democratic feelings, 
sympathy in particular. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter III 
Strange Sympathies in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter 
 
In “The Procession” chapter in The Scarlet Letter, Hester Prynne, watching 
Arthur Dimmesdale passing by with a throng celebrating the election day, abruptly “felt a 
dreary influence come over her, but wherefore or whence she knew not.” This inscrutable 
feeling forcibly divorced Hester from Dimmesdale by rendering him “so remote from her 
own sphere, and utterly beyond her reach.” Against the sudden affective dissociation, she 
strove to reinstate their furtive relationship by evoking a reminiscence of “the dim forest 
… where, sitting hand-in-hand, they had mingled their sad and passionate talk” and 
“deeply had they known each other then.” However, such a deep mutual understanding 
predicated on sympathetic dialogue was irrevocably ruptured by the inexplicable and 
ungovernable feeling, which severed their empathic rapport so completely that “[s]he 
hardly knew him now.” To add to Hester’s misery, Dimmesdale’s expression amid the 
procession betrayed “unsympathizing thoughts” and an intention to “withdraw himself 
from their mutual world.” Hawthorne’s dramatization of the profound disconnect 
between the couple not only accentuates the centrality of sympathy to reciprocal 
understanding and solidarity, but poses a provocative question regarding the substance of 
knowledge and association built on sympathy. Indeed, the strong sympathy that binds 
Hester and Dimmesdale together at the forest tryst is suddenly foreclosed, leaving no 
solid ground for their sympathetic comprehension and connection. Hawthorne reaffirms 
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the futility of sympathy in the wake of their mutual alienation by depicting how Hester’s 
“spirit sank with the idea that all must have been a delusion, and … there could be no real 
bond betwixt the clergyman and herself.”141 
Hawthorne’s intent to limn this saliently “unsympathizing” scene seems quite 
clear. He confounds the antebellum sense of sympathy which his contemporaries 
considered the most essential and effective interpersonal affect. Hawthorne’s 
contemporary understanding of sympathy is what Hester and Dimmesdale believe it to be 
in their forest reunion; it is supposed to lead individuals to share deeper truth of each 
other’s heart. To the contrary, sympathy in Hawthorne’s depiction in later scenes is 
desubjectivizing, disruptive, disintegrating, and decoupling. But Hawthorne scholars, 
though never missing the thematic importance of sympathy, have ignored Hawthorne’s 
concerns with the paradoxical—binding yet immaterial—substance of sympathy 
expressed by his depiction of the ways in which Hester, Dimmesdale, and Chillingworth 
suffer its unquestioned mechanism. During Dimmesdale’s public sermon, for instance, 
his “tremulously sweet, rich, deep, and broken” voice and “[t]he feeling that it so 
evidently manifested, rather than the direct purport of the words, caused it to vibrate 
within all hearts, and brought the listeners into one accord of sympathy.” His emotional 
“appeal” was so “powerful” that “[e]ven the poor baby at Hester’s bosom was affected by 
the same influence” (67). In Hawthorne’s delineation of the scene, sympathy arises 
among townsmen to concatenate them into one affectively homogeneous group as the 
pastor’s sonorous voice and its emotional repercussions—not the didactic content of his 
sermon—touch a chord in their hearts; thus, even Hester’s infant baby, who understands 
                                                          
141 Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter, vol. 1 of The Centenary Edition of the Works of Nathaniel 
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not a single word of the sermon, becomes one of those sympathizers. What is notable 
here is Hawthorne’s particular attention to the way in which sympathy substantiates a 
state of emotional synchronization of individuals regardless of the actual content of what 
they are supposed to sympathize with. This paradox offers an explanation of why the 
strong sympathetic binding between Hester and Dimmesdale suddenly comes to naught. 
Hawthorne suggests that sympathetic welding, whether epistemological or ontological, is 
in effect formed by the contingent merging of feelings, rather than the firm foundation of 
enduring mutual understanding and connection. To this end he depicts Hester and 
Dimmesdale “sitting hand-in-hand” in the forest “mingl[ing] their sad and passionate 
talk,” and mistaking this for deeply knowing each other. Their sympathy is directed 
toward the “sad and passionate” expression of respective emotional talk, not its profound 
content. In the same vein, their failure to fend off the intrusion of unsympathizing affect 
proves that they have not constructed a “real bond” beneath the veils of sympathetic 
feeling, “a delusion” as Hester puts it. 
It is also noteworthy that sympathy is not merely a moral virtue in Hawthorne’s 
view. Note that the mingled talk the couple shares in the forest has nothing to do with 
moral relief or salvation and Dimmesdale’s listeners are captivated by his emotional 
voice regardless of its moral message. Moreover, Hawthorne’s other representations of 
how sympathy arises and operates in The Scarlet Letter divulge some darkly 
multifarious—immoral, irrational, and even pathological—effects that preclude any 
possibility of sympathetic harmony. These negative sympathies subjugate the main 
characters, though the characters do not recognize this due to their misunderstanding of 
the true structure of sympathy and their circumscribed agency. Rather they remain 
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believers and followers of sympathy as their own while their respective fate is doomed to 
fall victim to the power of sympathy which they believe to work for them. Hawthorne’s 
particular focus on the non-subjective, insidious attributes of sympathy, I argue in this 
chapter, complicates and challenges the antebellum conception of sympathy. 
Hawthorne’s contemporaries generally hold that sympathy is in essence a self-generated 
and self-governing feeling grounded on a rational and moral awareness of another’s 
condition. Therefore, the very subjectivity and rational morality of sympathy should lead 
sympathizers to build a harmonious social order because of each individual’s reasonable 
judgment and ethical practice for the public good and justice. In this light, sympathy is 
perceived and pursued as a politically valorized affect that serves the purpose of arousing 
public attention to the sufferers and their problematic social conditions. This prevalent 
notion of sympathy, less theoretical than prescriptive, especially added impetus 
abolitionism and the women’s rights movement in antebellum America. Indeed, social 
activists and reformers such as William Lloyd Garrison, Lydia Maria Child, Margaret 
Fuller, the Grimké sisters, and Frederick Douglass in their lectures and writings resort to 
individual and collective sympathy for those under the burden of patriarchal bondage or 
racial enslavement. With the American goal of creating a democratic society of liberal 
individuals, they all seek to capitalize on the far-reaching and permeating effect of 
sympathy in order to raise awareness of and encourage engagement with the social 
abuses oppressing women and African-Americans.  
Composed at a time replete with political and cultural discourses relying on the 
reforming—liberating and democratizing—power of sympathy, The Scarlet Letter 
demonstrates that Hawthorne is also concerned with the enlightening and solidifying 
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effect of sympathy, but only to pose a question concerning its ability to redress the social 
structure and system that hinder the realization of a genuine liberal democracy. This 
question brings the paradoxical substances of both sympathy and sympathizer to the fore 
so as to demystify the contemporary notion of sympathy as cementing interpersonal 
relations in a subjective, moral, and harmonious way that serves the cause of social 
liberation and democratization. In The Scarlet Letter Hawthorne vividly represents 
amoral, immoral, or morbid instantiations of sympathy; the striking lacuna of subjectivity 
in such cases; and the main characters’ inability to identify their true feelings with 
another’s in a harmonious way or to realize their impotent feelings. The public’s 
misconceptions of sympathy indicate the serious misconceptions of sympathy which 
mislead the public into pursuing the power of sympathy as laying the groundwork for 
establishing a liberal, democratic sociality. In what follows, I first discuss the premises of 
sympathy widely posited in Hawthorne’s time, then investigate how the logic of 
antebellum cultural politics exploits the posited power of sympathy, and finally 
reexamine how Hawthorne delves into the question of paradoxical sympathies in The 
Scarlet Letter. 
 
Premises of Sympathy 
The antebellum notion of sympathy inherited the legacy of its philosophical usage 
in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. The term sympathy gained currency in moral 
philosophy as Adam Smith explicated its nature and function in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759). Departing from the contemporary thinkers discussing the origin of 
morality in terms of intrinsic moral sensibility or practical social utility, Smith 
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maintained that it is sympathy that structures and activates moral ideas and actions. In 
order to advance a new theory of sympathy, he first considered the case of “pity” or 
“compassion,” which he defined as “the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, 
when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner.” According to 
him, one cannot feel pity or compassion for another’s emotional expression without 
“conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation.” That is to say, pity or 
compassion stems from the working of one’s imaginative consciousness which puts 
oneself in another’s shoes. It is in this sense that Smith called pity and compassion 
“fellow-feeling,” an affect that “arises from any object in the person principally 
concerned” as “an analogous emotion [which] springs up, at the thought of his situation, 
in the breast of every attentive spectator.” Then he linked pity and compassion as 
“fellow-feeling” to sympathy which encompasses both pity and compassion: “[p]ity and 
compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of 
others, Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, 
however, without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with 
any passion whatever.”  
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith predicates his formulation of sympathy 
on three interlocking presuppositions, each of which he considers self-evident. The first 
premise of sympathy is its spontaneity, which is so important that Smith mentions it in 
the very opening passage of his theory of sympathy: “That we often derive sorrow from 
the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; 
for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means 
confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most 
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exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of 
society, is not altogether without it.”142 Here sympathy—as a comprehensive idea that 
includes sentiment and passion for another—is conceptualized as a natural tendency 
inherent in human agency with which we are all endowed equally; therefore, Smith calls 
sympathy one of the “principles” and “original passions of human nature.” According to 
this notion of sympathy as a universal, self-generated feeling, it is self-evident that 
individual cannot fail to feel sympathy for others while watching their troubles and 
difficulties. 
Though Smith confirms that sympathy does not only belong to “the virtuous and 
humane,” he posits that sympathy always arises in a moral manner. What renders 
sympathy morally operative are two a priori faculties inherent in human agency: 
imagination and reason. Regarding the mechanism of sympathy, Smith explains that one 
cannot feel sympathy for the watched sufferer without “imagination” though which “we 
can form any conception of what his sensations are.” That means, “[t]he compassion of 
the spectator must arise altogether from the consideration of what he himself would feel 
if he was reduced to the same unhappy situation … with … present reason and 
judgment.”143 Here Smith associates imaginative faculty with “reason and judgment,” 
indicating that the working of sympathy is, though affective and imaginative, grounded 
on rational consideration of another’s condition. If so, it is impossible that sympathy 
works under the influence of immoral intention or thought. Hence sympathy is always a 
moral sentiment per se. 
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In addition to the essential spontaneity and rational morality of sympathy, the last 
premise of sympathy Smith considers self-evident is its socially harmonizing power. He 
explains that when we “‘place ourselves in [another’s] situation” through imagination, 
‘‘we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with 
him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though 
weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them.’’144 Yet, as Smith acknowledges, the 
sympathizer’s feelings “will, indeed, always be, in some respects, different from what he 
[the sufferer] feels, and compassion can never be exactly the same with original sorrow; 
because the secret consciousness that the change of situations, from which the 
sympathetic sentiment arises, is but imaginary, not only lowers it in degree, but, in some 
measure, varies it in kind, and gives it a quite different modification.” Nonetheless, he 
asserts that “[t]hese two sentiments … may, it is evident, have such a correspondence 
with one another, as is sufficient for the harmony of society. Though they will never be 
unisons, they may be concords, and this is all that is wanted or required.”145 To Smith’s 
mind, sympathy that enables one’s emotion to correspond with another’s is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for establishing a harmonious society; the mutual affective 
identification through sympathizing is not only possible but probable because sympathy, 
which has a subjective and rational effect on the individual level, is supposed to work in a 
moral way on the public level. 
As a matter of fact, sympathy in Smith’s formulation is equivalent to empathy in 
current usage, which specifically signifies both the understanding of and identification 
with another’s feeling and situation. Sympathy as synonymous with empathetic “fellow-
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feeling” denotes the essentially moral and social dimension of the word. And the latter, in 
Smith’s regard, cannot be constituted without the fundamentally individual and 
voluntary—i.e., subjective—dimension of sympathy, since “there may be some 
correspondence of sentiments between the spectator and the person principally concerned, 
the spectator must, first of all, endeavor, as much as he can, to put himself in the situation 
of the other, and to bring home to himself every little circumstance of distress which can 
possibly occur to the sufferer.”146 In the later part of his book, Smith develops the idea of 
the sympathetic spectator into the conception of the “impartial spectator,” an agent whose 
sympathy always arises from a sense of social harmony: “To disturb his happiness merely 
because it stands in the way of our own, to take from him what is of real use to him 
merely because it may be of equal or of more use to us, or to indulge, in this manner, at 
the expense of other people, the natural preference which every man has for his own 
happiness above that of other people, is what no impartial spectator can go along 
with.”147  
 
Puissance of Sympathy 
Smith’s contemporary Jean-Jacques Rousseau also considers sympathy a feeling 
for the public good in terms of an “impartial spectator.” In Discourse on the Origin and 
Basis of Inequality among Men (1755), published five years before The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, Rousseau, as Philip Fisher points out, views “compassion” as a “species 
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preserving” different from “individual preserving feeling.”148 Fisher shows interest in 
Rousseau’s intentional use of vivid literary images that directly appeal to the reader’s 
sympathy as in Rousseau’s depiction of “the tragic image of an imprisoned man who sees, 
through his window, a wild beast tearing a child from its mother’s arms, breaking its frail 
limbs with murderous teeth, and clawing its quivering entrails. What horrible agitation 
seizes him as he watches the scene which does not concern him personally! What anguish 
he suffers from being powerless to help the fainting mother and the dying child.” In 
Fisher’s analysis, Rousseau intends that this appalling image evinces the fact that 
sympathy stems from “a species-preserving feeling as opposed to those feelings which 
have only the individual’s own survival at their source.”149 Indeed, by limning a peculiar 
case of a helpless prisoner who can do nothing but watch the tragic scene happening 
outside his cell, Rousseau implies that sympathy as a social feeling occurs only when the 
motive of the spectator who sympathizes with another is far from self-interested and 
personal.150 
But there is a significant difference between Rousseau and Smith in their 
understanding of social sympathy. Whereas Rousseau’s emphasis on the prisoner’s 
inability to stop the suffering he watches “makes him a crucial image of the reader of 
sentimental stories” who “obviously cannot affect the outcome of events that he 
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witnesses,”151 Smith’s model of the spectator sympathizing with the watched sufferer 
effaces the boundary between the personal and the public under the influence of 
sympathy. While Rousseau highlights the sympathizer’s inability to act as a crucial part 
of social sympathy, Smith puts emphasis on the substantial power to affectively identify 
with the sufferer. This contrast is more specifically revealed as Smith provides the 
example of literary plot and characters to account for the actual working of sympathy: 
“[o]ur joy for the deliverance of those heroes of tragedy or romance who interest us, is as 
sincere as our grief for their distress, and our fellow-feeling with their misery is not more 
real than that with their happiness. We enter into their gratitude towards those faithful 
friends who did not desert them in their difficulties; and we heartily go along with their 
resentment against those perfidious traitors who injured, abandoned, or deceived 
them.”152 Smith’s point is that one’s sympathetic “enter[ing] into” another’s emotions, as 
in the specific case of feeling for sentimental characters in “happiness,” “distress,” 
“misery,” or with “resentment,” submerges the sympathizer’s view and concern in the 
very feelings of the sufferer. For Smith, the substantial formation of such sympathetic 
identification through the experience of affective (inter)subjectivity lays the solid 
foundation of a social harmony.  
In his thorough historical study of the formation of the public sphere in the 
seventeenth- and eighteenth century, Jürgen Habermas also notes the power of sympathy 
to substantiate an interpersonal space where a feeling subject takes part in constituting a 
public sphere. Like Smith, Habermas considers the case of a reader’s experience of 
literary sentimentalism:  
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… the empathetic reader repeated within himself the private relationships 
displayed before him in literature; from his experience of real familiarity 
(Intimität), he gave life to the fictional one, and in the latter he prepared 
himself for the former. On the other hand, from the outset the familiarity 
(Intimität) whose vehicle was the written word, the subjectivity that had 
become fit to print, had in fact become the literature appealing to a wide 
public of readers. The privatized individuals coming together to form a 
public also reflected critically and in public on what they had read, thus 
contributing to the process of enlightenment which they together 
promoted.”153 
 
What Habermas suggests is the centrality of the imaginative identification on an 
interpersonal level to the formulation of a public sphere, which echoes Smith’s 
formulation of the social dynamic of sympathy. In fact, in the late seventeenth- and 
eighteenth century, Habermas mainly examines and adopts Smith’s notion of social 
sympathy rather than Rousseau’s.  
Along with the immense popularity of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, the three 
underlying premises of sympathy Smith posits in the book served as the significant 
conceptual underpinnings to the booming sentimental culture—especially literary 
sentimentalism. Smith’s contemporaries were still infatuated with Samuel Richardson’s 
internationally acclaimed sentimental novels such as Pamela; or, Virtue Rewarded (1740) 
and Clarissa, or, the History of a Young Lady (1748) published about two decades before, 
which inaugurated the widespread popularity of literary sentimentalism during the latter 
half of the eighteenth century and subsequent decades. Some examples of internationally 
successful sentimental novels are Oliver Goldsmith’s The Vicar of Wakefield (1766), 
Laurence Sterne’s A Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy (1768), and Henry 
Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling (1771). These works collectively reflect the profound 
influence of the Smithian concept of sympathy; they all represents sympathy as a 
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personal and public affect that can contribute to building a more moral and harmonious 
social order. 
Smith’s deep, lasting influence also permeates the antebellum American 
understanding and usage of sympathy. For example, the 1853 edition of An American 
Dictionary of the English Language by Noah Webster defines sympathy exactly as Smith 
does: “Fellow-feeling; the quality of being affected by the affection of another, with 
feelings correspondent in kind, if not in degree.” This common understanding of 
sympathy also permeates American letters in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century, 
which witnessed the sentimental genre dominating the literary public sphere with its 
enormous popularity and commercial success. The most popular antebellum novel that 
echoes Smithian sympathy in Hawthorne’s time is Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin (1852) published one year after The Scarlet Letter. Stowe intends her sentimental 
novel to evoke public sympathy for African American slaves through illustrating their 
perils and agonies in graphic detail and thereby invoking the political advantages of 
sympathy as a solution to the increasing political dissensions and moral dilemmas 
surrounding slavery. She manifests this view in the novel’s concluding chapter, basing it 
on a belief that “[a]n atmosphere of sympathetic influence encircles every human being; 
and the man or woman who feels strongly, healthily and justly, on the great interests of 
humanity, is a constant cultural benefactor to the human race” [emphasis in the original]. 
154 In this passage she posits that any individual who sympathizes with the cause of 
humanity cannot help but work for general human welfare; therefore each sympathizer 
for those in the inhumane realities of enslavement and bondage must make constant 
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efforts to abolish the institution of slavery. Central to this axiom, she stresses, is the 
simple fact that “every individual can … feel right” (emphasis in the original).155 For her, 
to “feel right” is a universal faculty serving as the a priori locus of sympathy which 
works in an individually spontaneous and socially moral manner, which applies Smith’s 
premises of sympathy to the cultural politics of antebellum America. Like Smith, Stowe 
has no doubt that individuals are endowed with rational judgment and moral sensibility, 
and accordingly individuals can and should “feel right” about the social evils they cannot 
but watch.  
Noting this conceptual affinity between Smith and Stowe in their respective 
formulation of sympathy, critics have tended to read Stowe’s deployment of sympathy in 
terms of Smith’s formulation of the term. For example, in his discussion of Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin Glenn Hendler first explains that “Smith insists that there must be a mediating 
force between the sympathizer and the sufferer, even if that mediator is the viewer’s own 
imagination.”156 Hendler continues, noting that Smith implies that sympathy is not simply 
a natural sensation; for Smith, it is a sentiment that can and should be cultivated in order 
to identify Smith’s view as constitutive of Stowe’s injunction to “feel right.” The problem 
here is that the application of Smith’s theory to Stowe’s text disregards a subtly 
differentiated case of sympathy Stowe recognizes. For instance, Simon Legree, Uncle 
Tom’s vicious and barbaric master on the Louisiana plantation is completely subject to 
his “strong, impassioned” mother on the brink of Legree’s insanity, who “had always 
kept over Legree the kind of influence that … made her a sort of object of dread to 
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Legree, who had that superstitious horror of insane persons which is common to coarse 
and uninstructed minds.”157 This line suggests that Legree sympathizes with his mother in 
a terrified way and the sympathy is what he tries to escape, but in vain. However, the 
strange supernatural case of Legree is not Stowe’s main concern regarding sympathy; it is 
depicted as an aberration from a general concept of sympathy. In contrast, Hawthorne is 
mainly concerned with the aberrant modes of sympathy unidentified by Smith. 
Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter is structured around the conundrum of such unrecognized 
sympathies.    
 
Paradox of Sympathy 
Hawthorne’s particular concern with sympathy is already found in “Ethan Brand,” 
written in the winter of 1848 and 1849 and published in the Boston Weekly Magazine in 
January 1850.158 The tale is like a portico to The Scarlet Letter in that it deals with a very 
similar question regarding sympathy. It centers on the unexpected return and death of the 
titular character, a mysterious roamer who has travelled the world in search of what he 
calls “the Unpardonable Sin.” After eighteen years, he finally returns his hometown to 
report that he has found the sin, which ironically resides in his “own heart.” Yet after his 
deep rumination on “what love and sympathy for mankind, and what pity for human guilt 
and woe, he had,” as well as “with what reverence he had then looked into the heart of 
man,” he becomes greatly disillusioned by his discovery of “the Unpardonable Sin” in his 
“own heart,” and especially by the tragic fact that his heart is no longer “a temple 
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originally divine” as he had viewed it before. As a consequence, his heart, in sharp 
contrast to his cultivated and developed “intellect,” “had withered—had contracted—had 
hardened—had perished! It had ceased to partake of the universal throb.” The ensuing 
result is, as Hawthorne laments, that “[h]e had lost his hold of the magnetic chain of 
humanity. He was no longer a brother-man, opening the chambers or the dungeons of our 
common nature by the key of holy sympathy, which gave him a right to share in all its 
secrets.”159 
Hawthorne had hoped to publish a longer romance about Brand’s life and travel in 
search of the “Unpardonable Sin.” Thus, the full title of “Ethan Brand” when it was 
republished was “Ethan Brand: A Chapter from an Abortive Romance.” The failure was 
brought about by the excessive difficulty Hawthorne underwent in composing it. 
Working on it, he confessed that “I have wrenched and torn an idea out of my miserable 
brain, or rather, the fragment of an idea, like a tooth ill-drawn and leaving the roots to 
torture me.”160 This unprecedented trouble seems to come from the difficulty of treating 
the question of sympathy that is the cause of Brand’s tragic fate. In his narration, Brand 
reveals his bitter regret about his loss of “sympathy” as well as “love” and “pity” in his 
heart. Hawthorne implies that, paradoxically, Brand sacrificed his heart to sympathize 
with another, and “he was now a cold observer, looking on mankind as the subject of his 
experiment, and, at length, converting man and woman to be his puppets, and pulling the 
wires that moved them to such degrees of crime as were demanded for his study.” The 
striking incompatibility between sympathy and intellect in Hawthorne’s description of 
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Brand allows no middle zone for the Smithian doctrine of the “impartial spectator” as the 
model of a true sympathizer; being “a cold observer” is, for Hawthorne, the inevitable 
consequence of “vast intellectual development, which, in its progress, disturbed the 
counterpoise between his mind and heart.”161  
Also notable in the story is Hawthorne’s quite ambiguous descriptions of the 
nature and function of sympathy. The narrator of Brand’s story defines sympathy as “the 
magnetic chain of humanity,” suggesting that the powerful effect of sympathy is an 
irresistible bond, and that the sympathetic bond is structured by the affective mechanism 
built in human agency. Far more ambiguous is the description of Brand’s actions as: 
“opening the chambers or the dungeons of our common nature by the key of holy 
sympathy, which gave him a right to share in all its secrets.” By this account, “holy 
sympathy” imbues its holder with a faculty for unsealing the deep dark secrets deposited 
in “the chambers or dungeons of our common nature.” If this is the case, sympathy is not 
simply operating to help express and share true feelings among one another; rather, it 
helps one detect the hidden depth of another’s feelings. Smith never conceives of this 
dark use of sympathy. Yet given the capacity and propensity for affection built into 
human agency, the existence of this dark sympathy is not implausible; it is just another 
consequence of a sympathetic connection among feeling individuals. In “Ethan Brand” 
Hawthorne does not provide a plausible explanation for why it is impossible for one to 
inhabit a middle zone—the zone of the “impartial spectator”—between excessive 
intellect and drained sympathy. Hawthorne offers no account of why Brand could not 
stop cultivating his intellect during his transformation into a “fiend” as Hawthorne calls 
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him. Several months later, Hawthorne revisits this lingering question in The Scarlet 
Letter, in which he succeeds in presenting the answer.  
The question of sympathy haunts the reader of The Scarlet Letter from its opening 
chapter. In describing the “wooden jail,” which is an “ugly edifice,” the narrator turns his 
gaze on “a wild rose-bush, covered, in this month of June, with its delicate gems, which 
might be imagined to offer their fragrance and fragile beauty to the prisoner as he went in, 
and to the condemned criminal as he came forth to his doom, in token that the deep heart 
of Nature could pity and be kind to him” (48). The following two chapters focus on 
Hester’s public ignominy in front of the coldhearted crowd, evoking the reader’s 
sympathy for the victimized heroine who helplessly expects to seek “whatever sympathy” 
possible “in the larger and warmer heart of the multitude” (64), but her expectations are 
in vain due to “the solemn mood of the popular mind” (57) that blames her for the sin of 
adultery. Here, sympathy serves the interest of the law by not working at all; that is, one 
of the tools of Hester’s punishment is that the public does not reveal their sympathy for 
her because she is a criminal. This paradoxical working of sympathy twists the Smithian 
premise of the spontaneity of sympathy. The blocking of sympathy, for Hawthorne, is a 
tool for social control and the forced absence of its spontaneity is an effective means of 
public punishment. In fact, forcing Hester to wear the scarlet letter A on her chest 
prevents people from sympathizing with her: “Man had marked this woman’s sin by a 
scarlet letter, which had such potent and disastrous efficacy that no human sympathy 
could reach her, save it were sinful like herself” (89). As a result, when Hester appears to 
the townspeople on a public holiday seven years after her first exposure to public 
ignominy, “[h]er face … was like a mask; or, rather like the frozen calmness of a dead 
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woman’s features” because “Hester was actually dead, in respect to any claim of 
sympathy, and had departed out of the world with which she still seemed to mingle” 
(226). Sympathy deployed as a mode of strict discipline in the public sphere is not 
included in Smith’s design of socially moral sympathy. Therefore, sympathy, as 
Hawthorne suggests in the very beginning of The Scarlet Letter, is difficult to define as a 
moral virtue. In later chapters, he represents the morally ambiguous attributes of 
sympathy. 
Though the spectators initially refuse to sympathize with Hester, Dimmesdale 
successfully makes a sympathetic connection with his audience—the same townspeople 
watching Hester—through his eloquent speech. During the emotionally charged public 
sermon, his powerful and appealing voice welds “the listeners into one accord of 
sympathy.” However, as I have pointed out in the introduction to the present chapter, 
their sympathy is captivated by his expressive voice, “rather than the direct purport of the 
words.” Though without content, their shared sympathy takes the form of a belief and 
works in such a way. In his narration, Hawthorne’s notes that “[s]o powerful seemed the 
minister’s appeal, that the people could not believe but that Hester Prynne would speak 
out the guilty name; or else that the guilty one himself, in whatever high or lowly place 
he stood, would be drawn forth by an inward and inevitable necessity, and compelled to 
ascend the scaffold” (68). This public belief established by their shared sympathy is not 
necessarily moral, and this amoral belief is not going to be realized, contrary to its 
believers’ communal, substantial expectation. Hester indeed would not reveal the veiled 
sinner’s name. The failure of sympathy as a mode of belief indicates the substantial yet 
delusional power of sympathizing together.  
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As the story develops, Hawthorne represents another significant attribute of 
sympathy unidentified by Smith. In Chapter IV, for instance, after returning to prison 
Hester and her child become emotionally unstable. To treat them, the jailer leads in a 
physician named Roger Chillingworth, who is in fact Hester’s legal husband yet disguises 
his identity. After offering the mother and the daughter a cure for their symptoms, he 
urges her to reveal the name of the adulterer, but she firmly refuses. Then, Chillingworth 
confidently tells her that he will “sooner or later” seek out the veiled lover because 
“[t]here is a sympathy that will make me conscious of him. I shall see him tremble. I shall 
feel myself shudder, suddenly and unawares. Sooner or later, he must needs be mine!” 
(75) The sympathy Chillingworth deploys is an efficacious strategy that enables him to 
approach and dig out another’s dark secrets nestled deep in his or her heart. This strange 
usage of sympathy is neither fit for nor compatible with any of Smith’s premises of 
sympathy, especially the model of the impartial spectator who thinks and acts in a moral 
manner. Rather, the dark intention of the sympathy Hawthorne represents undermines the 
most crucial ground of Smithian sympathy as it does harm to harmonious interpersonal 
relations.  
The capacity for dark sympathy is also found in Hester and Dimmesdale. In the 
following chapter that describes Hester’s life after she is released from jail, Hawthorne 
states that “the scarlet letter had endowed her with a new sense. She shuddered to believe, 
yet could not help believing, that it gave her a sympathetic knowledge of the hidden sin 
in other hearts.” She can now exert the same sympathy that Chillingworth is employing 
in order to identify her secret lover. Hester is “terror-stricken by the revelations” of “the 
insidious whispers of the bad angel, who would fain have persuaded the struggling 
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woman … that the outward guise of purity was but a lie, and that, if truth were 
everywhere to be shown, a scarlet letter would blaze forth on many a bosom besides 
Hester Prynnes’s” (86). The intent and method of this sympathy is undoubtedly dark, 
since it would “leave nothing, whether in youth or age, for this poor sinner to revere.” 
Unlike her husband, however, Hester tries to reject her newly recognized sympathizing 
power by “struggl[ing] to believe that no fellow-mortal was guilty like herself” (87). Yet 
Hester’s moral determination does not deprive her of her capacity for the inexplicably 
dark sympathy. 
Dimmesdale also recognizes that the same power exists in his feeling agency. One 
day, Dimmesdale’s ability to sympathize with the public through his powerful language 
“gave him sympathies so intimate with the sinful brotherhood of mankind; so that his 
heart vibrated in unison with theirs, and received their pain into itself, and sent its own 
throb of pain through a thousand other hearts, in gushes of sad, persuasive eloquence” 
(142). In a later chapter titled “The Minister in a Maze,” Hawthorne shows that even after 
the pastor reunites with and deeply sympathizes with Hester in his secret meeting with 
her in the forest, he fails to recover his sound reason and virtuous sympathy. Rather, on 
the way back to town from the woods, he is unusually filled with physical and emotional 
energy and regards the world differently. Hawthorne suggests that his strong sympathetic 
binding with Hester immediately brings a profound change to his painful life. However, 
the striking change transforms his ability to sympathize. On the path back to town, 
Dimmesdale abruptly feels the overwhelming desire to corrupt an innocent young girl, or 
to teach naughty words to Puritan children. This new aspect of his changed moral fabric 
is highlighted by his encounter and conversation with the witch Mistress Hibbins, whose 
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sympathetic connection to him “stupefied all blessed impulses [in him], and awakened 
into vivid life the whole brotherhood of bad ones. Scorn, bitterness, unprovoked 
malignity, gratuitous desire of ill, ridicule of whatever was good and holy, all awoke to 
tempt, even while they frightened him.” As Hawthorne notes, “his encounter with old 
Mistress Hibbins … did but show its sympathy and fellowship with wicked mortals, and 
the world of perverted spirits” (222). Given that Dimmesdale is a moral and religious 
beacon for his community, it is significant that dark sympathy cannot be driven out, even 
by strong moral sensibility and firm religious belief. 
In “Ethan Brand,” Hawthorne suggested the existence of a sympathy that allows 
one to detect another’s concealed secrets. Yet he leaves the story as an abortive romance 
because he fails to grapple with the sources of the insidious sympathy. In The Scarlet 
Letter, Hawthorne gives a plausible answer to this question through the case of 
Chillingworth, a counterpart of Ethan Brand. Like Brand, Chillingworth is a scholarly 
figure who later transforms into a fiend or Satan through of his excessive obsession with 
making full use of his intellect. In his earlier life, however, Chillingworth was a model of 
rational judgment and proper use of reason. “Old Roger Chillingworth, throughout life,” 
writes Hawthorne, “had been calm in temperament, kindly, though not of warm 
affections, but ever, and in all his relations with the world, a pure and upright man.” Even 
Hester acknowledges in him “the former aspect of an intellectual and studious man, calm 
and quiet.” Furthermore, upon meeting a “half-frenzied” Hester and her moaning baby in 
a prison room, he makes and gives his best medicine to the two for the sole purpose of 
relieving them; when Hester worries about his intent to poison her and her baby, he 
calmly replies, “[w]hat should ail me to harm this misbegotten and miserable babe? The 
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medicine is potent form good; and were it my child, — yea, mine own, as well as thine! 
— I could do no better for it.” He never chastises her or her lover for her adultery in his 
absence; instead, he acknowledges his “folly” in marrying her, “the first wrong” 
committed by himself “when [he] betrayed [her] budding youth into a false and unnatural 
relation with [his] decay.” He even promises Hester that “as a man who has not thought 
and philosophized in vain, I seek no vengeance, plot no evil against thee” and “shall [not] 
interfere with Heaven’s own method of retribution, or, to my own loss, betray him to the 
gripe of human law,” nor shall he “contrive aught against his life; no, nor against his 
fame, if, as I judge, he be a man of fair repute.”  
For Chillingworth, as he expresses frankly, “[n]o matter whether of love or hate; 
no matter whether of right or wrong!” He is only concerned with his scrutiny of the 
identity of the veiled adulterer, which preoccupies him. He is certain that he will find out 
who cuckolded him because “there are few things, — whether in the outward world, or to 
a certain depth, in the invisible sphere of thought, — few things hidden from the man, 
who devotes himself earnestly and unreservedly to the solution of a mystery but the 
investigation of his hidden identity through sympathy” (75-76). This confidence, which 
suggests that he associates his reasoning power with sympathizing power, foreshadows 
his tragic fate. Yet it is not his obsession that leads him to his doom. In the case of Ethan 
Brand, Hawthorne defines Brand as “a fiend” as his heart comes to be completely drained 
by using his reason and intellect to the utmost. On the other hand, Chillingworth becomes 
“Satan” because he relishes his obsessive desire to fully exploit his reasoning power in 
order to sympathize with the one he chases after. When he is first concerned with and 
then obsessed with the process of searching for the true identity of Hester’s lover, he 
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actually enjoys his investigation of the enigma no one else can solve. What “the eyes of 
the wrinkled scholar” ardently seek after is not any vengeance on the adulterer but 
uncovering his hidden identity, as he makes clear to Hester. The real ethical problem lies 
in the fact that he does it with a “smile,” which makes Hester “troubled at the expression 
of his eyes” and leads her to conceive of him as “the Black Man” (73-74). It is clear that 
he is morbid in deploying his sympathy and the very morbidity is another attribute of 
sympathy that Hawthorne suggests.   
In a chapter titled “The Leech,” a detailed account of Chillingworth’s complex 
qualities as an able yet morbid doctor, Hawthorne directs the reader’s attention to the 
question of how Chillingworth derives morbid pleasure from his chase after the man who 
cuckolded him. For Chillingworth, the pleasure emerges from his “new interests” that 
tempt his “faculties”; once he is known to be dead at sea as he intends, he expects that 
“new interests would immediately spring up, and likewise a new purpose; dark, it is true, 
if not guilty, but of force enough to engage the full strength of his faculties.” In the 
following scene, Hawthorne intentionally juxtaposes Chillingworth’s “dark” intellectual 
“force” with “an intellectual cultivation of no moderate depth or scope” joined by “a 
range and freedom of ideas” that Dimmesdale recognizes in the doctor. Hawthorne 
represents Chillingworth, whom Dimmesdale identifies as “the man of science” and “a 
physician” possessed of “learning and intelligence … [in] more than a common measure” 
(119, 123), as a case of reason coupled with passion which was not considered in the 
Enlightenment thought until David Hume formulated it. 
The representative Enlightenment thinker René Descartes claimed that our 
knowledge of the external world is constructed by the use of reason, and that sensory 
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input is inherently unreliable owing to its changeable and erroneous attributes. Since this 
binarism, reason and passion have been treated as inherently disparate, even conflicting 
entities and the full use of reason is favored as the only certain measure and instrument 
for understanding of the world. In his article “Answer to the Question: What Is 
Enlightenment?” (1784), Immanuel Kant asserted that the “Enlightenment is man’s exit 
from his self-incurred minority.”162 “Minority,” he contended, “is the incapacity to use 
one’s intelligence without the guidance of another. Such minority is self-incurred if it is 
not caused by lack of intelligence, but by lack of determination and courage to use one’s 
intelligence without being guided by another.” It was in this light that he declared “the 
motto of the enlightenment:” “Sapere Aude!” (“Have the courage to use your own 
intelligence!”)163  
On the other hand, there is a different perspective on reason within Enlightenment 
philosophy. David Hume maintains that “reason” is “the slave of the passions”164 in A 
Treatise of Human Nature (1739), in which he discusses reason in its inseparable relation 
to passion. Yet Hume fails to clarify that the two are a combined entity; he merely 
distinguishes between “calm” passions that “cause no disorder in the soul” and “are 
readily taken for the determinations of reason” and “certain violent emotions of the same 
kind” to conclude that “[w]hat we call strength of mind, implies the prevalence of the 
calm passions above the violent.”165 In other words, it is only the orderly passions that are 
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constitutive of our reason; that is, passionate reason is in effect operative as a mode of 
reason.  
In The Scarlet Letter Hawthorne pushed further Hume’s notion of reason coupled 
with passion by presenting a case of pathological reason associated with morbid passion. 
Chillingworth is his case study, who incarnates Hume’s model of passionate reason in a 
more radical manner. Hawthorne accounts for what lies beneath the ideal model of reason 
that Chillingworth embodies: 
He had begun an investigation, as he imagined, with the severe and equal 
integrity of a judge, desirous only of truth, even as if the question involved 
no more than the air-drawn lines and figures of a geometrical problem, 
instead of human passions, and wrongs inflicted on himself. But, as he 
proceeded, a terrible fascination, a kind of fierce, though still calm, 
necessity seized the old man within its gripe, and never set him free again, 
until he had done all its bidding. (129) 
 
In this passage, Hawthorne describes how Chillingworth’s reasoning process becomes 
transformed into a morbid obsession, “a terrible fascination” with the arduous 
investigation and, ultimately, a pathological desire that tries to find its own pleasure 
through the exhaustive use of reason and judgment. Hawthorne attributes this morbid 
reason that ardently pursues “the disclosure of human thoughts and deeds,” to 
Chillingworth’s stated intention that he “meant merely to promote the intellectual 
satisfaction of all intelligent beings” (131). 
Ironically, Chillingworth himself realizes that his irreversible “fascination” with 
exhaustive reasoning is “a dark necessity”: 
It is not granted me to pardon. I have no such power as thou tellst me of. 
My old faith, long forgotten, comes back to me, and explains all that we 
do, and all we suffer. By thy first step awry, thou didst plant the germ of 
evil; but, since that moment, it has all been a dark necessity. Ye that have 
wronged me are not sinful, save in a kind of typical illusion; neither am I 
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field-like, who have snatched a fiend’s office from his hands. It is our fate. 
Let the black flower blossom as it may! [174, emphasis added] 
 
Such “a dark necessity,” Chillingworth rightly realizes, gradually transforms him into a 
satanic figure; “a pure and upright man” becomes “a devil” after “gloat[ingly]” indulging 
himself in the investigation of another’s heart: 
In a word, old Roger Chillingworth was a striking evidence of man’s 
faculty of transforming himself into a devil, if he will only, for a 
reasonable space of time, undertake a devil’s office. This unhappy person 
had effected such a transformation by devoting himself, for seven years, to 
the constant analysis of a heart full of torture, and deriving his enjoyment 
thence, and adding fuel to those fiery tortures which he analyzed and 
gloated over. (170)  
 
Chillingworth’s hideous metamorphosis, which he cannot prevent or stop, contrasts 
strikingly with a description of what he was like nine years ago. At that time, all his life 
“had been made up of earnest, studious, thoughtful, quiet years, bestowed faithfully for 
the increase of [his] own knowledge, and faithfully, too, … for the advancement of 
human welfare” (172). The noble Enlightenment cause of advancing knowledge and 
reason is now deformed by the very dynamic inherent to the pursuit of knowledge and 
reason. 
Revealing the true identity of Chillingworth to Dimmesdale, Hester “thoughtfully” 
explains that “[t]here is a strange secrecy in his nature … and it has grown upon him by 
the hidden practices of his revenge. I deem it not likely that he will betray the secret. He 
will doubtless seek other means of satiating his dark passion” (196). Indeed, when he first 
notices Dimmesdale’s hidden history of the “hot passion of his heart” (137), 
Chillingworth joyfully mutters “A rare case! … I must needs look deeper into it. A 
strange sympathy betwixt soul and body! Were it only for the art’s sake, I must search 
this matter to the bottom!” (138) By critically portraying the pathological transformation 
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of “a man of thought, — the book-worm of great libraries, — a man already in decay, 
having given my best years to feed the hungry dream of knowledge” (74) into a diabolic 
“unfortunate” scholar who is now irrevocably preoccupied with “a wild … wonder, joy, 
and horror,” reveling in “a ghastly rapture” (138) resulting from the thorough scrutiny of 
his victim’s moral interior, Hawthorne negates the Enlightenment model of the subjective 
reason of the rational subject as an admirable substance of human agency; for Hawthorne, 
a subject is an amalgam of reason and passion that is always subject to irresistible 
pathological degradation. 
This degrading effect of sympathy is morally ambiguous, even to Chillingworth 
himself. When Hester supplicates him to stop searching into Dimmesdale’s body and soul, 
he asks her “[w]hat evil have I done the man?” (171), and even she cannot answer clearly. 
For until then Chillingworth had only delved into the heart of Dimmesdale, and it is 
difficult to for the reader and for Hester to distinguish between morbidity and evil intent 
in Chillingworth’s attempt to sympathize with Dimmesdale. Hawthorne suggests that 
there is a moral ambiguity in Chillingworth’s exploitation the power of sympathy, calling 
it “dark … if not guilty” (118). Chillingworth’s intention is morally dark, yet it cannot be 
considered “guilty” based solely on its dark intention. However, as his study progresses, 
Chillingsworth becomes obviously “satanic” in that he feels no guilt about continuously 
eliciting morbid pleasure from his evil sympathy.  
Though not as morbid as Chillingworth, Dimmesdale also suffers from a serious 
problem with sympathy that Smith never identifies. For Dimmesdale, sympathy is not a 
means of interpersonal communication, nor is it a self-sustaining property. Though 
Hawthorne first describes the pastor’s powerful sympathetic appeal to the public in the 
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market place scene, his agency in private life undergoes and conceals the torment of the 
shadowy side of sympathetic connection. Though he achieves “a brilliant popularity in 
his sacred office” through his eloquent preaching that comes from”[h]is intellectual gifts, 
his moral perceptions, his power of experiencing and communicating emotion,” no one 
recognizes that these gifts all are “kept in a state of preternatural activity by the prick and 
anguish of his daily life.” Likewise, he is endowed with the gift of “addressing the whole 
human brotherhood in the heart’s native language,” which is profoundly different from 
simply religious sermons that only “express the highest truths through the humblest 
medium of familiar words and images.” Thus highly praised, “[i]t is inconceivable, the 
agony with which this public veneration tortured him!” since “[i]t was his genuine 
impulse to adore the truth, and to reckon all things shadow-like, and utterly devoid of 
weight or value, that had not its divine essence as the life within their life.” Though “[h]e 
had spoken the very truth, and transformed it into the veriest falsehood,” his parishioners 
are unable to sympathetically understand his plight or help to soothe his agony. 
Consequently, “above all things else, he loathed his miserable self” (144). This is an 
example of the inherent impossibility of communication that sympathy cannot resolve. It 
is highly ironic that Dimmesdale has no sympathizer beside Chillingworth; only the 
physician can sympathize with his moral suffering, and his sympathy leads to no moral 
ends.  
In highlighting Chillingworth’s morbid sympathy, Hawthorne strongly indicates 
that he has no control of it. In other words, he is not the author of his own excessive 
feelings. Likewise, Hester cannot fully control her feeling agency that struggles with the 
outer world from the first market-place scene to the last one. For example, Hester cannot 
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leave the town that stigmatizes her because “there is a fatality, a feeling so irresistible and 
inevitable that it has the force of doom, which almost invariably compels human beings 
to linger around and haunt, ghost-like, the spot where some great and marked event has 
given the colour to their lifetime; and, still the more irresistibly, the darker the tinge that 
saddens it” (79-80). Here, feeling works as a non-subjective—neither self-generated nor 
self-governing—force that confines an individual’s body and mind to a particular place 
for no rational reason. Hester cannot resist or even understand why she feels a certain 
way; she just follows it as if it is a given fate.  
The salient absence of subjectivity in affective agency is also found in the scene 
where Hester listens to Dimmesdale’s last sermon at the scaffold of the pillory. The 
“weitht[y]” yet “ill-defined” sense holds her tight by “an inevitable magnetism in that 
spot, whence she dated the first hour of her life of ignominy,” which creates the illusion 
that “her whole orb of life, both before and after, was connected with this spot, as with 
the one point that gave it unity” (244). However, even that seemingly subjective sense, as 
Hawthorne emphatically states, is stirred by “[a]n irresistible feeling” (242) that 
forcefully brings her to and keeps her at the scaffold.  
The lack of subjective affectivity is also characteristic of Dimmesdale. In his 
examination of the pastor’s moral interior, Chillingworth “dug into the poor clergyman’s 
heart, like a miner searching for gold; or, rather, like a sexton delving into a grave, 
possibly in quest of a jewel that had been buried on the dead man’s bosom, but likely to 
find nothing save mortality and corruption” (129). Paradoxically, Dimmesdale’s heart is 
full of nothingness. Knowledge and religion cannot fill the void, and neither can his 
powerful preaching or his ability to appeal to and communicate with others through 
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sympathy. In this sense, it is highly suggestive that he dies soon after confessing his sin to 
the public. Since his agency lacks substance, he passes away when he is done with his 
functional—that is, religious and moral—social role. 
All the paradoxical sympathies Hawthorne dramatizes in The Scarlet Letter are 
critical of Smith’s premises of sympathy. In challenging Smith’s premises, Hawthorne 
demystifies the contemporary belief that sympathy lays the groundwork for a genuine 
liberal democracy. What Hawthorne really proposes in his romance is a new political 
understanding of sympathy. 
  
Social Reform and Politics of Sympathy 
The relationship between literary production and the social reform movement was 
especially close in Hawthorne’s time. As María Carla Sánchez has argued, “antebellum 
social reform writings seized on fiction as ‘too important an engine’ to be ignored, and in 
so doing, helped to form connections among fiction, truth, and literariness that shaped 
U.S. literary history.”166 According to Sánchez, “in the nineteenth century, every aspect 
of social life needed to be fixed, and Americans set out to do the fixing” (8). In broadly 
defining reform writing to include “any work that diagnoses an institution, system, or 
social practice in need of change,” for Sanchez, literature participates in advancing a 
reformist agenda whether it does so overtly or covertly (11). In her view, therefore, 
Stowe and Child are especially emblematic of an antebellum tendency to view history “as 
a branch of literature, not a wholly separate vein of writing” (148). 
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Hawthorne has been hardly discussed in relation to the contemporary social 
reform movements; he has been construed as a politically conservative or nonchalant 
quietist who condoned slavery and women’s inequality due to their necessity or difficulty 
to abolish. For instance, Sacvan Bercovitch, Jonathan Arac, and others have proposed a 
political reading of the text of The Scarlet Letter, highlighting the way the text “expresses 
a particular culture’s mode of resolving crisis.”167 For these critics, Hawthorne’s work 
serves as a vessel for the dominant ideologies and contradictions of liberal individualism. 
On the contrary, Lauren Berlant, who is more concerned with the diverse and local 
cultures that operate in Hawthorne’s narrative, has suggested that in The Scarlet Letter 
nothing is clearly resolved in any given political sphere, and that Hawthorne tries to 
capture political tensions located between the national and the local, the collective and 
the individual, a utopian vision and an historical reality.168 Similarly, Larry J. Reynolds 
has recently argued that Hawthorne sought to understand political issues through 
“sustained study from multiple perspectives,” valuing “complexity” over “partisan” 
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dichotomy,169 a way of resistance to the inherent “fanaticism” of his surrounding 
influences, including his Salem ancestors, American revolutionaries, and New England 
abolitionists who imagined public matters in terms of “good and evil” or “moral 
absolutes.” These critics, whether focusing on the containment or the diversification of 
antebellum political culture in Hawthorne’s work, all assume that The Scarlet Letter is an 
implicitly political defense of the possibility of genuine American liberalism or 
democracy. In contrast, I am interested in Hawthorne’s attention to the way in which 
liberalism and democracy in America are conceptually possible yet not historically 
probable because of the necessary working of sympathy. For Hawthorne, sympathy is the 
most powerful vehicle for the ideological transmutation of the abstract concept of 
liberalism or democracy into the real form of government because it allows individual 
citizens with different concerns and interests to imagine the existing regime taking the 
forms of liberalism and democracy as if it is, in essence, a liberal-democratic polity. To 
his mind, liberalism’s and democracy’s presence is what is believed to be real, so long as 
it is felt as real. 
Since the very beginning of the American republic, sympathy played a crucial 
role as an affective channel through which Americans could substantially feel that their 
vision of a democracy was an historical construct. During the revolutionary war and the 
subsequent years of nation-building, as historian Gordon S. Wood points out, “for many 
American thinkers this natural sociality of people became a modern substitute for the 
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ascetic classical virtue of antiquity.”170 The rhetorical effect of sympathy welded them 
into a newly formed national sociality. Deployed to concatenate different individual 
citizens into a strong affective bond, sympathy led them to cherish a belief that they could 
feel with and for one another in the cause of social order and harmony. Critics such as 
Elizabeth Barnes attend to this nationalizing function of sympathy in early American 
fiction and politics, maintaining that reading sympathetically, which was equated with 
reading like an American citizen, played a key role in the construction of an American 
sociopolitical identity. What is interesting in Barnes’ argument is her concern for the 
substantial way in which “[s]entimental literature exploits the idea [of sympathy] by 
attempting to both represent and reproduce sympathetic attachments between readers and 
characters” (emphasis in the original). She explains that by “typically foreground[ing] 
examples of sympathetic bonding in their story lines as a model for the way in which 
readers themselves are expected to respond,” sentimental narratives urge the reader to 
“imagine how the other feels … by projecting onto the other person what would be one’s 
own feelings in that particular situation. According to this model, personal feeling 
becomes the basis of both one’s own and the other’s authenticity.” 
Raising the Smithian notion of sympathy in order to discuss its national 
importance in early American novels, Barnes also posits that “[a]s Smith describes it, 
sympathy is more than feeling for others; it involves a projection of the self outward, so 
that the viewer or reader imaginatively inhabits the minds of others.”171 In the same vein, 
Cathy Davidson asserts in her investigation of early American novels during the 
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Revolutionary years that through sympathetic identification “the distance between text 
and reader, author and reader is effaced,” as “[t]he reader is present at the conversation 
and becomes imaginatively part of the company.” As a consequence, she stresses, 
“[w]hether an esteemed political leader or a lowly printer’s apprentice, the reader is 
privileged in relationship to the text, is welcomed into the text, and, in a sense, becomes 
the text” [emphasis in the original].172 Both Barnes and Davidson postulate the solid 
substance of sympathetic identification in American reality and politics. 
The two scholars’ communal postulation was important to antebellum American 
literary culture. Central to the popularity of literary sentimentalism was the public’s 
growing interest in the political importance of sympathy in uniquely American cultural 
and political registers. For example, earlier American bestselling novels such as William 
Hill Brown’s The Power of Sympathy: or, The Triumph of Nature (1789) Susanna 
Rowson’s Charlotte Temple, A Tale of Truth (1791) and Hannah Webster Foster’s 
Coquette or, The History of Eliza Wharton (1797) are typical sentimental narratives that 
center on the tragedy of a heroine who falls a prey to vicious temptation and degradation. 
A number of scholars have paid critical attention to the political implications of these 
sentimental plots and characterizations. Davidson and many others focus on the novels’ 
portrayal of the increasing conflict between the individual and the social world, as well as 
between reason and passion. Situating the texts in their specific historical contexts, these 
critics collectively maintain that the underlying political ideology of the early American 
republic was created by the emerging middle class and that this class’s novelistic 
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representation of reality captures the social violence of the Revolution and the foreclosure 
of liberty for women, the poor, Native Americans, and African Americans.173 
The power of sympathy to engender a close, reciprocal intersubjectivity became 
more politically important and powerful in the 1820s and 1830s, as various calls for 
social reforms increasingly captivated public attention and popular writers and lecturers 
began to speak out on the social issues of racial discrimination, slavery, poverty, and 
women’s rights. Sympathy became politically valorized as crucial to fulfilling the vision 
of a liberal and democratic republic because it was thought to be the natural internal force 
that serves to connect one person to another. Accordingly, leading social activists and 
reformers relied heavily on the enlightening and solidifying power of sympathy in 
advocating for their causes. Their public discourse became a venue for them to take 
advantage of the power of sympathy in order to bring attention to those suffering from 
the problematic social structure and system—for example, Lydia Maria Child’s Hobomok: 
A Tale of Early Times (1824) and Catharine Sedgwick’s Hope Leslie: Early Times in 
Massachusetts (1827) convey strong feminist overtones and concerns about the historical 
treatment of Native Americans. Some years later, William Garrison, the Grimké sisters, 
Margaret Fuller, Frederick Douglass, and many other social reformers and activists wrote 
and lectured regarding the question of equality for women and African-Americans. They 
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all appealed to their audience’s sympathetic connection with others in order to raise 
awareness of and redress the structural and systematic problems of their society.174 
However, the politics of fostering sympathy through the literary imagination, an 
imagination that relied on the premises of the Smithian notion of sympathy, inevitably 
encountered serious political problems with fitting conception and cause of sympathy 
into a literary narrative. For instance, Child’s Hobomok: A Tale of Early Times (1824), a 
pioneering anti-patriarchal and anti-racist work, portrays sympathy as capable of forming 
a sense of affinity between the titular Indian chief Hobomok and the white heroine Mary 
Conant. In the novel, Hobomok embodies the contemporary concept of the “noble 
savage,” a famous literary or rhetorical device that represents an idealized indigene who 
is as essentially rational and virtuous as a civilized westerner in order to highlight the 
oxymoronic combination of his or her inherent nobility and his or her uncivilized social 
condition and life. Hobomok’s admirable virtue and nobility are epitomized in his 
rational judgment to sacrifice his happiness by leaving Mary, who married him in a state 
of grief over the purported death of her white lover, when her supposedly drowned lover 
returns alive. In the ending of the novel, Hobomok goes west, alone, to pass away, 
thereby foreshadowing the doom of his whole race.  
In Child’s novelistic narrative, Hobomok incarnates the Smithian ideal of the 
“impartial spectator” through the disinterested benevolence and dignity that he expresses 
through his rational, moral actions. His rationality and morality are the reasons he was 
able to communicate with and fall in love with Mary despite their racial differences and 
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cultural boundaries. For readers, sympathizing with an Indian other who was depicted as 
equal to themselves in terms of human nature and agency allowed them to sympathize 
more readily with the plight of the Native Americans. However, Child’s strong 
humanitarian overtone is offset by her inability to locate the ethnic other in the actual 
reality of white Americans. After his demise, Hobomok’s child, given Mary’s patronym, 
moves to England and becomes a Cambridge graduate, and to him “[h]is father was 
seldom spoken of; and by degrees his Indian appellation was silently omitted.”175 This 
ending proves that sympathy does nothing in reality. Ultimately, for Child sympathy only 
creates social order and harmony between the reader and the character, not between 
historical people as they are depicted in the literary imagination, because literature has an 
interpersonal, but not necessarily social, dynamic.  
Another circumscribed and problematic application of sympathy through 
literature is more clearly shown in Sedgwick’s Hope Leslie or Early Times in the 
Massachusetts (1827). Her romance centers on the interracial relations between the main 
characters and is set against the backdrop of the historical relations and conflicts between 
early Puritan settlers and Native Americans in the 1640s. Despite offering a sentimental 
depiction and a sympathetic view of Native American displacement and removal, 
Sedgwick does not conceive of sympathy as a mode of integration and cooperation 
between the natives and the settlers; sympathy only serves as a medium of mutual 
understanding between the reader and the characters—whether Indian or Puritan—in the 
text. Though she maintains a very open-minded view of Indian culture and she indicts the 
hypocrisy and violence of the Puritans, she suggests that no integration is probable 
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between them through the resolution of the love stories of two interracial couples—the 
romantic relationship between Everell and Magawisca fails to develop, and Faith and 
Oneco’s relationship is never fully explored by the narrator. Moreover, Faith, who 
marries Oneco, no longer speaks English, thereby erasing her original cultural identity. In 
their interpersonal relations, each lover strongly sympathizes with his or her partner. But 
their sympathy is frustrated by social norms, cultural taboos, and political prejudices, 
hence their strong interpersonal sympathy only effects their partners, not the larger social 
world.176 
Also set in the 1640s,177 Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter exemplifies his 
underlying belief that sympathy is not the necessary and sufficient condition for a liberal 
democracy. Through the romance, he aligns his view with a more profound philosophical 
insight into the misconceived and misled premises of sympathy. For Hawthorne, the 
fundamental improbability of social sympathy lies in the ontological limits of human 
agency rather than an unbridgeable political divide. In formulating his theory of 
sympathy, Smith presupposes “the entire concord of the affections” in their kind, if not in 
their degree. For example, when we see others in distress, we feel for them but our 
feeling cannot be as strong as the original because we are not (or cannot be) the sufferer. 
Yet Smith believes that a sympathetically shared feeling is the same kind of feeling. 
                                                          
176 For the encouraged yet circumscribed function of sympathy in antebellum literature, see Laura L. 
Mielke, Moving Encounters: Sympathy and the Indian Question in Antebellum Literature (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2008). Kristin Boudreau also argues that the “earliest proponents of 
sympathy” such as Hannah Webster Foster and William Hill Brown view it as a “social panacea” which is 
capable of uniting a diversity of social members with ties of affection regardless of their identities. 
However, she contends, later writers such as Stowe colludes in the “erasure of all differences between 
spectator and spectacle” in their deployment of sympathy in their literary work (Sympathy in American 
Literature: American Sentiments from Jefferson to the Jameses [Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 
2002], xiv, 83). The implicit ideological work of Hobomok and Hope Leslie I have discussed evidences 
how the dominant social ideology functions in American literature prior to Uncle Tom’s Cabin. 
 
177 Hope Leslie is set mostly in 1643 and The Scarlet Letter is set in between 1642-1649. 
 151 
 
However, the problem with Smith’s belief is that a different degree of feeling is 
tantamount to a different kind of feeling; if one has a feeling that is different in degree, 
the feeling is already different in kind. Smith does not see that a difference in degree is a 
difference in kind. 
Another practical problem with the Smithian notion of sympathy is that the 
dialectics of difference and sameness or differentiation and identification in actual 
historical reality is much more complicated than can be explained by theory. In the 
material conditions of social reality, profound differences such as racial otherness, 
cultural disparity, economic disparity, and gender difference cannot be resolved only by 
sympathy because the workings of sympathy bring in two practical dilemmas that are 
hard to resolve. First, how can one perfectly know the other’s suffering in order to 
identify with the sufferers in their actual plight? To do this, one should imaginatively 
“enter,” as Smith describes the process, into the other’s situation to experience how one 
would feel in the other’s place. However, to imagine is one thing and to experience is 
another; there is always a gap between imagining and experiencing. This epistemological 
and representational problem poses a more serious question regarding the fundamental 
nature and function of the imagination. Epistemological or representational gaps or errors, 
which usually result from the difference of material conditions, can bring about the 
mistaken or misguided imagining of another’s feeling and condition. As a consequence, 
as Hannah Arendt has sharply noted, unlike pity “[c]ompassion, by its very nature, cannot 
be touched off by the sufferings of a whole class or a people, or least of all, mankind as a 
whole. … Its strength hinges on the strength of passion itself, which, in contrast to reason, 
can comprehend only the particular, but has no notion of the general and no capacity for 
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generalization.”178 For this reason, sympathy is not a necessary condition for democratic 
social reforms. 
Moreover, Smith hardly takes into consideration the subtle and serious differences 
among individuals and their agencies in terms of their specific social status and condition 
that directly or indirectly affect the particular way in which they make an imaginative 
connection with others. Smith’s postulation of affective agency is simply predicated on 
the universal subject in the abstract; thus, in his formulation, when the other’s “agonies ... 
are … brought home to ourselves … [and] begin at last to affect us,” the “we then 
tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels.”179 However, the actual subject is an 
historical individual with personal concerns and interests who functions in a specific 
social context. In other words, sympathy is not a universal moral sentiment, but a 
particular expression of feeling associated with the sympathizer’s political, social, and 
cultural condition. Therefore, there is no spectator who can impartially sympathize with 
another. 
In The Scarlet Letter, Hawthorne demonstrates how theoretically possible 
conceptions such as subjectivity, rational morality, and sympathetic identification only 
substantiate their improbabilities. But the egregious paradox in The Scarlet Letter is that 
belief in each concept’s probability is substantially delusive, like a visible yet not tangible 
ghost. For Hawthorne, such spectral substance is characteristic of sympathy and the 
sympathizer, and it constitutes historical progress though it is always faulty and 
problematic. Chillingworth, Hester, and Dimmesdale are created to show the very 
working of a cruel historical paradox, as well as the sad paradox of humanity. Capturing 
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the two paradoxes creates, as Hawthorne calls The Scarlet Letter in its first chapter, “a 
tale of human frailty and sorrow” (48). 
While Hawthorne attends to the central paradox of social reform movements, 
Melville focuses on the central paradox of national politics. What Melville captures is a 
political leviathan that would devour American democracy. The following chapter is 
about Melville’s hunt for the monster in his romance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter IV 
The Aporia of Popular Sovereignty in Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick 
 
“Nothing is more surprising to those, who consider human affairs with a 
philosophical eye, than to see the easiness with which the many are governed by 
the few; and to observe the implicit submission with which men resign their own 
sentiments and passions to those of their rulers. When we enquire by what 
means this wonder is brought about, we shall find, that as Force is always on the 
side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but 
opinion. ’Tis therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this 
maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as 
to the most free and most popular.” 
 -David Hume, Essays and Treaties on Several Subjects (1758) 
 
“… the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as 
soon as he enters the political field. … He becomes a primitive again. His 
thinking becomes associative and affective.” 
 -Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942) 
 
In October 1849, Melville sailed for London to negotiate for the publication of 
White-Jacket; or, The World in a Man-of-War (1850), after which he planned to take a 
long journey through England and the Continent for the twofold purpose of selling his 
new book in person for the best price and finding sources for future works. While 
bargaining with publishers in London, he “saunter[ed] into” the city’s historical sites, art 
galleries, and literary places, and after finally signing the contract in late November he 
took a channel steamer for Boulogne and arrived in Paris by train. In Paris, an unexpected 
spectacle awaited him: in his travelogue he described the “great numbers of troops 
marching all about” as in “a garrisoned town.”180 This unusual military display was 
staged by the current President, Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte (hereafter referred to as 
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Napoleon), who was oppressing his political dissenters and quelling their demonstrations 
by means of his armed forces.181 He was the nephew of Napoleon I and had been elected 
the first President of the French Republic by popular vote in December 1848 due to his 
famous last name. Melville, an eloquent advocate of the inviolable value of a democratic 
republic, expressed no fulmination about the reactionary potentate until scathingly 
dubbing him “Louis the Devil” in Moby-Dick; or, The Whale (1851).182 This epithet is 
found in chapter 35, in which Ishmael refers to the imposing statue of Napoleon I gazing 
down “careless[ly], now, who rules the decks below; whether Louis Philippe, Louis 
Blanc, or Louis the Devil,” only to find “the distracted decks,”183 an allusion to the 
continuing political unrest caused by the dethroned King Philippe, the reformative but 
failed socialist Blanc, and the democratically elected but tyrannical President Louis 
Napoleon. Given that Melville’s British editor changed “Louis the Devil” to “Louis 
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Napoleon” in order to tone done Melville’s harsh censure of the despotic ruler, 
contemporaries must have easily recognized the referent of the satanic sobriquet. Indeed, 
“Louis the Devil” had already proved to be the demonic anathema to liberalists, 
democrats, and republicans due to his drastic hypocritical metamorphosis from President 
to Emperor. 
Napoleon had been forced into a long exile since his famous uncle’s deposition 
in 1815. He finally returned to France as an elected member of the newly established 
Constituent Assembly in September 1848, and he was hailed as the savior of the French 
Republic by numerous people disenchanted with the continuing social conflict and 
political unrest since the February riots that had dethroned King Louis Philippe. The 
provisional government, whose key representative for common workers was the popular 
socialist Louis Blanc, had failed to relieve the continuing unemployment crisis, which led 
to a series of violent civil uprisings in June 1848. Meanwhile Napoleon, though 
campaigning from in London, had electrified a majority of voters by representing his 
celebrated last name as the “hope of social consolidation” for a “great-hearted people,” as 
well as “the symbol of order, of glory, of patriotism.”184 In November 1848, the new 
Constitution established a single four-year-term presidency by universal male suffrage, 
the first institutionalization of a national referendum in the Western world. Napoleon won 
the presidential election in a landslide victory in December.185 But the Second Republic, 
under his command continued to remain “the distracted decks,” for the self-proclaimed 
“People’s President” soon took an overtly dictatorial course in the name of the will of the 
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nation, which his opponents vehemently resisted with demonstrations in the street. By 
July 1851, when Melville completed the draft of Moby-Dick, few contemporaries doubted 
Napoleon’s imperialist aspirations, and on July 1 he asked the Parliament to revise the 
Constitution for an imperial restoration so that an empire would be established by “the 
will of the people, freely expressed and devoutly accepted.”186 The Parliament rejected 
his request and in December 1851 he responded by staging a coup to declare his 
presidency for life; exactly one year later he finally became Emperor Napoleon III. 
Ironically, the two incidents were legitimately approved afterwards by the overwhelming 
majority of popular votes in the fairly conducted plebiscites. 
“[T]he histories of the French and American republics for these four years,” 
lamented George Sanders in the lead article in the January 1852 issue of the Democratic 
Review, “have been identical.” The year 1848 was, he reminded readers, the inception of 
“four years of anti-democratic rule,” when “The French republic [was] deceived” by “an 
outlaw” and “[t]he American people [were] similarly duped into the worship of a name 
merely victorious on the battle field.” Accordingly, Americans “yielded, 
contemporaneously with the French people, the power of the American Republic, and the 
control and use of its government, into the hands of a party-colored faction” against “the 
popular will.”187 Sanders unmistakably implied that the two identical political imposters 
were President Napoleon and his American counterpart, President Zachary Taylor. Such 
a pair was not preposterous at all to Sanders’ contemporaries: both were elected in 
1848—Taylor in November and Napoleon in December; both played no part in politics 
before 1848 and owed their victory to their unmatched popularity—“Napoleon” was the 
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most nostalgia-inducing last name in France and Taylor was the most famous military 
hero from the Mexican-American War; and though both uniformly resorted to the power 
of popular sovereignty, their political leadership failed to satisfy popular expectations—
Napoleon became a tyrannical emperor and Taylor failed to assuage the escalating crisis 
over slavery. In light of these negative consequences, Sanders claimed that Napoleon and 
Taylor had “deceived” and “duped” their innocent, gullible people. However, it was the 
people themselves who worshipped the two political neophytes and enthusiastically voted 
them into office. More precisely, it was the institutionalization of the essential democratic 
principle of popular sovereignty through the establishment of universal suffrage and the 
referendum process that made it possible for the people of the two nations to excitedly 
channel their political hopes, aspirations, and desires into the most popular candidate, 
only to find that their choice proved to be against “the popular will.”  
Such a profound paradox confounded and contested what the Declaration of 
Independence had proclaimed as the founding doctrine of the American Republic—a 
government “instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed.” Melville was one of the witnesses to the emergence of this paradox of popular 
sovereignty; before his trip to Europe in late 1849 he had seen how the popularity of the 
political novice Taylor allowed him to defeat the experienced statesman Lewis Cass in 
the 1848 presidential election, and during his stay in France he observed the rise of the 
democratically elected yet increasingly dictatorial Napoleon. Melville composed Moby-
Dick from early 1850 through July 1851, a period of mounting political tensions in both 
the U.S. and France caused by Taylor’s sudden death in July 1850 and Napoleon’s overt 
democratic despotism. I argue in this chapter that the two presidents, both beneficiaries of 
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the institution of popular sovereignty which at the time existed only in the U.S. and 
France, exposed a paradox that permeated Melville’s political imagination as he worked 
on Moby-Dick. Note that in the opening chapter of Moby-Dick Ishmael claims that “the 
grand programme of Providence” set his whaling voyage after the “Grand Contested 
Election for the Presidency of the United States” (7).188 Furthermore, the chapter that 
contains the allusion to “Louis the Devil” is followed by the romance’s celebrated 
quarter-deck scene that dramatizes how the “magnetic” “ascendency” (211) of Captain 
Ahab, who acknowledges himself to be “demonic” (168), results from the convened 
crew’s voluntary consent to join his monomaniacal chase after Moby Dick against their 
best economic interests. Central to this consensus is the paradox that the decision enacted 
by the popular vote is democratic but not legitimate because the transformation of the 
Pequod from a commercial whaler to a vessel motivated by vengeance is a serious breach 
of contract with the ship’s owners. 
In what follows, I examine how, in Moby-Dick, Melville offers a critical anatomy 
of the paradox of popular sovereignty in order to indicate its centrality to the American 
and French presidential elections of 1848 and their political ramifications. As Ishmael 
offers a series of chapters that analyze different parts of the leviathan’s anatomy, I argue 
that Melville anatomizes the bodies of the political leviathan in order to unveil the 
inherent, constitutive constrictions central to the working of popular sovereignty. I first 
discuss two emblematic events—the Taylor Boom and the Napoleonic Cult in 1848—in 
more detail to explore how the American and French people respectively “deceived” and 
“duped” themselves, to borrow Sanders’s terms, by means of the very democratic 
                                                          
188 In chapter 32 of Moby-Dick, Ishmael indicates that the present year is 1850. Thus, the most recent 
president election was the 1848 one. 
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political system they took pride in. I then turn to the quarter-deck scene in Moby-Dick. 
My rereading of the scene challenges the dominant Manichean interpretation of Ahab as 
a totalitarian leader with the crew as his helpless victim. Through a close reading of the 
way that even Ishmael and Starbuck, who critics have construed as the dogged dissenters 
against Ahab the dictator, feel with and for the captain and ultimately give their consent 
to his request, I claim that the quarter-deck scene captures the paradox that the possibility 
of despotism is always already implicated in the institution that makes possible the 
instantiation of democracy. 
 
The Taylor Boom and the Napoleonic Cult in 1848 and their aftermath 
In the summer of 1847, Evert Duyckinck asked Melville to write a story for 
Yankee Doodle, a humorous weekly popularly called “the American Punch” that was 
edited by his friend, Cornelius Mathews Taylor. Melville wrote a collection of short 
satirical sketches called “Authentic Anecdotes of ‘Old Zack.’” They recount General 
Taylor’s vulgar attitudes and uncivilized habits, such as slapping his buttocks to 
emphasize a point during conversation and wearing down “the seat in his ample pants” 
until they become almost threadbare.189 The pieces squib the Mexican-American War 
hero whose spectacular victory at the Buena Vista battle in February 1847 suddenly 
dominated popular attention and launched the Taylor boom for the coming presidential 
election. Taylor’s lack of qualifications for the presidency were skewered and spurned in 
Melville’s explicitly political sketches. In fact, the homespun General deserved this 
                                                          
189 Herman Melville, The Piazza Tales and Other Prose Pieces 1839-1860, vol. 9 of The Writings of 
Herman Melville, ed. Harrison Hayford, Alma A. MacDougall, and G.Thomas Tanselle (Evanston and 
Chicago: Northwestern University and the Newberry Library, 1987), 155. For a study of Melville’s attempt 
to write a political satire, see Luther S. Mansfield, “Melville’s Comic Articles on Zachary Taylor,” 
American Literature 9, no. 4 (1938): 411-418. 
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public suspicion and derision. Except for his military feat, he was unfit for presidency in 
many respects: he had shown neither physical appeal nor experienced statesmanship,190 
nor did he, aspire to run for presidency—he was content to remain in the military until 
the Whigs began to desperately draw him into their political ring because they thought 
Taylor would help them end the reign of the Democratic Party.  
Only because of the war hero’s national popularity for his military leadership, the 
Whigs chose Taylor to beat Lewis Cass of the Democratic Party, who had long-term 
political careers: Cass had served as governor of Michigan (1813-1831), Secretary of 
War (1831-1836), the American ambassador to France (1836-1842), and a U.S. senator 
from Michigan since 1845. Yet Taylor’s response to the overtures of the Whig Party was 
consistently lukewarm. Despite the Whig preference for Taylor, the general had been 
openly indifferent to their preference and seemed to be discomfited by being suggested as 
the Whig candidate. Like former soldier-turned-presidents such as Andrew Jackson and 
William Henry Harrison, Taylor garnered popular support by building on his national 
fame as a war hero. But unlike his two predecessors, who publicized their party identity 
and remained loyal to party principles, Taylor tenaciously and openly referred to his 
desire to be drafted “by the spontaneous will of a majority of the people, & not by any 
party,”191 and his hope for a nomination by a nonpartisan popular convention “to be the 
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president of the people if at all, & not of a party.”192 Though finally nominated as a Whig 
candidate in June 1848, he refused to espouse the Whig positions and policies.193 Nor did 
he even canvass the country during the campaign; he rarely left his home in Louisiana 
and confined his brief travels to neighboring states, making no public appearances or 
speeches. His stubborn insistence on and public manifestation of the principle of popular 
sovereignty continued persistently throughout his campaign; he kept reaffirming his 
political neutrality, making no concrete legislative proposals or political comments 
related to the Whig Party. Instead of party affiliation, he silently relied on the political 
authority of the people’s choice. He firmly believed that his presidency would be won or 
lost at the mercy of the people’s will and choice.  
Published as Taylor was unexpectedly emerging as the most popular Whig choice, 
Melville’s “Authentic Anecdotes of ‘Old Zack’” lampooned the new political star. 
However, the stubborn, boorish General still received both electoral and popular 
majorities in the presidential election. His victory would have been impossible without 
the popular support of voters of different and divergent political affiliations and interests 
who expected his strong military leadership to resolve the intricate questions of slavery 
and sectional tensions. Ironically, his multifarious, somewhat contradictory political 
                                                          
192 Zachary Taylor to Robert Wood, 30 May 1847, Ibid., 103. In his letter written on 23 June 1847, Taylor 
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193 Whereas the Whigs condemned President James K. Polk’s war politics, Taylor never blamed Polk or the 
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Jefferson’s ideals he admired than the Democrat’s. His son-in-law Jefferson Davis confirmed it by saying 
that Taylor was neither a Whig nor a Democrat. See K. Jack Bauer, Zachary Taylor: Soldier, Planter, 
Statesman of the Old Southwest (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), 225. 
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identities—a Southern slave owner but not a hard-liner on the slavery question, a solid 
Jeffersonian, a lukewarm Whig, and an advocate of bipartisanship—convinced a wide 
spectrum of voters of his political neutrality and reliability as well as his strong 
leadership for the nation; Northern abolitionists expected him to deal with the slavery 
issue impartially and independently from the Whigs, while pro-slavery southerners 
preferred that a Louisiana-based planter and slaveholder would represent their 
concerns.194 Moreover, his military fame overshadowed his lack of political career and 
directly appealed to general voters as a guarantee that his strong leadership could rescue 
the nation from internal strife.  
 After the election, Taylor simply attributed his victory to “a majority of the free & 
independent voters of the country.” The victory’s “maxim” was, he stressed, “that the 
sovereign people when left to themselves rarely err” and “they are capable of judging for 
themselves & showing their servants who they placed in high places that they are capable 
of judging for themselves & deciding who shall rule over them.”195 Though he 
understood that his victory was also won by his majority of electoral votes, it was the 
popular enthusiasm and support for him expressed during a series of political rallies and 
conventions that earned him the candidacy. At the heart of his presidency, as Taylor 
firmly believed, was the power of popular sovereignty. However, it is difficult to discern 
whether his obstinate advocacy of popular choice was, as Sanders claimed in his criticism 
of Taylor, intended to deceive his people. 
                                                          
194 Unlike Zachary Taylor, Lewis Cass and Van Buren were not slaveholders; they actually were 
abolitionists. 
 
195 Zachary Taylor to Robert Wood, 10 December 1848, Letters of Zachary Taylor From the Battlefields of 
the Mexican War, ed. William H. Samson (Rochester: Genessee Press, 1908), 167. 
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A month after Taylor’s triumph, Louis Napoleon won France’s first presidential 
election by a landslide, polling 5,434,226 votes against his rival Louis-Eugène 
Cavaignac’s 1,448,107 votes. Surprisingly, Alphonse de Lamartine, a moderate 
republican and a handsome, charming, intellectual, and capable statesman, garnered only 
17,910 votes.196 Napoleon’s astonishing victory was wholly ascribable to his shrewd 
strategy of hiding his true political identity from the general voters. In order to appeal to 
millions of first-time voters after universal male suffrage was established, his presidential 
campaign centered on the restoration of the order and glory of the obsolete Bonaparte 
Dynasty, though he still openly confirmed his allegiance to the Republic. Like Taylor, he 
had neither eloquence nor personal appeal; he even had a German accent acquired during 
his long exile. Yet he tried to convince all the upper, middle, and lower classes that he 
stood, not only for law and order, but for the army and the workers. Thus, his campaign 
promises included: freedom of occupation and education, protection of property, 
reduction of taxation, provision of employment, care for the elderly, improvement of 
industrial conditions, free enterprise, liberty of the press, the interests of army, and a 
general amnesty for political offenders. He also publicly pledged that he would leave the 
presidency to his successor at the end of his four-year term after seeing “the executive 
strengthened, liberty intact, and progress accomplished.” Along with these rosy promises, 
his name emotionally captivated the majority of voters from all over the country.197 As 
historian Mike Rapport has pointed out, he “offered many contradictory things to a wide 
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197 Tompson, Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire, 95-96. Also see S. C. Burchell, Upstart Empire: 
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variety of people” including peasants, the working class, radicals, moderates, republicans, 
conservatives, and monarchists, all of whom voted for him because they wanted the great 
Napoleon to represent their respective interests and concerns.198 
Both of the 1848 presidential elections were characterized by the increased 
importance of the popular vote. Both the Taylor boom and the Napoleonic cult 
demonstrated the growing power of the voting public’s tastes and desires. Taylor and 
Napoleon were both very sensitive about the public preference for their campaign. They 
were sharply cognizant of the fact that the popular response to the presidential candidate 
would play a decisive role in the national election. Indeed, Taylor’s inaugural address 
reaffirmed the victory of popular power by beginning with a humble introduction of 
himself as “Elected by the American people to the highest office known to our laws.”199 
Likewise, in his inauguration ceremony after giving his oath to “the French people” and 
“the democratic Republic,” Napoleon emphasized that “[m]y future conduct is 
determined by the national vote and the oath that I have just taken.”200 The two presidents 
were the beneficiaries of the power of popular sovereignty as expressed through 
participatory political activities, especially universal suffrage, which was only 
institutionalized in the U.S. and France in 1848. They also betrayed, whether 
intentionally or not, the people’s expectations that their leadership would lead their 
nations in a harmonious direction. 
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“I am prepared to be baptized with the waters of universal suffrage, but I do not 
intend to live with my feet in a puddle,” President Napoleon allegedly said. Indeed, he 
aspired to become emperor like his uncle and was not faithful to the idea of national 
politics ruled by the popular will. Though he swore in his oath of office to “remain 
faithful to the one and indivisible democratic Republic” and read a short speech declaring 
his faith in the Republic and his desire to “strengthen democratic institution,”201 for him, 
receiving the baptism of universal suffrage was simply a necessary step towards his 
coronation. Since the Constitution of 1848 only allowed a one-term presidency, he 
proposed a constitutional amendment that would make it possible for him to succeed 
himself, arguing that four years were not enough to fulfill his political and economic 
programs. His regime became increasingly authoritarian and oppressive. Finally he 
transformed the Second Republic into the Second Empire through his coup in December 
1851 and his ascendency to the imperial throne in December 1852. Karl Marx was one of 
witnesses to Napoleon’s rise to dictatorship. In “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte” (1852), he wrote that “[t]he period 1848 to 1851 saw … the adventurer, who 
covers his low and repulsive visage with the iron death mask of Napoleon.” In his astute 
analysis, “[a] whole people, believing itself to have acquired a powerful revolutionary 
thrust, is suddenly forced back into a defunct era” and this historical setback, which 
paradoxically came after a series of civil revolutions, was ascribed to “[u]niversal 
manhood suffrage,” which had been “building” and “demolishing” all the achievement of 
the French democracy such as “[t]he constitution, the national assembly, … the blue 
[right-wing] and the red [left-wing] republicans, … the sheet-lighting of the daily press, 
all the literature, political names and intellectual reputations, the civil law and the penal 
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code, liberty, equality and fraternity”; these had been “magically vanished under the spell 
of a man whom even his enemies would deny was a sorcerer.”202 
After the 1848 election in the U.S. came the increasing crisis of the debate over 
slavery and threats of secession. In office, President Taylor angered many Southerners 
who had voted for him by taking a moderate stance on the question of slavery. Though 
many expected that Taylor would be bipartisan, over the course of his administration a 
rift developed between Taylor’s firm belief in the decisions of “the sovereign people” and 
his deep distrust of a newly proposed, controversial political formula that was ironically 
also based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty. The notion of popular sovereignty 
gained new currency as a solution to the simmering disputes about the extension of 
slavery into the new territories acquired through the Mexican-American War.203 As 
Congressional attempts to resolve the issue led to gridlock, during his presidential 
campaign in 1847, Lewis Cass proposed that the residents of a new state should 
electorally determine the form—slave or free—of their local government instead of 
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letting Congress decide.204 The idea was closely tied to the principle of popular 
sovereignty as well as the democratic principle of majority rule. Thus, Cass employed the 
term “popular sovereignty” in naming his new legislative principle. The bill was aptly 
named; obviously, it applied the principle of popular sovereignty to determine the 
constitution of local government. The founding principle of popular sovereignty was, on 
a local level, related to the question of how to organize and legitimize a local government. 
Stephen A. Douglas, the chairman of the Committee on Territories in both the House and 
Senate, strongly promoted Cass’ proposal as the only practical solution to resolve the 
contentious debate over slavery in the territories and to prevent the threat of further 
sectional conflict.205 However, Cass’ proposal would call into question the fundamental 
nature and elements of independent self-government; it was also constitutionally 
problematic since the Constitution was unclear about the relationship between the federal 
and local governments.206  
President Taylor, an ardent advocate of the principle of popular sovereignty in 
terms of universal suffrage in a national election, adamantly rejected Cass’ doctrine of 
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“the popular sovereignty” for fear that the authorization of self-government would lead to 
increasing sectionalism. Indeed, the principle of popular sovereignty, which placed 
ultimate authority in the people, haunted lawmakers with questions of how to put the 
doctrine into practice—how could a collective sovereign be defined and decided? In what 
ways would “the people” exercise sovereignty in their territory? How would they 
constitute their self-government? These questions betrayed a potentially dangerous 
ambiguity in the practice of popular sovereignty free from the interference of the federal 
government or the courts. Moreover, the key principle of popular sovereignty—leaving 
decisions about local government up to the electoral decision of the locality’s people—
could bring about secessionist ideas of independent self-government. The underlying 
paradox was that what worked for a local government might not be conducive to national 
unity. Cass and Douglas remained silent on the specific procedures of this proposition. 
Noting this contradiction inherent in the logic of popular sovereignty, Jefferson Davis in 
A short History of the Confederate States of America (1890) derided it by 
contemptuously calling it “squatter sovereignty.” According to him, “[l]ogically carried 
out, the theory of “squatter” or “popular sovereignty” bestowed on territorial legislatures, 
the creatures of Congress, a power not vested in Congress itself, or in any legislature in 
the fully organized and sovereign States, as their authority is limited both by the State and 
the Federal Constitutions.”207 
Taylor’s sudden death in July 1850 finally ended this controversy and made 
possible the passing of the Compromise of 1850 in September. However, as Taylor and 
many others worried, the Compromise’s reliance on popular sovereignty would tear the 
                                                          
207 Jefferson Davis, A Short History of the Confederate States of America (New York: Belford Company, 
Publishers, 1890), 32. 
 170 
 
Union apart in a few years. The Compromise of 1850 called to attention to the dilemmas 
of individual and public sovereignty as well as the possibility of self-government and its 
independent sovereigns. Melville dramatizes all these intermingled political questions 
about popular consent and sovereignty in the quarter-deck scene in Moby-Dick to 
investigate their profound paradoxes. Before the scene, he first writes about what is 
paradoxically central to democracy; the irresistible yet violent puissance of democracy as 
“the Spirit of Equality,” who “select[s] champions from the kingly commons.” 
 
“Thy selectest champions from the kingly commons” 
No passage in Moby-Dick eulogizes the democratic equality of all people and the 
dignity of the common people as ardently as the one in chapter 26. The passage is the 
narrator’s ode to democratic equality that praises the ordinary people who embody “that 
democratic dignitary which, on all hands, radiates without end from God; Himself!” (117) 
Evoking Tocqueville’s famous praise of “[t]he gradual development of the equality of 
conditions” as “a providential fact … possess[ing] all the characteristics of a divine 
decree” which is “universal” and “durable,”208 the paean to the deified “The great God 
absolute! The centre and circumference of all democracy! His omnipresence, our divine 
equality!” extols the very essence of equal democracy. Critics have read the passage as 
evidence of Melville’s advocacy of American democracy in terms of universal equality. 
Myra Jehlen, for instance, contends that Melville views “class” as “what defines those 
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who do not define themselves” and “[d]emocracy, in the passage about the Spirit of 
Equality, means being able to escape class.”209 
However, the passage conveys a subtly yet significantly different overtone, as it 
personifies the “Spirit of Equality,” who “hast spread one royal mantle of humanity over 
all my kind!” The “great democratic God!” the narrator goes on to state, “didst not refuse 
to the swart convict, Bunyan, the pale, poetic pearl; Though who didst clothe with doubly 
hammered leaves of finest gold, the stumped and paupered arm of old Cervantes; Thou 
who didst pick up Andrew Jackson from the pebbles; who didst hurl him upon a war-
horse; who didst thunder him higher than a throne!” Here, Melville suggests the historical 
movement of the impact of democracy from the past cases of European authors to the 
uniquely American example of Andrew Jackson, implying that the locus of democratic 
power is not confined to literature in American politics as it is in European monarchies. 
More significantly, Melville’s vivid depiction of the ascendency of Andrew Jackson from 
his low birth to the presidency by means of his military renown employs quite violent 
verbs as in “didst pick up Andrew Jackson from the peebles,” “didst hurl him upon a war-
horse,” and “didst thunder him higher than a throne!” Here, Andrew Jackson is hardly a 
self-willed subject in his rise to the presidency; rather, he is the mere agent of the 
almighty democratic force. Given that the “great democratic God” “in all [his] mighty, 
earthly marchings” “select[s] champions from the kingly commons,” the sentence 
indicates how the popular vote picks and lifts up its favored candidate. The passage thus 
describes the basic doctrine of democratic sovereignty—that, based on the principle of 
equality, all individuals can select their political leader by casting a vote. This 
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interpretation can be verified by Melville’s emphasis on the “democratic dignity” resting 
“on all hands” (117), an allusion to the principle of universal suffrage that is central to the 
ideal of popular sovereignty. 
In this passage on democratic equality, Melville suggests that the new power of 
popular sovereignty is embodied in the institution of universal suffrage and the general 
election, which establish the fundamental democratic doctrine that every individual voter 
is equally important and significant in the electoral constitution and each supports the 
political power of a democracy by his voting. Melville’s personification of the “Spirit of 
Equality” implies that each vote is of equal value and thus this spirit can be also called 
the “great democratic God” operating “in all [his] mighty, earthly marchings” in order to 
“select champions from the kingly commons.” After all, the “democratic dignity” resting 
“on all hands” precisely signifies the democratic principle of popular sovereignty 
expressed by universal suffrage and the general election, the doctrine that posits that the 
ultimate sovereign power is vested in the people—their voting in particular, the 
legitimacy of political authority comes from their collective democratic will, and they 
should choose the form and function of their government. The most radical substantiation 
of this doctrine on a national level emerged through the American Revolution and the 
U.S. Constitution, what historian Sean Wilentz calls “the great principle undergirding 
American government.”210 As the founding principle of national government, the doctrine 
of popular sovereignty was premised on, as Donald S. Lutz suggests, “the existence of 
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some form of popular consent.”211 Melville’s description of democratic equality 
allegorizes the very substantial form of popular consent—how the deified might of 
popular sovereignty “select[s] champions from the kingly commons” (117). This allegory 
applied to Zachary Taylor who was selected by the popular will to rise from general to 
president. In fact, Taylor did not even believe that he, a resident of a slave state and a 
slaveholder, would become President. In early 1847, he regarded his candidacy as “too 
visionary to require a serious answer,” confessing that “[s]uch an idea never entered my 
head, nor is it likely to enter the head of any sane person.” In July 1847 he reiterated his 
disinterest in the presidential nomination, assuring Jefferson Davis, “[I] can truly say that 
I feel more interest in the recovery of your wound, & in the termination of this war … 
than I do of being president of the U. States.”212 Despite his reserved attitude and 
prolonged indecision, his popularity as a war hero elevated him to the office eventually. 
In short, it was the God of popular sovereignty that “did pick up” Zachary Taylor “from 
the peebles,” “didst hurl him upon a war-horse,” and finally “didst thunder him higher 
than a throne!”  
 
The Question of Popular Sovereignty in the Quarter-deck 
While the heated debates over the Compromise of 1850 were raging after the 
sudden death of President Taylor and while the French President overtly revealed his 
dictatorial designs, Melville was drastically reshaping the draft of Moby-Dick. Melville 
changed the text from Ishmael’s documentary-like whaling narrative to the story of a 
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newly created character, Ahab,213 who is idiosyncratic in every respect. He is, as Michael 
Paul Rogin has astutely pointed out, “the first and only captain with commanding 
personal authority in all Melville’s diction.”214 Due to his charismatic and domineering 
leadership, a number of critics have viewed Ahab as a representation of contemporary 
political leaders such as Daniel Webster, John Calhoun, or William Lloyd Garrison. Yet, 
as Rogin has convincingly maintained, “Ahab derived from no single one alone. Rather 
he reunited … patriarchal New England Whiggery—Webster and Shaw … [and] 
[p]olitical figures who exposed one connection between American slavery and American 
freedom. … Ahab stands as a reproach to and culmination of the all.”215 In critical 
attempts to identify the real model for Ahab among the political figures who were 
Melville’s contemporaries, no one has considered the possibility that Zachary Taylor and 
Louis Napoleon might have been the models. Their tendency to appeal to popular support 
and the popular vote and their success in winning the supreme political authority they 
desire, however, are very similar to the power dynamics of Ahab, who also garners the 
general consent of his crew in order to lead the Pequod to hunt a killer whale called 
Moby Dick for his own purpose. Chapter 36 (“The Quarter-Deck”) limns this dramatic 
and decisively important event that inaugurates a completely new plot. The chapter is 
especially famous for its shocking description of how the captain and the entire crew of 
the Pequod decide together to reject commercial whaling and undertake a revengeful 
quest for Moby Dick. During the quarter-deck scene Ahab suddenly emerges, gathers all 
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the crew members, and then renders them his followers in the new plan of pursuing Moby 
Dick.  
Ahab’s unexpected and remarkable power play, which accounts for a drastic 
change in the plot as well as the fate of the crew, has long plagued critical attempts to 
give a political reading of the captain’s leadership and the crew’s conformity. For F.O. 
Matthiessen and many other critics, the importance of the scene in political terms lies in 
the simple, obvious fact that Ahab “coerces the crew” into following his plan for revenge. 
Matthiessen’s influential reading of the text as a reflection of “Melville’s hopes for 
American democracy” claims that the author represents Ahab as “a fearful symbol of the 
self-enclosed individualism that, carried to its furthest extreme, brings disaster both upon 
itself and upon the group of which it is part” in order to highlight its opposite political 
symbols—“[t]he strong self-willed individuals” and their democratic hopefulness.216 
C.L.R James advances Matthiessen’s point by maintaining that “we can see in his full 
stature Ahab, embodiment of the totalitarian type. With his purpose clear before him, he 
is now concerned with two things only … “the management” of “things” and “men.”217 
David S. Reynolds also highlights a sharp contrast between “the Pequod’s … rebellious 
crew” and Ahab as “an oppressive master.”218 In the same vein, David Dowling has 
recently reconfirmed this interpretation by noting that “Ishmael gives his consent to 
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Ahab’s mission, but Melville is careful to portray it as being unnaturally coerced out of 
him through a kind of witchery or sorcery … Ishmael’s soul is processed by Ahab’s 
mysticism on the quarter-deck.”219  In these readings, Ahab is as a powerful 
antidemocratic leader forcing his irresistibly mysterious and coercive leadership onto two 
innocent victims—liberal Ishmael and dissenting Starbuck. 
However, what Melville actually depicts during the quarter-deck scene is how 
Ishmael and Starbuck are subject to the centripetal force of Ahab’s appeal, but only by 
their consent. Moreover, the Ahab of the quarter-deck scene is hardly tyrannical. The 
image of Ahab as dictator comes from Ishmael’s description of him as “the absolute 
dictator” (97), “supreme lord and dictator” (122), and “a Khan of the plank, and a king of 
the sea, and a great lord of Leviathans” (129). These evil images, however, stem from 
Ishmael’s own imaginings about the reclusive captain before he even appears to the crew. 
Ishmael frankly narrates that his “first vague disquietude touching the unknown captain, 
now in the seclusion of the sea, became almost a perturbation” (122). Thus, the image of 
the tyrannical Ahab is generated by Ishmael’s curious anxiety. Unlike his vague 
expectations of Ahab, the captain in the quarter-deck scene is hardly tyrannical when he  
garners his crew’s consent to obey his plan to chase after Moby Dick. 
On appearing, he first “order[s] Starbuck to send everybody aft” (160). When all 
the sailors get together, he suddenly and loudly asks a series of very simple questions 
about whaling such as “What do ye do when ye see a whale, men?” to excite some of the 
gathered sailors. Their increasingly emotional responses are spontaneously generated by 
what their feelings about Ahab’s questions; except Ishmael, they are experienced whalers. 
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Ahab knows that his simple questions regarding whaling will arouse a contagious, 
collective enthusiasm among his sailors. Thus, “observing the hearty animation into 
which his unexpected question had so magnetically thrown them,” he continues to ask the 
similarly simple yet carefully-planned questions—“And what do ye next, men?” “And 
what tune is it ye pull to, men?” Responding to those questions, “[m]ore and more 
strangely and fiercely glad and approving, grew the countenance of the old man at every 
shout; while the mariners began to gaze curiously at each other, as if marveling how it 
was that they themselves became so excited at such seemingly purposeless questions.” 
This is followed by a depiction of their being “all eagerness again, as Ahab, not half-
revolving in his pivot-hole, with one hand reaching high up a shroud, and tightly, almost 
convulsively grasping it” (161). 
Ahab then pulls out a gold Spanish doubloon, shows it to everyone, announces 
that whichever lookout finds “a white-heated whale with a wrinkled brow and a crooked 
jaw … with three holes punctured in his starboard fluke” will receive the doubloon, and 
finally nails the doubloon to the mast. Watching this unexpected action, the crew 
becomes more wildly excited: “Huzza! Huzza!” cried the seamen, as with swinging 
tarpaulins they hailed the act of nailing the gold to the mast” (162). It is notable that Ahab, 
in addition to astonishing his spectators with his well-planned rhetorical devices and 
strategies, employs an emotionally charged symbol to move them in the particular ways 
he intends. According to Emile Durkheim, “it is a well-known law that the feelings 
something awakens in us are spontaneously communicated to the symbol that represents 
it. This transfer of feelings simply occurs because the idea of the thing and the idea of its 
symbol are closely connected in our minds: as a result, the emotions provoked by one are 
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contagiously extended to the other.”220 Ahab clearly understands what Durkheim calls the 
“well-known law” of the arousal and contagion of feelings through the strong effect of 
affective symbols. Indeed, Ahab’s gold doubloon incites the crew to a display of stronger 
emotions associated with the now collectively shared idea of the ultimate goal of hunting 
down Moby Dick together. 
After all, all Ahab does is facilitate his crew members’ ebullience. After he 
succeeds in forming affective unity, Ahab asks for their consent and support by 
employing excessively emotional gestures and rhetoric: “it was Moby Dick that 
dismasted me; Moby Dick that brought me to this dead stump I stand on now. Aye, aye,” 
he shouts, “with a terrific, loud, animal sob, like that of a heart-stricken moose.” Also 
with “tossing both arms, with measureless imprecations,” he keeps loudly shouting: “Aye, 
aye! And I’ll chase him round Good Hope, and round the Horn, and round the Norway 
Maelstrom, and round perdition’s flames before I give him up. And this is what ye have 
shipped for, men! To chase that white whale on both sides of land, and over all sides of 
earth, till he spouts black blood and rolls fin out.” After that, he asks for the crew’s 
consent but without coercion: “What say ye, men, will ye splice hands on it, now? I think 
ye do look brave.” To this sudden request, his whalers immediately and enthusiastically 
respond together with ““Aye, aye!” even “running closer to the excited old man.” In a 
completely voluntary and consensual manner, they shout a rallying cry together: “A sharp 
eye for the White Whale; a sharp lance for Moby Dick!” (163). Amid the sailors fervently 
approving Ahab’s description of the vengeful pursuit as “what ye have shipped for” (163), 
only his first mate Starbuck dissents due to the new plan’s religious blasphemy and 
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commercial incongruity, but to no avail, as he too becomes one of Ahab’s followers with 
“the enchanted, tacit acquiescence.” He is finally persuaded by Ahab’s impassioned 
proclamation that like “a general hurricane” the other crew members are now “one and all 
with Ahab, in this matter of the whale” (164). 
In the same emotionally charged way, Ahab secures the consent of the crew by 
creating a ritual to bind them together. Central to the rite, as Melville narrates, is that 
Ahab “would fain have shocked into them the same fiery emotion accumulated within the 
Leyden jar of his own magnetic life.” Also notable is the way in which Ahab foregrounds 
the free will of the crew: “I do not order ye; ye will it.” Consequently, Ahab succeeds in 
forging an “indissoluble league” to serve his monomaniacal purpose. The essential 
ontological paradox of the quarter-deck drama is precisely captured by Melville, who 
comments in the scene that “with little external to constrain us, the innermost necessities 
in our being, these still drive us on” (165). Matthiessen interprets the ritual as an example 
of “Ahab’s power to coerce all the rest.” Yet clearly Ahab, in Melville’s depiction of his 
expressions and actions, employs no physically or verbally coercive force to achieve his 
purpose in the quarter-deck scene. It is the inexplicable “innermost necessities in our 
being,” Melville suggests, that “drive us on.” Starbuck’s soliloquy after the quarter-deck 
scene explains the secret of Ahab’s power that successfully generates the crew’s self-
willed servitude: “my soul is more than matched; she’s overmanned; and by a madman!” 
for Ahab has “drilled deep down, and blasted all my reason out of me!” The authority of 
Ahab’s emotional persuasion is clearly analyzed in Starbuck’s soliloquy: “I think I see 
his impious end; but feel that I must help him to it” because “Will I, nil I, the ineffable 
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thing had tied me to him” and even though he “tows me with a cable I have no knife to 
cut.” Hence, he calls Ahab “Horrible old man!” (169) [emphasis added]. 
The captain’s confession after the quarter-deck scene reveals something more 
horrible than Ahab’s irresistible power. He soliloquizes that “’T was not so hard a task, I 
thought to find one stubborn, at the least; but my one cogged circle fits into all their 
various wheels, and they revolve” (167). The truth is, he goes on to say, “like so many 
ant-hills of powder, they all stand before me; and I their match” (168). That is, as a leader 
Ahab only activates the already built-in dynamics of affective unification and communal 
fanaticism in order to obtain the crew’s emotionally charged volition and cohesion, which 
deceptively confirms the validity of the crew’s consent to their captain’s plan to find and 
kill Moby Dick. Because of this internal mechanism, no sailor except Starbuck suspects 
the malicious intention of Ahab or gets in the way of his purpose; and because of internal 
mechanism, Starbuck finally submits himself to Ahab’s request. 
This striking scene of unification is followed by a chapter that contains the 
confessions of Ahab, Starbuck, and Stubb, and a chapter that depicts the dazzling ethnic, 
regional, national, and cultural diversity of the Pequod sailors (Chapter 40 “Midnight, 
Forecastle”). In contrast to the quarter-deck scene of forming “an indissoluble league,” or 
a collective identity of the crew, “Midnight, Forecastle” brings the incommensurable 
pluralities of the heterogeneous whalers to the fore. There are, Ishmael narrates as the 
Pequod sets sail from Nantucket, “nearly all Islanders in the Pequod, Isolatoes too, … 
each Isolato living on a separate continent of his own.” Their whaling voyage, however, 
renders them “federated along one keel, what a set these Isolatoes were!” (121) This 
precarious union of heterogeneities characteristic of the true identity of the Pequod is 
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essentially different from the unity that will be rebuilt on the quarter-deck later. Whereas 
the former is created by the contract of commercial whaling that each sailor signs, the 
latter is nothing but a collectivity engineered for Ahab’s own purpose, demanding the 
sacrifice of the original contract that contains all the sailors’ economic motives and 
interests. The latter constitutes a homogenized unity that serves the purpose of finding 
and killing Moby Dick, but for no profit. This drastic change is ominously depicted in the 
description of the crew on the second day of the chase after Moby-Dick: “[t]hey were one 
man, not thirty. For as the one ship that held them all … all the individualities of the crew, 
this man’s valor, that man’s fear; guilt and guiltlessness, all varieties were welded into 
oneness, and were all directed to that fatal goal which Ahab their one lord and keel did 
point to” (557). 
This transformation of “a set” of “Isolatoes” into the “welded” “oneness” calls 
attention to the enabling conditions of such a drastic change. “I, Ishmael, was one of that 
crew,” Ishmael admits a few chapters later as he reflects on what transformed him into 
the captain’s rabid votary: “my shouts had gone up with the rest; my oath had been 
welded with theirs; and stronger I shouted, and more did I hammer and clinch my oath, 
because of the dread in my soul. A wild, mystical, sympathetical feeling was in me; 
Ahab’s quenchless feud seemed mine” (179). Aware of the overpowering empathetic 
identification that engenders his self-contradictory, voluntary, and irresistible mental 
merging with Ahab, Ishmael questions “[h]ow it was that they so aboundingly responded 
to the old man’s ire—by what evil magic their souls were possessed, that at times his hate 
seemed almost theirs; the White Whale as much their insufferable foe as his; how all this 
came to be” (187). Ishmael’s question indicates Melville’s deep concern with the 
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question of affective collectivization leading to a communal consent. Indeed, central to 
Ahab’s successful strategy is that the crew’s voluntary and consensual assent to Ahab’s 
despotic design is, as Ishmael recognizes, in effect coerced by their feeling of unity, 
which irresistibly identifies Ahab’s private enmity with theirs, thus nullifying their profit 
motives only to sanction and obey a new authority. That is, the only coercion in the 
quarter-deck scene does not come from Ahab but from the way the crew feels with and 
for their captain’s anger at Moby Dick for mutilating him with “an inscrutable malice,” 
and in the way this empathy for Ahab stirs up their animus against the demonized 
behemoth whale (164). Without such reciprocal affectivity, Ahab could not successfully 
enlist the crew’s compassionate support in transmuting the whaling voyage into a 
communal hunt for his attacker. 
From a political perspective, Ahab essentially holds a general election on the 
quarter-deck; he makes all the individuals on the Pequod participate in the decision-
making process that will decide the new course of the whaler by verbal voting. During 
the pseudo-election the captain’s fiery rhetoric sounds emotionally outrageous and 
aggressive, yet not derogatory against his crew; rather, he praises and respects the valor 
of his crew. Therefore, the sailors become excited about Ahab’s new plan to chase after 
Moby Dick. Though the plan actually comes from Ahab’s personal motive for revenge, 
his direct appeal to the crew jolts them into a collective frenzy as in election campaigns. 
The quarter-deck scene implies that each sailor is able to decide on the fate of their 
community as an independent, liberal sovereign. It also dramatizes the idea that sovereign 
power is vested in the people and their elected representative, who is chosen to govern his 
voters, is a trustee of this power and must exercise his power in obedience to the general 
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will. In the American political context, the power of popular sovereignty—the 
establishment of electoral consent in the form of extended universal male franchise—
which will determine the fate of the Union is allegorized in the quarter-deck scene as the 
principle that will decide the destiny of the Pequod. The procedure Ahab follows is 
surprisingly democratic and thereby represents the paradoxical outcome of the 
democratic principle of popular sovereignty. Central to the paradox is that a leader 
selected by the electorate, like Ahab, can aspire to “higher than a throne” through popular 
consent and support. He can also justify his autocratic decision as the representative 
expression of the general will. After all, the nemesis of democracy is already inside the 
very institution of democracy. 
 
The Nemesis of Democracy within Democracy  
The quarter-deck scene complicates and challenges the Enlightenment models of 
subjectivity and sociality which undergird the formation of democratic citizens and 
democratic society. Melville especially calls into question John Locke’s formulation of 
self-sustaining reasoning agency and a contractual society of such individuals, which is 
the philosophical ground of American democracy. Locke defines the “person” as “a 
thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, 
the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that 
consciousness” and “self” as “that conscious thinking thing” which is “concerned for 
itself, as far as that consciousness extends.”221 In this regard, “When we see, hear, smell, 
taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our 
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present sensations and perceptions: and by this everyone is to himself that which he calls 
self”222 [italics in the original]. He does not, however, ignore the corporeal “substance” of 
consciousness, adding that “the body too goes to the making the man.”223 Therefore, the 
Lockean self is a self-aware and self-reflective consciousness that is reified in a corporeal 
body. That is, a self is the self-sustaining unity of soul and body. 
In Moby-Dick Melville depicts Ishmael as a typical Lockean subject. Ishmael, a 
former “schoolmaster” (6), oftentimes ruminates on the deeper, veiled meaning of his life 
before and after the Pequod. His compulsion to grapple with inscrutable mysteries is an 
arduous means of seeking a harmonious balance between his thinking self and his 
experiencing body, which prompts him to thoroughly examine the surface and the depth 
of things he observes in order to delve into what lies behind and beneath. Yet Ishmael is 
also characterized as possessing cognitive affect. For him, feeling is a way of assuring 
himself of the mode and standard of his agency. When Ishmael becomes a bosom friend 
to Queequeg, for instance, he describes how “I began to be sensible of strange feelings. I 
felt a melting in me. No more my splintered heart and maddened hand were turned 
against the wolfish world. This soothing savage had redeemed it” (51). Here Ishmael 
remarks that affect operates as a deeper channel of understanding the world, which helps 
him to naturalize his new abstract understanding and unprecedented experience. This 
intercommunicative affect is in effect a mode of sympathy. However, it operates in an 
inexplicable and impersonal way. For example, when Ishmael “felt a sympathy and a 
sorrow for him [Ahab]”, he confesses, “I don’t know what, unless it was the cruel loss of 
his leg. And yet I also felt a strange awe of him; but that sort of awe, which I cannot at all 
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describe, was not exactly awe; I do not know that it was. But I felt it; and it did not 
disincline me towards him; though I felt impatience at what seemed like mystery in him” 
(80). Melville suggests that a feeling of sympathy can work as a paradoxical—obscure 
and contingent yet self-assuring—mechanism to confirm the affective and cognitive basis 
of one’s interpersonal identification, thereby revising the Lockean model of subjectivity 
that is based on cognitive consciousness and awareness. 
In his reminiscence of the quarter-deck scene, Ishmael asks himself: “How it was 
that they so aboundingly responded to the old man’s ire—by what evil magic their souls 
were possessed, that at times his hate seemed almost theirs; the White Whale as much 
their insufferable foe as his; how all this came to be.” What befuddles him the most is the 
oxymoronic—both substantial and insubstantial—core of the shared feelings at the 
quarter-deck scene. The only possible explanation for such a mysterious affective 
solidarity is that “what the White Whale was to them, or how to their unconscious 
understandings, also, in some dim, unsuspected way, he might have seemed the gliding 
great demon of the seas of life.” He then acknowledges the impossibility of fully 
understanding the conundrum: “all this to explain, would be to dive deeper than Ishmael 
can go. The subterranean miner that works in us all, how can one tell whither leads his 
shaft by the ever shifting, muffled sound of his pick? Who does not feel the irresistible 
arm drag?” (187).  
Melville noted the significance of inexplicably paradoxical affect when he wrote 
Moby-Dick. In June 1851, working on the draft of Moby-Dick, Melville penned a letter to 
Hawthorne and inserted a postscript that “[t]his “all” feeling, though, there is some truth 
in. You must often have felt it, lying on the grass on a warm summer’s day. Your legs 
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seem to send out shoots into the earth. Your hair feels like leaves upon your head. This is 
the all feeling. But what plays the mischief with the truth is that men will insist upon the 
universal application of a temporary feeling or opinion.”224 The universalizing tendency 
of feeling, Melville indicates, enables us to believe in the reality of this experience of 
feeling. This affective substance of thinking and action is a key to the mystery of the 
quarter-deck scene and the actual political scene it represents. Melville implies that the 
secret of the crew’s voluntary submission to Ahab, as Ishmael recognizes, lies in the 
human tendency for “the universal application of a temporary feeling.” During the 
quarter-deck scene, Stubb notices that Ahab “smites his chest … [but] it rings most vast, 
but hollow,” and Stubb is right; there is no ontic substance to Ahab’s preposterous cause. 
Yet Ahab proves more correct than Stubb when he underscores that “my vengeance will 
fetch a great premium here!” in order to refute Starbuck’s criticism of the plan’s 
unprofitability (163). The “great premium” Ahab promises is, in effect, the shared 
enthusiasm, an affective mode of communal consent and unification, which substantially 
motivates every individual crew member to voluntarily and consensually follow their 
leader.  
The quarter-deck scene also contests and confounds the Lockean model of 
possessive individualism and the social contract. As Ishmael explains, “[p]eople in 
Nantucket invest their money in whaling vessels, the same way that you do yours I 
approved state stocks bringing in good interest” (73). That is, whaling is a collective 
business based on a socioeconomic contract. The Pequod’s “two principal and 
responsible owners” are Bildad and Peleg (77). By detailing the contract-making process 
in which Ishmael and Queequeg participate in Chapter 18, Melville especially 
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underscores the fact that the Pequod is a contracted commercial business involving the 
participants’ private profit motive and interest. Through his democratic coup, however, 
Ahab usurps their property rights. The changed purpose of the Pequod has nothing to do 
with bringing back whale oil; it is now solely concerned with how to wreak vengeance 
upon the great white whale. Ahab’s new authority and the crew’s voluntary subjection to 
it cancel the original and essential economic purpose of the contractual society, which 
Starbuck clearly points out when he objects to the captain.225 In order to counter 
Starbuck’s objection, Ahab utters words that strike at the very foundation of the Lockean 
possessive individualism and the principle of social contract. He shouts: ‘Nantucket 
market! Hoot! … If money’s to be the measurer, man, and the accountants have 
computed their great counting-house the globe, by firdling it with guineas, one to every 
three parts of an inch; then, let me tell thee, that my vengeance will fetch a great premium 
here!” (163) 
In this line, Ahab recklessly tramples upon the sacred Lockean principle of a 
social contract of individuals with personal property, thereby menacing the pillars of 
American democracy. According to Locke, a society is constructed by free men who own 
property and this contracted society should protect their rights. He predicates his model 
of a liberal, individual subject with free will and property rights on the model of 
autonomous self-containment and self-coherence. For Locke, the autonomous individual 
who enters into a social compact with other such individuals is the only foundation of 
legitimate political authority. The old authority established and justified by divine right, 
Scripture, and history is now to be replaced by a rational political and socioeconomic 
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contract between autonomous men. In this vein, Locke argues for the imperative to “set 
the mind right … on all occasions … to consent to nothing but what may be suitable to 
the dignity and excellency of a rational creature.”226 Ahab rejects all these principles. For 
example, one day when oil is leaking from the vessel, Ahab, only intent on his pursuit of 
Moby Dick, refuses to stop to repair the leak. Starbuck protests again, saying “[w]hat will 
the owners say, sir?” and Ahab replies: “Let the owners stand on Nantucket Beach and 
outyell the Typhoons. What cares Ahab? Owners, owners? Thou art always prating to me, 
Starbuck, about those miserly owners, as if owners were my conscience. But look ye, the 
only real owner of anything is its commander” (474).  
The quarter-deck scene also questions Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of direct 
popular sovereignty. According to Rousseau, “[s]overeignty cannot be represented for the 
same reason that it cannot be alienated; it consists essentially in the general will, and the 
will does not admit of being represented: either it is the same or it is different; there is no 
middle ground.” For Rousseau, the problem of representation can only be solved when 
“sovereignty cannot be represented.” That is, the people as a collective whole of 
individual citizens are sovereign only to the extent that they directly take part in 
articulating their general will; without such direct participation, they are not sovereign. 
As Rousseau’s famous example indicates, “[t]he English people thinks it is free; it is 
greatly mistaken, it is free only during the election of Members of Parliament; as soon as 
they are elected, it is enslaved, it is nothing. The use it makes of its freedom during the 
brief moments it has it fully warrants its losing it.” Against Rousseau’s idea that directly 
expressed sovereignty can prevent the side-effect of represented sovereignty, the quarter-
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deck scene indicates that the former, though it seems to be more thoroughly democratic, 
can also result in an undemocratic decision. What Rousseau ignores—and what Melville 
highlights—is the fact that members of a democracy can make an undemocratic decision 
that goes against their political and economic interests, an enduring dilemma of modern 
democracy. As Charles Taylor has explained, “[i]n Rousseau’s language, the primitive 
instincts of self-love (amour de soi) and sympathy (pitié) fuse together in the rational and 
virtuous human being into a love of the common good, which in the political context is 
known as the general will.”227 Melville rejects these presuppositions by dramatizing how 
Ahab’s monomaniac leadership becomes legitimized by the general will and consent of 
his crew. The paradox is highlighted when Starbuck, in his monologue after the quarter-
deck congregation, addresses Ahab’s essentially undemocratic politics: “Who’s over him, 
he cries;—aye, he would be a democrat to all above; look, how he lords it over all below!” 
(169) Melville also notes that Ahab definitely has “certain sultanism of his brain, which 
had otherwise in a good degree remained unmanifested; through those forms that same 
sultanism became incarnate in an irresistible dictatorship” (147). As Ahab soliloquizes, 
“all my means are sane, my motive and my object mad” (186). 
Like Ahab, Louis Napoleon utilized apparently sane means for his despotic 
objective. The fair plebiscites were a part and parcel of his imperial designs and 
aspirations. After he staged a coup, he asked the people to approve or disapprove it. On 
December 21, 1851, a referendum, conducted largely without coercion and in a 
democratic way, approved his illegitimate seizure of power by an astounding majority—
seven and a half million affirmative votes as against 640,000 opposed. On December 12, 
1852, he became the Emperor Napoleon III, and was subsequently approved by a fair 
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plebiscite again. Even more ironically, according to the official formula used in all 
decrees issued by Napoleon III, he was Emperor “by the grace of God and the national 
will.”228 Just like Napoleon, Ahab produces a scene of plebiscite by all crew members to 
legitimize his authority because his regime openly relies on a procedurally democratic 
franchise as the primary source of its legitimacy.  
Another similarity is the way in which Napoleon and Ahab employ the strategy 
of creating a popular spectacle. During his presidency, Napoleon particularly enjoyed the 
spectacle of cheering masses wildly yelling out “Vive Louis-Napoleon!” and “Vive le 
President!” regarding these displays as evidence of his power and authority. The 
enthusiastic crowds gave tangible substance to the abstraction of the general will of the 
nation, transforming them into a coherent political force. Both ardent Bonapartist and 
non-Bonapartist newspapers provided accounts and illustrations of the public ceremonies 
and the enthusiasm of large crowds cheering for their President.229 Likewise, Ahab stages 
a spectacular scene of popular consensus on the quarter-deck and the spectacle itself 
facilitates and strengthens the process of affective unification. When individual citizens 
of a nation-state are concatenated by a shared bond into an organic social whole, this 
national unity is, as is the striking case in the quarter-deck scene, mobilized and cemented 
by the affective solidarity among individuals impersonalized and totalized by the very 
union they take part in. The deeper paradox of this homogenizing politicization lies in the 
way in which liberal individuals will follow their leader despite the sacrifice of their 
given rights and promised benefits only because they feel a unity with him. For it is, 
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given their voluntarily reached consensus, procedurally liberal and democratic rather than 
oppressive and totalitarian. In Moby-Dick, Melville precisely captures this paradox; no 
sailor on the Pequod is forced or hoodwinked by Ahab into joining the pursuit of Moby 
Dick. The captain only activates the paradoxical dynamics of affective agency and 
solidarity.  
 The most serious problem revealed by Ahab’s paradoxical democracy is that the 
factual truth no longer matters. Melville highlights this paradox by leaving Moby Dick’s 
responsibility for Ahab’s deformity highly questionable, raising the reader’s suspicion 
thorough Starbuck’s question: “Captain Ahab, I have heard of Moby Dick—but it was 
not Moby Dick that took off thy leg?” (163) The fact that the other crew members do not 
care about the factual truth means that they are not deceived by Ahab or by their own 
false consciousness. In the first chapter of Moby-Dick, Ishmael narrates in retrospect that 
“now that I recall all the circumstances, I think I can see a little into the springs and 
motives which being cunningly presented to me under various disguises, induced me to 
set about performing the part I did, besides cajoling me into the delusion that it was a 
choice resulting from my own unbiased freewill and discriminating judgment” (7). As the 
only survivor from the Pequod, Ishmael now clearly sees the workings of the affective 
delusion that deceived him into feeling for and with Ahab, the beginning of the Pequod’s 
tragic course. During the quarter-deck scene, Ishmael, who has never served as a whaler, 
shouts and cries like his fellow whalers because he, like they, believes that his choice 
“result[s] from my own unbiased freewill and discriminating judgment.” Ahab now 
benefits from the operation of such delusion, from the very process of the paradoxical 
workings of affective politics. 
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Also problematic is the nature of Ahab’s and his crew’s communal purpose. For 
the sailors, whaling is their identity and their asset regardless of their nationality and race. 
Ahab’s appeal to their self-esteem gives rise to their enthusiasm, which immediately 
forms a collective identity. Yet it aims at no public good. The problem of the quarter-
deck convention is the fact that it is structured by individual and collective feelings of 
both the love of the hunt and hatred of Moby Dick, not for the accomplishment of the 
tangible public good. After describing the features of Moby Dick, Ahab vividly relates 
the tragic story of his mutilation: “aye, my hearties all round; it was Moby Dick that 
dismasted me; Moby Dick that brought me to this dead stump I stand on now. Any, aye,” 
he shouted with a terrific, loud, animal sob, like that of a heart-stricken moose.” And 
subsequently he stresses that “Aye, aye! it was that accursed white whale that razeed me; 
made a poor pegging lubber of me for ever and a day!” This emotionally charged appeal 
is soon coupled with collective hateful politics. Right after representing himself as a 
tragic victim of Moby Dick, Ahab demonizes the whale. Starbuck’s monologue also 
addresses the same question of Ahab’s procedurally undemocratic politics more directly: 
“Who’s over him, he cries;—aye, he would be a democrat to all above; look, how he 
lords it over all below!” (169) Designating an external malice or an enemy, something or 
somebody to abhor and annihilate together, is a very effective way of making a strong 
affective solidarity in a polity because nothing can help it more effectively than 
expressing and enacting a communal hatred together against a public foe. In short, 
affective solidarity has a double dynamic of forces—inwardly driven sympathy and 
outwardly directed antipathy, both of which encourage a society to solidify its own 
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identity and unity based only on the simple interpersonal feelings of association and 
indignation.  
Ahab’s political rhetoric, designed for communal indignation and hatred, 
undermines Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy as a constitutive dynamic of a society of 
liberal subjects. Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) posits that “a 
correspondence”—not necessarily “unisons”—exists between the emotions of the 
sufferer and the spectator through the latter’s “imaginary change of situation, upon which 
their sympathy is founded” and these imaginings are “sufficient for the harmony of 
society”; “all that is wanted or required” to construct a harmonious society of liberal 
individuals is, he adds emphatically, the “concords” of sympathy as an inter-subjective 
“fellow-feeling,” and to this aim “nature teaches the spectators to assume the 
circumstances of the person principally concerned, so she teaches this last in some 
measure to assume those of the spectators.”230 In this formulation, Smith undoubtedly 
postulates sympathy as the essential substance of good human nature and the building 
materials for constructive socialization. However, the same inherent mechanism of 
sympathy, Melville suggests, can also be employed more readily to serve an autocratic 
leader like Ahab. 
In the second volume of Democracy in American (1840), Tocqueville wrote that 
“obviously without …  common belief no society can prosper … no society does subsist; 
for without ideas held in common, there is no common action, and without common 
action, there may still be men, but there is no social body.” For the existence and 
prosperity of a society, he concluded, “it is required that all the minds of the citizens 
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should be rallied and held together by certain predominant ideas.”231 Yet he was aware of 
the possibility of the rise of demagogues to power in a democracy. Nonetheless, he 
believed “[t]he nearer the citizens are drawn to the common level of an equal and similar 
condition, the less prone does each man become to place implicit faith in a certain man or 
a certain class of men.” However, what still haunted his mind was the paradoxical power 
of “the common belief”: “[b]ut his readiness to believe the multitude increases, and 
opinion is more than ever mistress of the world. Not only is common opinion the only 
guide which private judgment retains among a democratic people, but among such a 
people it possesses a power infinitely beyon what it has elsewhere”232 (383). What 
concerned Tocqueville was the paradox that the condition that makes possible democracy 
would work as the condition that makes it impossible; the nemesis of democracy resides 
in the heart of it. It is this dilemmatic contradiction of the common belief in a democracy 
that Melville stages in the quarter-deck chapter.  
 
Moby-Dick as the Wicked Prophecy of Democracy 
In his November 1851 letter to Hawthorne, Melville candidly confessed his 
feelings about the recent publication of Moby-Dick: “I have written a wicked book, and 
feel spotless as the lamb.”233 Earlier, in June while the book was still in progress, he 
wrote Hawthorne that his book was being “boiled in hell-fire” and gave Hawthorne a 
riddle to guess: “This is the book’s motto (the secret one), —— but make out the rest 
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yourself.”234 As Melville had anticipated, the finished romance bore witnessed to the 
actual occurrence of the previously described “secret motto.” In Chapter 113 (“The 
Forge”), Ahab baptizes the special harpoon meant for Moby Dick, anointing its barb with 
the blood of his three pagan harpooners—Tashtego, Queequeg, Daggoo, and a Satanic 
incantation, “Ego non baptize te in nomine patris, sed in nomine diaboli!” (489) Adding 
“patris, sed in nomine diabolic” (“the Father, but in the name of Devil”) as the answer of 
his riddle for Hawthorne, the sensationally blasphemous line obviously mocks the 
Christian baptismal formula.235 Yet the “secret” “motto” of Moby-Dick, given Melville’s 
suggestive description of the work as “a wicked book,” indicates that its more profound 
meaning has yet to be unearthed. If the text of Moby-Dick is “wicked,” then the 
embodiment of its “wicked” theme is arguably the character of Ahab, who acknowledges 
himself to be “more a demon than a man” (544) in his diabolic transformation of the fate 
of the Pequod crew in the quarter-deck scene. The wicked Ahab reveals the wicked truth 
of popular sovereignty, the essential element of public consent that has self-
contradictory—both democratic and antidemocratic—ramifications in the years after the 
1848 presidential elections in the U.S. and France.   
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An even more wicked truth is that Ahab himself is a desubjectivized agent who 
gradually loses his self-sustaining selfhood. The nemesis of Ahab’s democracy is most 
vividly revealed in his pained soliloquy after the quarter-deck chapter: “Gifted with the 
high perception, I lack the low, enjoying power; damned, most subtly and most 
malignantly! damned in the midst of Paradise!” (167) Notably, a later scene also 
delineates that Ahab suffers from his absent selfhood: “when what seemed Ahab rushed 
from his room, was for the time but a vacated thing, a formless somnamsulistic being, a 
ray of living light, to be sure, but without an object to color, and therefore a blankness in 
itself” (202). Toward the end of the text, Ahab finally confesses his desubjectivized 
agency by telling that “I act under orders” (561) and his actions are “mechanical” (562). 
More explicitly, in a later scene he questions what constitutes and sustains his own 
identity: “What is it, what nameless, inscrutable, unearthly thing is it; what cozening, 
hidden lord and master, and cruel, remorseless emperor commands me; that against all 
natural lovings and longings, I so keep pushing, ready to do what in my own proper, 
natural heart, I durst not so much as dare? Is Ahab, Ahab? Is it I, God, or who, that lifts 
this arm?” (545) This radical loss of the substantial entity of his sovereign individuality 
highlights the profound paradox of Ahab’s democracy—if a leader is devoid of his own 
subjectivity, what can one make of the popular support of and submission to his 
leadership? 
Recent readings of Melville’s politics have attended to his problems with the 
predominance of liberal individualism as a menace to proper democracy236or considered 
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the author’s growing anxiety over aberrations of democracy, such as mob riots.237 In all 
these readings, critics have always enshrined Melville in the pantheon of the most 
genuine champions of American democracy, those who believe in the value and dignity 
of democracy as an ideal polity and thus criticize the derailed democracy. However, the 
quarter-deck scene is layered with multiple political references and allusions that evade a 
simple interpretive dichotomy of democracy and its menaces. What the famous scene 
ultimately divulges is an egregious paradox: that the conditions of democracy preclude 
democracy per se.  
Democracy, in Claude Lefort’s view, requires “an institutionalization of conflict” 
since “[t]he locus of power [in a democracy] is an empty place, it cannot be occupied—it 
is such that no individual and no group can be consubstantial with it—and it is cannot be 
represented.”238 Lefort disregards the possibility that Melville presents in the quarter-
deck scene, in which the locus of power in a democracy is occupied by Ahab’s affective 
politics and the center is effectively represented by the consensus to pursue Moby Dick. 
For David Held, “[d]emocracy is not a panacea for all human problems, but it offers the 
most compelling principle of legitimacy – ‘the consent of the people’ – as the basis of 
political order.”239 What Melville indicates in the quarter-deck scene is the danger of the 
consent of the people. The presidential elections of 1848 in America and France 
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demonstrated how popular sovereignty could occupy the empty locus of national politics 
in the name of the consent of the people, only to be misused by the president who was 
elected by the popular vote. In that sense, the institution of democracy can always be 
baptized in the name of devil, for example, the devil-like Louis Napoleon. Melville’s 
Moby-Dick brings the deep paradox of modern democracy emerging in the U.S. and 
France to light by representing the tragic end of the captain and crew of the Pequod. 
Melville clearly understands that the paradox contradicted the ideals of liberal democracy 
as embodied by popular sovereignty.  
The true wickedness of Moby-Dick is thus ascribable to Melville’s politico-
ontological analysis of the profound aporia of popular sovereignty. In the quarter-deck 
chapter Melville prophesies the tragic, inevitable dialectic of democracy with this 
ominous metaphor: “the bloodshot eyes of the prairie wolves meet the eye of their leader, 
ere he rushes on at their head in the trail of the bison … only to fall into the hidden snare 
of the Indian” (165). At the end of the romance, only Ishmael “survive[s] the wreck.” 
Ishmael was “drawn towards the closing vortex” but could escape from it by grapping 
“the coffin life-buoy” [italics in the original]. He is also the only survivor from the 
irresistible vortex and the irrevocable wreck of Ahab’s consensual democracy. The truth 
Ishmael can tell after his survival is the very vortex and wreck of democracy. He is about 
begin to tell the truth by saying, “I only am escaped alone to tell thee” (573). 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The Romance of A New Hauntology of Democracy 
 
The instantiation of modern democracy has been haunted by questions regarding 
its substance. Since Rousseau and Locke revived the long-forgotten ancient Athenian 
principle of rule by the people to provide a conceptual fulcrum for a new political system 
and social order, the perceived substances of subjectivity and sociality germane to the 
democratic principles of universal liberty, equality, and popular sovereignty have been 
questioned due to the unbridgeable gulf between democracy as a concept and democracy 
as a reality. Thus, the history of modern democracy, first theorized as a set of abstract 
political doctrines and then enacted as a distinct form of political rule on a national scale, 
has registered how an individual and collective life is always incompletely defined and 
mobilized by its ontologically dilemmatic conditions. No historical case demonstrated the 
paradoxical emergence of the politico-ontological question of modern democracy more 
vividly than American democracy during the antebellum period. Brown, Poe, Hawthorne, 
and Melville, I have suggested, capture the profound paradox underlying the dynamic 
operation of modern democracy by focusing on how its spectral substances such as 
autonomous agency, solidifying affect, and consensual power are contrived and 
compromised so that Americans can sustain their sense of a seamless and holistic 
democracy as manifested and insisted upon in the grounding principles of the Declaration 
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of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. These spectral substances, as the authors 
dramatize in their romances, are paradoxically necessary conditions—though always 
evasive and elliptical—for upholding the ideologized idea of an American identity and 
reality. 
What the four writers observed in each important period of the history of 
American democracy—Brown in the process of nation building, Poe in the rise of 
Jacksonian era, Hawthorne at the height of social reform movements, and Melville in the 
Secession crisis leading to the Civil War—was the American instantiation of ambivalent 
Western modernity, a modernity that was, as Bruno Latour defines it, “much more than 
an illusion and much less than an essence.”240 American democracy has remained “much 
more than an illusion,” given its contribution to the actual historical progress that has 
brought about political, socioeconomic, and cultural democratizations. It also has been 
“much less than an essence,” given its perennially delayed fulfillment of what its 
doctrines prescribe and promise. David Held in his thorough study of the models of 
democracy has concluded that “[d]emocracy, as an idea and as a political reality, is 
fundamentally contested,” and his comment actually encapsulates the internal dynamics 
of American democracy rather than forces that assail it from without. At the heart of this 
essential contest between ideal democracy and real democracy, explains Held, lies the 
interlocking questions of “the proper meaning of ‘political participation’, the connotation 
of ‘representation’, the scope of citizens’ capacities to choose freely among political 
alternatives, and the nature of membership in a democratic community.”241 All these local 
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issues are the best representations of what American democracy has struggled with and 
strived for. They are, at the most fundamental levels, reduced to the common conundrum 
of the oxymoronic modalities of political agent, action, faculty, identity, and affiliation, 
and these modalities operate in ways that reveal more about them as conceptual notions 
than ontic entities.  
Throughout the antebellum period, American democracy evinced this inherently 
in-between nature and function of modern democracy, especially because of the intricate 
questions of race, class, and gender inequalities prevalent in antebellum society. These 
issues were arguably the nemesis of modern democracy, which thwarted the ideal of 
democratic citizens and their democratic society. The discriminations, disparities, and 
oppressions in the realms of race, class, and gender have always served as a barometer 
that indicates how the promise of democracy has failed to be fulfilled. The enduring 
dilemmas of modern democracy have provoked leading political thinkers to reformulate 
the substance of democracy in terms of spectrality.  
For instance, Jacques Derrida stresses the profound ontological aporia that “the 
specter is a paradoxical incorporation, the becoming-body, a certain phenomenal and 
carnal form of the name: neither soul nor body, and both one and the other,”242 and 
deploys the concept of spectrality in order to confront and compound the premises of 
traditional ontology. According to him, the idea that a ghost is “someone other that we 
will not hasten to determine as self, subject, person, consciousness, spirit, and so forth”243 
negates the dichotomous divide between being and nonbeing, the present and the absent, 
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and the identical and the non-identical. This new problematic leads him to outline a 
newly subversive mode of ontology, what he terms “hauntology.” In Specters of Marx 
(1993), he describes the twofold aim of hauntology: 1) it deals with the in-between and 
porous modalities of being veiled and repressed by the predominant logic of ontological 
binarism predicated on and reducible to the premises of ontic identity, certainty, and 
plenitude. Derrida ascribes this function of hauntology to the ghost’s “effectivity.”244 2) it 
also sheds new light on the messianic—returning and redemptive—“potentiality” 
inherent in a disregarded, abandoned, and forgotten entity. The latter, now “dead” in 
Derrida’s expression, will come back to life one day because of its potential to survive 
the current time that is “out of joint.”245 In either case, Derrida’s hauntology proposes that 
the substance of the spectral is not unreal; it is always operative in the mode of its own 
effectivity and potentiality. 
In fact, Specters of Marx engages in the debate over the demise of communism in 
order to resuscitate the lost communist cause in the era of the apparent victory of liberal 
democracy. His hauntological call for spectrality serves the particular political purpose of 
his book. Derrida makes a Jeremian prophecy that “communism has always been and will 
remain spectral: it is always still to come and is distinguished, like democracy itself, from 
every living present understood as plenitude of a presence-to-itself, as totality of a 
presence effectively identical to itself.” Because “a ghost never dies, [and] it remains 
always to come and to come-back,” the proper values and ideals of communism will 
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outlive the current misunderstandings and blindness to it.246 What is notable here is his 
reference to “democracy itself,” which aligns the two opposing ideologies. This unusual 
juxtaposition indicates that democracy is also a hauntological entity, which is at once 
what is dead now and what is to come in the future. Indeed, in Specters of Marx Derrida 
oftentimes alludes to democracy in terms of democracy to come. In this regard, 
democracy is not an actual reality in the way that the conservative liberalists such as 
Francis Fukuyama insist it to be: as the most perfect form of a nation-state to defeat 
communism. To the contrary, democracy, like communism, is the spectral substance of 
history, and hence any guarantee of its triumphant realization and fulfillment in the 
present is misleading. 
Leading contemporary political philosophers have shown a tendency to construe 
the unresolved ambivalence intrinsic to modern democracy as indicative of the essential 
dynamics of “democracy to come,” as Jacques Derrida calls it. In a recently published 
collection of essays on democracy, these leading political philosophers all concur with 
Derrida’s understanding of democracy as less of a fixed or established political system 
than an undecidable potentiality: Giorgio Agamben redefines democracy as “a fiction, a 
screen set up to hide the fact that there is a void at the center”; for Alain Badiou, “there is 
no doubt that this word [democracy] remains the dominant emblem of contemporary 
political society”; Wendy Brown calls democracy “an empty signifier to which any and 
all can attach their dreams and hopes”; Jean-Luc Nancy construes democracy as “an 
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exemplary case of the loss of the power to signify … no longer capable of generating any 
problematic or serving any heuristic purpose”; Jacques Rancière asserts that “democracy, 
in the sense of the power of the people, the power of those who have no special 
entitlement to exercise power, is the very basis of what makes politics thinkable”; and 
addressing the paradoxical issue of democratic dictatorship, Slavoy Žižek contends that 
democracy is not an intrinsically impartial and democratic form of government but in 
effect “an empty frame” which always becomes class-biased and class-driven in its 
political instantiation.247 What underlies these critics’ reformulations of the nature of 
democracy is a common attention to the absent substance of present, practical forms of 
democracy. The substance of democracy is, in their view, always inscribed in the future 
tense; thus, the genuine democracy in the present exists like a haunting ghost that returns 
to the world in order to evince its oxymoronic—neither alive nor non-existent—
ontological modality.  
According to Žižek, however, “it is not sufficient to say that “pure” democracy is 
not possible” since “the crucial point is where we locate this impossibility.” Žižek 
stresses that ““[p]ure” democracy is not impossible because of some empirical inertia that 
prevents its full realization but which may be gradually abolished by democracy’s further 
development; rather, democracy is possible only on the basis of its own impossibility; its 
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limit, the irreducible “pathological remainder, is its positive condition””248 [italics in the 
original]. Žižek’s point is that the desire for democracy is directed and activated 
pathologically yet positively toward the democratization of society due to the essential 
impossibility of democracy. On the other hand, this paradoxical dynamic of social 
democratization is ascribed to what he calls “[t]he subject of democracy … in all its 
abstraction.” In other words, “democracy is a formal link of abstract individuals” in that 
democratic principles and doctrines always posit individual citizens as universally liberal 
and equal regardless of their particular identities and specific situations—especially by 
ignoring their differences and disparities; indeed, the concept and practice of democracy 
cannot be possible without the premise of individual liberty and equality; that is, the 
abstract subject of democracy is “a pure singularity, emptied of all content, freed from all 
substantial ties,”249 like an apparition devoid of substance of life.  
However, there is another unidentified, spectral yet substantial ghost who has 
always lived with us in our political life. To face the ghost allows us to unveil the way it 
haunts political realities and relations in our democracy. The intent of this dissertation has 
been to conjure up the ghost from the romances of Brown, Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville. 
The ghosts they lived with evince the spectral substances of American democracy that 
enabled its continuation through a lasting belief in its historical entity. Antebellum 
history has indeed shown that the ghost of American democracy is more than a phantasm. 
The writers’ contemporaries, who believed in their autonomous and singular agency, 
harmonious and solidifying affect, consensual and popular power—all essential 
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prerequisites for a genuine democracy—had shared, solid convictions of the substances 
of their democracy. And their substantial beliefs, in turn, enabled them to believe in the 
substances of their shared beliefs without doubts. However, as the four romancers tell us, 
these substances were in effect spectral; they were present as ideas, but absent as 
practices—though always operative in a set of enduring social desire and energy of 
democracy. 
“[H]aunting is historical,” argues Derrida, in that it comes back to our reality as 
an actual event. In this sense, the spectral substances of American democracy are 
historical as well. These substances have activated actual historical events and 
participated in the course of American history. All the expectations and enthusiasms 
about American democracy thus cannot simply be dismissed as illusions or mirages. 
Though the underlying conceptions of an individual human being as free, equal, moral, 
self-governing, and sympathizing with others for the public good and their society 
established by their rational and harmonious consent are always misleading, the feelings 
of and beliefs in—whether individual or collective—these substantial grounds of proper 
democracy make our reality bearable, fixable, and pursuable. 
“[T]he state becomes democratic, and the empire of democracy is slowly and 
peaceably introduced into the institutions and manners of the nation,” wrote Tocqueville 
in 1835. In America, he actually observed how American democracy had mobilized 
tangible political, socioeconomic, and cultural spheres—e.g., democratic townships, local 
administrations, political jurisdiction, parties, and the liberty of the press, to name a few. 
In tandem with the actual substantiation of democratic values and principles, Tocqueville 
also saw the negative workings of “the impetuosity of the feelings,” “enthusiasm,” and 
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“an ardent faith” in the scenes of social democratization in America. He expected that in 
the absence of such feelings, “great sacrifices may be obtained from the members of a 
commonwealth by an appeal to their understandings and their experience.” He also 
“conceive[d] that a society in which … the loyalty of the subject to the chief magistrate 
would not be a passion, but a quiet and rational persuasion.”250 Tocqueville was correct in 
valuing the substantial democratizations of American society, but incorrect in 
anticipating the future democracy free from feelings and faiths to preclude its fulfillment. 
As Brown, Poe, Hawthorne, Melville suggest, these feelings and faiths—always 
associated with the fantasized substances of democracy—are the very necessary 
preconditions for democracy. Therefore, we have to face this paradoxical truth, a key to 
the success and failure of democracy in America. 
In William Shakespeare’s Hamlet, which actually inspired Derrida to bring the 
notion of spectrality to philosophy, the late king’s ghost is no simulacrum devoid o 
substance. It is indeed more than a hallucination or a nonentity; in full armor he beckons, 
speaks, and orders like a real live king, causing tremendous shock and fear to those who 
face it. Thus, his son, though “a noble mind” and “scholar,” never doubts the substance—
though spectral—of his apparitional father, and “will take the revenant’s word for a 
thousand pound.” The prince Hamlet says, “[i]t is necessary to speak of the ghost, indeed 
to the ghost and with it.” For the ghost’s “haunting is historical,” according to Derrida. 
Likewise, it is necessary for us to speak of and with the ghost of historical democracy and 
its spectral substances, for they tell us the hauntology of our democracy. Indeed, the 
heterodox political ontologies of Brown, Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville enable this 
conversation by establishing a genealogy of the crucial spectral substances of democracy, 
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which foretells the essential impossibility of democracy while guaranteeing its significant 
contributions to democracy. 
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